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INTRODUCTION
In many, and perhaps most, modern punitive damages 1
t Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law
School; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1996; A.B. Duke University, 1992. I would
like to thank Rachel Barkow, Guido Calabresi, William Colby, Richard
Epstein, Jack Goldsmith, Saul Levmore, Eric Posner, Shilpa Satoskar, Cass
Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
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cases-including those involving mass torts, product liability,
consumer fraud, and insurance bad faith-the defendant
stands accused of committing an act or engaging in a course of
conduct that harmed a large number of people. In recent
decades, as this type of litigation has grown more prevalent, 2 a
curious phenomenon has emerged. The plaintiffs attorney,
although she usually represents only one (or, at most, a few) of
the many victims, will typically ask the jury to impose punitive
damages in an amount sufficient to punish the defendant not
only for harming the plaintiff, but also for the full scope of
harm that its conduct caused to all victims and all of society.
As one court has noted, "plaintiffs' lawyers argue[U to the jury
in summation.., that punitive damages should take into
account the totality of [the] defendant's wrongful conduct as to
all plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs," and that the defendant
should be punished for injuring or "'kill[ing] thousands of
people.' 3 Along these lines, the attorney will often ask the jury
Article. All errors are, of course, my own.
1. The term "punitive damages" typically refers to damages in excess of
the amount necessary to make the plaintiff whole. According to most courts,
punitive damages are imposed to punish the defendant for its wrongdoing and
to deter the defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct in the
future. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Throughout their history,
these damages have also been referred to as "exemplary damages," "punitory
damages," "vindictive damages," and "smart money," see 1 LINDA L.
SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.1(A) (4th ed.
2000), and they have been employed to serve a number of purposes, see
Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34-35 (7th Cir. 1996).
2. For a discussion of the recent upsurge in punitive damages claims in
cases of this sort, see, for example, David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in
ProductsLiability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1261 (1976); Richard A.
Seltzer, Punitive Damagesin Mass Tort Litigation:Addressing the Problems of
Fairness,Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 48-49 (1983); Note,
Developments in the Law, The Paths of Civil Litigation: Problems and
Proposalsin Punitive Damages Reform, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1783, 1783 (2000).
3. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., No. CV-87-0537, 1991 WL
4420, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1991) (reviewing and quoting plaintiffs' closing
arguments in various asbestos cases); see also, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 564
(noting plaintiffs attorney's argument that the jury should render punitive
damages in an amount that would "provide an appropriate penalty" for
harming approximately 1000 people); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F.
Supp. 1053, 1056 (D.N.J. 1989) ("[Elach jury is told how many persons have
been injured or have died or are likely to do so as the result of the defendant's
conduct. Those statistics undoubtedly play a substantial role in the jury's...
determining the amount [of punitive damages] to be imposed."), vacated in
part on reconsideration, 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1234 (D.N.J. 1989) ("The court
abides by its ruling that multiple awards of punitive damages for a single
course of conduct violate the fundamental fairness requirement of the Due
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to take away all of the defendant's profits from the entire
course of wrongful conduct, not just the profit that the
defendant derived from wrong done to the plaintiff. To take
but one example, in the notorious Ford Pinto case, "[p]laintiffs'
attorneys.., asked for a punitive award of $100 million, the
amount they estimated Ford had saved by retaining the
allegedly defective design on Pintos and other small-car models
from the time they were introduced until the federally
4
mandated standards took effect on 1977 cars."
Process Clause, but concludes that equitable and practical concerns prevent it
from fashioning a fair and effective remedy."); Ripa v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 660 A.2d 521, 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (noting
that, "in numerous other Kaylo cases, where permitted by local law, juries
have been requested to punish defendant for its alleged entire course of
conduct"); C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Peter M. Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of
Class Members Who Opt Out: Should They Survive?, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 13
(1981) ("[Elach plaintiff is normally permitted to prove that the defendant's
conduct affected numerous persons other than the plaintiff, and each jury is
urged to award punitives in an amount sufficient to deter the defendant from
the entire course of conduct."); Gordon Fairclough, California May Be
Hazardous to Big Tobacco's Health, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2001, at B1 (quoting
a member of the jury that awarded $3 billion in punitive damages to a single
smoker saying that he "thought about how many people these guys have
killed'" and that he "'thought $3 billion doesn't even begin to do justice for all
the evil they've done"); George Jonas, Just What Were They Smoking?,
NATIONAL POST, July 15, 2000, at Al (noting that, in a class action on behalf
of Florida smokers, "the plaintiffs asked for an additional US$196 billion from
the tobacco companies as punitive damages" because "[aifter all, they argued,
the product kills 430,000 Americans a year"); Myron Levin & Dalondo
Moultrie, L.A. Jury Awards $3 Billion to Smoker Courts: Panel Orders Philip
Morris to Pay Record Damages to Man with Incurable Cancer, Saying Firm
Hid Risks, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at Al (quoting Richard Daynard, head of
the anti-tobacco industry Tobacco Products Liability Project, as suggesting
that the $3 billion award to a single smoker "shows what happens when a jury
tries to... punish companies that are responsible for killing hundreds of
thousands of their customers each year ....
I mean, what is the proper
punishment for that behavior?"); Rafael A. Olmeda, Foreman Recalls Duty,
Friendships Forged Lost Lives Guided Verdict, He Says, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), July 16, 2000, at 15A, available at 2000 WL 22185376 (quoting a
member of the jury that awarded $145 billion in punitive damages in Florida
class action as saying that "[pleople will focus on the billions of dollars we
think they should pay ....
[b]ut they'll forget the millions of lives that have
been lost because of this product").
4. Roy J. Harris, Jr., Why the Pinto Jury Felt FordDeserved $125 Million
Penalty, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at 1 (discussing Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 197761-199397, 1978 WL 74251 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1978)).
Similarly, plaintiffs counsel in another case against Ford Motor Company
based his argument for a $58 million punitive award on the following
calculations:
[Tiake that number, that Eighty-three Dollars ($83.00) a unit that we
know they saved, that two and a half percent of that additional profit
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As this form of jury argument has grown commonplace,
many courts-giving the matter little or no thought-have
explicitly endorsed the principle that the defendant should be
punished not only for the harm that it caused to the plaintiff,
but also for the harm that it caused to others,5 and that the
punitive "award should not only take away any profit realized
from the single sale to the plaintiff, but also the profits realized
from other such sales of the defective product to others."6

that Ford made, and multiply it times the 468,000 units they
anticipated. And I did the math last night and it is Thirty-eight
Million Nine
Hundred
and
Forty-Four
Thousand
dollars
($38,944,000) ....
The other way [to compute punitive damages] is to
take that same number times the number of vehicles that they
actually sold and say to Ford Motor Company, "we are going to take
away from you this time, so you never do this again, the profit that
you should not have earned on the Bronco II. We're going to take it
away from you.' [sic] Fifty-eight Million One Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($58,100,000).
Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539, 561 n.22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999);
see also Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 50 (Alaska 1979) (Burke, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the jury's award was designed to take away the
defendant's profits from all sales of its defective product), on reh'g, 615 P.2d
621 (Alaska 1980); Andrew C. Clausen & Annette M. Carwie, Problems
Applying the Life of Georgia v. Johnson Case in the Product Liability Setting,
58 ALA. LAW. 46, 49 (1997) (noting that, in product liability cases, plaintiffs'
lawyers will typically argue that the punitive award must be large enough to
take away the profit gained from all sales of the defective product).
5. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 584 (indicating that the state may punish
the defendant for the harm that it caused to all in-state consumers); Kirkland
v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (declaring that
"punitive damages serve the collective good by deterring a public wrong and
punishing egregious wrongdoing on the part of the defendant; the award is
measured to reflect, not the wrong done to a single individual, but the
wrongfulness of the conduct as a whole"); Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp.,
77 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 1996) (indicating that, in many circumstances, a
plaintiffs "potential punitive damages would be to punish and deter the course
of conduct as a whole"), overruled on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot,
Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63
F.3d 1326, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that each victim has a right to
punitive damages designed to punish the total harm to society), overruled on
other grounds by H&D Tire & Automotive-Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes
Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2000); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2001 WL 1246676, at *11 (Utah 2001) (upholding $145
million punitive verdict on the ground that "[elven if the harm to the
[plaintiffs] can be appropriately characterized as minimal, the trial court's
assessment of the situation is on target: 'The harm is minor to the individual
but massive in the aggregate' (quoting the trial court)), cert. granted, 122 S.
Ct. 2326 (2002).
6. Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1983); see
also, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that a goal of
punitive damages is to remove the profit derived from the full scope of the
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This practice of punishing the defendant, in a single case
brought by a single victim, for the full scope of societal harm
caused by its entire course of wrongful conduct-which I will
refer to as awarding "total harm" punitive damages-has led
countless judges and commentators to worry about the
potential for excessive multiple punishment: the possibility
that several victims will obtain punitive damages awards that
were each designed to punish the entire wrongful scheme,
resulting in unjustly high cumulative punishment. Thus,
numerous cases and articles have wrestled with the question of
whether and in what circumstances a state may subject a
defendant to multiple punitive damages awards for the same
conduct. 7 Ever since Judge Friendly first identified this
problem in a landmark 1967 opinion,8 it is fair to say that it
has been the single most discussed and debated issue in the
law of punitive damages (and indeed one of the most hotly
contested issues in all of tort law), spawning scores of cases and
law review articles, along with numerous congressional
Most
hearings and proposals for legislative reform. 9
commentators (though not yet most courts'0) agree that it
illegal activity); BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 514 (Ala. 1997)
(examining whether the award removed all of the defendant's profit, and
whether the award was in excess of the profit so that the defendant realized a
loss); Thompson v. Dalton, 520 P.2d 240, 245 (Idaho 1974) (holding that, in
"cases involving deceptive business schemes operated for profit and often
victimizing numerous members of the public aside from the plaintiff," the
punitive damages award should "serve[ to remove the profit factor from the
whole scheme"); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah 1993)
(discussing the propriety of awarding punitive damages designed to remove
the profit from the entire wrongful scheme).
7. See infra Part VI.A.
8. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-41 (2d Cir.
1967).
9. See infra Part VI.A.
10. See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(collecting cases rejecting the constitutional claim and summarizing their
reasoning); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 48-50
(Tex. 1998) (same); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Propriety of Awarding
Punitive Damages to Separate Plaintiffs Bringing Successive Actions Arising
Out of Common Incident or Circumstances Against Common Defendant or
Defendants ('One Bite" or "FirstComer" Doctrine), 11 A.L.R.4th 1261, 1262
(1982) (noting that courts "have generally held that no principle exists which
prohibits a plaintiff from recovering punitive damages against a defendant or
defendants simply because punitive damages have previously been awarded
against the same defendant or defendants for the same conduct"). But see
Malone, 972 S.W.2d at 50-51 (collecting cases holding and suggesting, in dicta,
that the multiple punishment problem is of constitutional dimension, at least
where the total amount of punitive damages exceeds the amount necessary to
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would be unconstitutional-or at least very bad1 '-to subject a
defendant to multiple punitive damages awards for the same
course of conduct where those awards, in combination, exceed
the amount necessary to vindicate the state's legitimate
interest in punishing and deterring the entire course of tortious
activity. 12 These commentators have proposed a litany of
possible reforms to our tort system aimed at preventing
excessive multiple punishment. 3
In my opinion, however, courts and commentators have
been asking the wrong question altogether.
The better
question-one that has, to this point, been ignored in the
literature and the case law-is a more fundamental one. We
should be asking not whether the practice of awarding "total
harm" punitive damages in each individual case can sometimes
lead to unconstitutionalresults, but rather whether the practice
is itself unconstitutional. That is, we should ask whether it is
ever permissible, in circumstances in which the defendant's
achieve the state's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence); infra
note 257.
11. Quoting a trial judge, one commentator noted, "'Perhaps this would
not be unconstitutional. It would be worse than that. It would be unjust."'
Alan Schulkin, Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1797, 1799 n.10 (1979) (quoting Ostopowitz v. Wm.S. Merrell
Co., No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Westchester County Jan. 11, 1967)); see also,
e.g., Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 840-41 (arguing that excessive multiple
punishment "may not add up to a denial of due process," but may "do more
harm than good").
12. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (1986) (suggesting that multiple
punishment is "arguably unconstitutional"); Dennis N. Jones et al., Multiple
Punitive DamagesAwards for a Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need
for a National Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991)
("[Alt some point the aggregate amount of multiple punitive damages becomes
fundamentally unfair, in violation of the Due Process Clause." (citations
omitted)); Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts and Punitive Damages:A Comment,
39 VILL. L. REV. 415, 422-23 (1994) (arguing that, with regard to multiple
punitive damages awards, the core principle of double jeopardy is included in
the Due Process guarantee). But see Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive
Damage Awards, 39 VILL. L. REV. 433, 437-38 (1994) (arguing that "there is
no inherent due process problem arising out of multiple punitive damages
awards for the same course of conduct, because each of the claimants has been
separately injured and, therefore, each may justly claim retribution from the
defendant"). Phillips's assertion is true, but misleading. The problem with
multiple punitive damages awards for the same course of conduct is not that
more than one plaintiff can recover punitive damages awards for harm
directed at a large number of people; it is that more than one plaintiff can
recover punitive damages calculated by reference to the entire scope of the
harm, not merely the harm caused to the plaintiff.
13. See infra Part VI.A.
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conduct harmed more than one person, to award in a case
brought by a single victim punitive damages in an amount that
is intended to punish the defendant's entire course of conduct,
or whether, instead, the law limits each plaintiffs recovery to
the amount necessary to punish the defendant only for the
harm done to the individual plaintiff. If the latter is true, then
the question that has consumed the literature and the
judiciary-whether and in what circumstances it is permissible
to allow more than one award designed to punish the entire
course of conduct-is essentially moot.
This Article seeks to answer the deeper question. In the
course of doing so, it delves into the history and theoretical
underpinnings of the punitive damages doctrine, and
ultimately rejects not only the practice of awarding "total
harm" punitive damages, but also the entire modern
understanding of punitive damages as punishment for public
wrongs upon which that practice is based.
In Part I, I use the facts of BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Supreme Court's leading punitive damages
Gore14-the
decision-to illustrate the proposition that the practice of
awarding "total harm" punitive damages, even in a single case,
is potentially unfair to the defendant in a number of significant
ways. Remarkably, however, this unfairness has escaped the
notice of courts and commentators, who have instead expressed
concern with "total harm" punitive damages only to the extent
that more than one such award presents the possibility of
unjust multiple punishment for the same course of conduct.
Part II offers an explanation for the absence of these
arguments from the case law and the literature: They are
obscured by the conventional theoretical account of punitive
damages. That account-which prevails in both the judicial
and the academic arenas-treats punitive damages as
punishment for public, societal wrongs, as a sort of anomalous,
privately enforced form of criminal law that stands as a unique
exception to the general rule that the courts may not punish
public wrongs without affording criminal procedural
safeguards.' 5 In this conceptual light, "total harm" punitive
damages-which are measured by the extent of the harm to
society-make perfect sense. Because the Supreme Court has

14. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The issue of multiple punishment was raised but
not decided in Gore. See id. at 612 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 62-71.

590

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:583

repeatedly rejected the argument that punitive damages are
per se unconstitutional,1 6 there would seem to be no room left to
challenge any form of unfairness that inheres in them.
Part II goes on to explain that, although this modern
conception of punitive damages as punishment for public
wrongs is ubiquitous, it is strikingly inadequate as a
descriptive matter. Many of the bedrock principles of punitive
damages law-such as the rule that the plaintiff must prevail
on an underlying civil cause of action in order to recover
punitive damages, the requirement that the amount of punitive
damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of
compensatory damages, and the fact that the punitive damages
are paid to the plaintiff-are impossible to reconcile with an
understanding of punitive damages as punishment for public
wrongs.
In Part III, I challenge the historical accuracy of the
modern theoretical account of punitive damages as punishment
for a wrong to society. In fact, historically, courts understood
punitive damages to be punishment not for the wrongful act
(and all societal consequences thereof), but rather for the
distinct legal wrong done to the individual plaintiff. Although
the multiple punishment problem rarely came up-in the days
before mass torts, the vast majority of punitive damages cases
involved acts that harmed only a single person 17-in the
occasional instances in which the issue did arise, the courts
resolved it not by precluding the second victim from receiving
punitive damages or by placing a limit on the total amount of
punitive damages awarded to the two victims, but rather by
ensuring that each punitive damages award was designed to
punish only the wrong done to the plaintiff, not the harm that
the same act may have caused to other persons not before the
court. 18
Part III further contends that this historical
understanding of punitive damages provides an explanation for
the aspects of modern punitive damages doctrine that seem
irreconcilable with the modern conception of punitive damages
as punishment for public wrongs.
In Part IV, I explain that punitive damages owe their
tenuous constitutionality exclusively to their historical
pedigree. Courts avoided early constitutional challenges to the
16.

See infra Part IV; infra note 72.

17.

See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.3d 832, 838 (2d Cir.

1967).
18.

See infra text accompanying notes 136-62.
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institution of punitive damages only by pointing to its long
history of judicial acceptance, and by explicitly relying on the
fact that punitive damages punish only private wrongs; the
courts recognized that punishment for public wrongs could not
be imposed in the absence of criminal procedural safeguards. 19
Thus, to reconceptualize punitive damages as punishment for
the harm to society (as courts have uncritically done in recent
years) is to all but concede their unconstitutionality.
Part V argues that "total harm" punitive damages are
unconstitutional under the constitutionally mandated historical
conception of punitive damages as punishment for individual
wrongs. Indeed, "total harm" punitive damages owe their
entire existence to the (mistaken) notion that punitive damages
are intended to punish the wrong done to society, rather than
the wrong to the individual victim. If punitive damages must
instead be understood as punishment for private wrongs, due
process generally forbids their imposition for the wrongs done
to third parties. Rather, to withstand constitutional scrutiny,
all punitive damages awards must be designed (and limited to
the amount necessary) to punish the defendant only for the
wrong done, and the harm caused, to the individual plaintiff or
plaintiffs before the court.
Finally, Part VI offers a means of curing this constitutional
infirmity by ensuring that each punitive damages award
punishes only the individual, private wrong. To be sure, this
principle cannot be vindicated without working a significant
change in modern punitive damages practice. Unlike most tort
reform proposals that have been advanced by commentators
seeking to solve the multiple punishment problem-many of
whom are seemingly motivated more by base politics than by a
genuine concern for constitutional rights-this change does not
require legislation or a radical restructuring of the tort system.
Nor does it constitute a revolutionary break from traditional
practices. In fact, the exact opposite is true; the constitutional
solution to the problems presented by the practice of awarding
punitive damages in cases where the defendant's conduct
harmed more than one person lies in a return to the traditional
understanding of punitive damages as punishment for
individual wrongs.

19.

See infra text accompanying notes 247-53.
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I. THE POTENTIAL UNFAIRNESS OF AWARDING "TOTAL
HARM" PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO A SINGLE VICTIMMULTIPLE PUNISHMENT AND BEYOND
The facts of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the
Supreme Court's leading punitive damages decision, provide a
useful means of illustrating the proposition that there are
serious questions about the fairness of awarding "total harm"
punitive damages in even a single case-questions that are
significant enough that it is surprising to find the
courts
20
routinely awarding these damages without reflection.
In Gore, the plaintiff, Dr. Gore, purchased a new BMW
sports sedan that, unbeknownst to him, had suffered paint
damage during transport to the United States and therefore
had to be repainted in America prior to sale. 2 1 When Dr. Gore
discovered the undisclosed repainting, he brought suit against

20. Of course, the term "fairness" can refer to a number of different
concepts. Some writers define the term primarily in procedural terms,
focusing on the necessity of affording the defendant the opportunity to present
an adequate defense. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness:
Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646 (1985). Others
take a more substantive view of fairness in tort law, focusing, for instance, on
the necessity of producing results that accord with traditional conceptions of
corrective justice-a concept that in its most crude form can be reduced to
ensuring that all victims are fully compensated by the injurer for their losses.
See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
15, 15-27 (1995); Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in
Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 191-206 (1981); Richard
W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 627 (1992).
Still others concern themselves with the substantive notion of retributive
justice-ensuring that wrongdoers are punished and that the punishment fits
the crime. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114
HARV. L. REV. 961, 1228 (2001) ("The central notion of fairness that is
employed as a justification for punishment is usually referred to as retributive
justice."); id. at 1228-36 (summarizing the literature of retributive justice).
Finally, some writers view the fairness of punitive damages in terms of
substantive distributive justice, a term that they are using not in the
Aristotelian sense of ensuring a fair distribution of resources throughout all of
society (rather than among a limited number people as the result of a specific
transaction), see Wright, supra, at 691-92, 702, or in the Rawlsian sense of
proceeding from distributively fair first principles, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 60-65 (1971), but rather in the less theorized sense of ensuring a
fair division of punitive damages awards among victims, see, e.g., Laura J.
Hines, Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages in Class Actions, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 889, 896 (2001); Joan Steinman, ManagingPunitive Damages:
A Role for Mandatory "Limited Generosity" Classes and Anti-Suit Injunctions?,
36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1043, 1065 (2001). Whatever conception of fairness
one chooses, "total harm" punitive damages pose legitimate questions.
21. See 517 U.S. at 563 & n.1.
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BMW for fraud, ultimately recovering $4000 in compensatory
damages-the difference in value between a repainted BMW
and a new vehicle with its original paint job intact 22-and $4
million in punitive damages. The jury arrived at the latter
figure by multiplying the actual harm associated with
repainting a BMW ($4000) by the approximate number of
repainted vehicles that BMW had resold nationwide (1000). As
the Supreme Court explained, "Using the actual damage
estimate of $4,000 per vehicle, Dr. Gore argued that a punitive
award of $4 million would provide an appropriate penalty for
selling approximately 1,000 cars for more than they were
23
worth."
Dr. Gore was not the first BMW purchaser to bring suit on
these grounds, 24 but he was the first to win a punitive damages
award, and quite a sizable one at that. In the aftermath of the
jury's verdict, many of the owners of the other 1000 repainted
BMWs brought their own lawsuits, 25 motivated, one speculates,
less by outrage over what BMW had done to them than by the
enticing prospect of obtaining their own multi-million dollar
punitive damages awards. Although there is no indication that
any of those cases proceeded to judgment, it is surely worth
asking what would have happened if a jury had found BMW
liable to another purchaser. That second purchaser would
likely have made a similar demand for $4 million in punitive
damages, notwithstanding the fact that the first punitive
award was explicitly calculated to provide adequate
punishment for BMWs entire course of conduct in failing to
disclose its repainting. In addition, if there were a third and
fourth successful purchaser plaintiff, they too would have
sought $4 million each in punitive damages. All told, if all
1000 BMW owners had brought successful suits, each owner
demanding and receiving punitive damages designed to punish
BMW for "selling approximately 1,000 cars for more than they
were worth,"26 BMW would have faced punitive judgments
totaling a staggering $4 billion, even though each jury had
agreed that a comparatively meager $4 million was adequate to
punish BMW in full for its wrongdoing and to completely deter
22. See id. at 563-64.
23. Id. at 564.
24. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 626 & n.4 (Ala.
1994).
25. See id.
26. Gore, 517 U.S. at 564.
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Numerous
it from making the same mistake again. 27
piling on,
commentators have bemoaned this risk of unfair
28
dubbing it the "multiple punishment" problem.
There is a simple and obvious remedy for this injustice:
Whenever a punitive damages award is calculated by reference
to the total harm caused by the defendant's actions, the law
could preclude subsequent plaintiffs from receiving additional
punitive damages awards. More than a handful of courts and
commentators have advocated the adoption of a rule such as
29
this.
In propounding this tantalizingly simple solution, however,
these courts and commentators have failed to recognize that
there may be more to the unfairness of "total harm" punitive
damages awards than just the multiple punishment problem.
To begin with, this solution might often be unfair to many
potential plaintiffs. It may not seem inherently unjust to
preclude some plaintiffs from receiving punitive damagesafter all, because these damages exceed the amount necessary
to achieve full compensation, it is universally recognized that a
plaintiff has no entitlement to them. 30 There is, however,
something unfair about awarding all of the punitive damages to
a single victim, 3 1 especially in circumstances in which each
27. Such a result would be unfair as a matter of retributive justice (see
supra note 20): The total punishment would be 1000 times greater than the
amount deemed appropriate by each of the jurors and would be far in excess of
anyone's notion of a fitting sanction. What is more, even if none of these other
cases proceeded to judgment, it is possible that this unfairness still manifested
itself in the form of higher settlements to the plaintiffs, who no doubt wielded
the Gore punitive damages award in settlement negotiations.
28. See infra Part VI.A.
29. See infra Part VI.A.
30. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,.52 (1983). The Smith Court
explained that, under common law tort principles,
punitive damages.., are never awarded as of right, no matter how
egregious the defendant's conduct. "If the plaintiff proves sufficiently
serious misconduct on the defendant's part, the question whether to
award punitive damages is left to the jury, which may or may not
make such an award." Compensatory damages, by contrast, are
mandatory; once liability is found, the jury is required to award
compensatory damages in an amount appropriate to compensate the
plaintiff for his loss.
Id. (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 204 (1973)) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
31. Because there is no entitlement to punitive damages, and because
these damages by definition exceed the amount necessary to fully compensate
the plaintiff, allowing only one plaintiff to recover all of the punitive damages
does not inherently violate notions of corrective justice. Still, it may be unfair
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victim's potential compensatory damages are probably too low
to justify bringing legal action. Consider Gore. If the simple
solution were adopted, once Dr. Gore received his verdict, there
would be no incentive for any of the other plaintiffs to pursue
their cases. No rational attorney would be willing to file a
costly and complex lawsuit against a large corporation that
could yield no punitive damages and only minimal
compensatory damages (and hence a nominal award of
attorney's fees). As such, the other victims of BMW's conduct
would not only be denied a piece of the punitive pie, they would
also end up without any compensation at all for their injuries.
It may be difficult to feel sorry for a bunch of barely wronged
BMW owners, but the fact remains that the simple solution
would have the practical effect of leaving hundreds of victims
wholly uncompensated while making one lucky victim (who
suffered only $4000 worth of actual damages) a multimillionaire.
This hardly seems like a fair and sensible
32
allocation of damages.
More significantly, at the other end of the damages
spectrum, where the degree of harm is enormous (and the
plaintiffs much more worthy of sympathy), the simple solution
would again run the risk of leaving most victims
uncompensated. Consider, for instance, a mass toxic tortperhaps a wanton decision by a cut-rate chemical company to
ignore federal safety rules, resulting in the contamination of a
local water table and the deaths of thousands of people. In
those circumstances, the first plaintiff (or first several
plaintiffs), if allowed to receive punitive damages calculated by
reference to the full scope of the harm visited upon all of the
victims, might well recover so much money in punitive
damages as to bankrupt the defendant, thus once again
denying subsequent plaintiffs not only punitive damages, but
also the opportunity to receive any compensation whatsoever
33
for their injuries.
as a matter of distributive justice. See supra note 20.
32. Indeed, it would seem to violate principles of both corrective and
distributive justice. See supra note 20.

33. Numerous courts and commentators have recognized this problem.
See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1398-99 (3d Cir. 1993) (Wies, J.,
dissenting); Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through

National Punitive Damage Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573, 1607 (1997).
Some writers have argued that this claim is overstated-that the prospect of
bankruptcy as a result of excessive punitive damages awards is more
theoretical than real. See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 838
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More importantly for present purposes, this simple
solution may also be unfair to defendants, insofar as it would
do nothing to ameliorate. a deeper potential unfairness in our
current system of awarding punitive damages-that which
inheres in the practice of punishing defendants for the harm
allegedly caused to an entire mass of people in a lawsuit
brought by only one person. When a defendant engages in a
course of conduct that allegedly harms a large number of
people, many of the alleged victims, if they bring their own
lawsuits, will not prevail, or perhaps will be unable to convince
the jury that the defendant's conduct was sufficiently malicious
to warrant the imposition of punitive damages. 34 Imagine, for
instance, a trumped-up product liability case allegedly affecting
1000 victims in which the question of liability (or of liability for
punitive damages) is extremely tenuous, perhaps because of
highly questionable evidence regarding inadequate warnings,
causation, or knowledge. The defendant, who may indeed be
innocent of actual wrongdoing, might prevail in the first fifty,
or even 950 lawsuits, but lose a single case to a very
sympathetic plaintiff with an unusually gifted attorney, and
still be forced to pay a crippling sum as punishment for the
harm done to all 1000 alleged victims, most of whom had
35
already been unable to prevail in their own lawsuits.
n.15 (3d Cir. 1983); Cynthia R. Mabry, Warning! The Manufacturer of This
Product May Have Engaged in Cover-Ups, Lies, and Concealment:Making the
Case for Limitless Punitive Awards in ProductLiability Lawsuits, 73 IND. L.J.
187, 203 (1997); Owen, supra note 2, at 1324-25. This concern may often be
overstated, but it is not entirely invalid; it is a fact that a number of
companies have entered into bankruptcy in the midst of mass tort litigation.
See Margaret M. Cordray, The Limits of State Sovereignty and the Issue of
Multiple Punitive DamagesAwards, 78 OR. L. REV. 275, 287 n.41 (1999).
34.

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].

Prosser

and Keeton explain that
[slomething more than the mere commission of a tort is always
required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or
evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and
deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be
called wilful or wanton.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. This is potentially unfair in the procedural sense-it forces the
defendant to defend over and over again against allegations seeking the same
"total harm" punitive damages for the wrong done to all 1000 victims-and
also in the substantive, retributive sense-it greatly increases the chances
that the defendant will be punished for harms for which it was not legally
responsible. See supra note 20.
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In the criminal context, this unfairness is obviated by the
law of double jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause "serves
the function of preventing both successive punishment and
successive prosecution." 36 It "protects against more than the
actual imposition of two punishments for the same offense; by
its terms, it protects a criminal defendant from being twice put
in jeopardy for such punishment." 37 In the civil law, where the
Double Jeopardy Clause has no application to litigation
between private parties,3 8 the fear of unfair multiple bites at
the same apple generally finds expression in the doctrine of res
judicata. 39 Among "'the policies underlying res judicata"' is
"'the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of twice
40
defending a suit.'
Of course, because it can only be applied to bind litigants
that were actually parties to the prior dispute,4 res judicata
has no direct role to play where different plaintiffs are seeking
the same punitive damages. Still, the Supreme Court has
noted that, even where "the technical rules of preclusion are
not strictly applicable, the principles upon which these rules
are founded should inform" judicial decision making, because
the principle that a defendant should be spared "'the expense
and vexation attending multiple lawsuits"' is "a fundamental
precept of common-law adjudication." 42 Where a second
plaintiff seeks to recover the exact same "total harm" punitive
damages that were unsuccessfully sought by the first plaintiff
(as opposed to each plaintiff seeking only damages sufficient to
punish the wrong done to the individual victim), from the point

36. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1995).
37. Id. at 396.
38. See Browning-Ferris Indus. ofVt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
276 n.21 (1989) ("'The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not

triggered by litigation between private parties."' (quoting United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989))).

39. See Kennedy v. Washington, 986 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Posner, J.) ("[D]ouble jeopardy is the criminal counterpart of the civil doctrine
of res judicata ....).
40. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (quoting United States
v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 432 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations

omitted)); see also, e.g., Jackson v. N. Bank Towing Corp., 213 F.3d 885, 889
(5th Cir. 2000) ("The purpose [of res judicata] is to 'foster judicial efficiency

and protect the defendants from multiple lawsuits."' (quoting Fine v. Reg'l
Transit Auth., 676 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (La. Ct. App. 1996))).
41.

See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 800-01 (1996).

42. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983) (quoting Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)).
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of view of the defendant, the situation is no different from the
same plaintiff bringing two successive causes of action-the
very essence of the unfairness sought to be remedied by res
43
judicata.
Indeed, the Court has refused to allow precisely this type of
unfairness in developing the law of collateral estoppel, "an
aspect of the broader doctrine of res judicata."44 In Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore,45 the Court considered the viability of the
doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel, pursuant
to which a plaintiff who was not a party to a prior lawsuit may
nonetheless use the judgment in the earlier suit to prevent the
defendant from re-litigating issues that were resolved against
it in the prior proceeding. The Court held that a plaintiff may
not bind the defendant in this way whenever doing so "would
be unfair to a defendant."46 Such unfairness would be present
if, inter alia, "the judgment relied upon as a basis for the
estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous
judgments in favor of the defendant."4 7 The Court explained,
In Professor Currie's familiar example, a railroad collision injures 50
passengers all of whom bring separate actions against the railroad.

After the railroad wins the first 25 suits, a plaintiff wins in suit
so
26.... [O]ffensive use of collateral estoppel should not be applied
48
as to allow plaintiffs 27 through 50 automatically to recover.

Even if it were the first plaintiff that was successful, it still
arguably would be unfair to allow subsequent plaintiffs to
invoke collateral estoppel. The landmark article upon which
the Court principally relied in delineating the boundaries of
fairness in this situation explains that
[i]f we are unwilling to treat the judgment against the railroad as res

judicata when it is the last of a series, all of which except the last
43. Cf. Wieberg v. GTE Southwest, Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2001)
(noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a), which requires that "[elvery action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest"-that is, in the name of

the person holding the substantive right sought to be enforced, and not
necessarily the person who will ultimately benefit from the recovery-is
intended "'to assure a defendant that a judgment will be final and that res
judicata will protect it from having to twice defend an action, once against an
ultimate beneficiary of a right and then against the actual holder of the
substantive right' (quoting Farrell Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 896 F.2d
136, 150 (5th Cir. 1990))).
44.
45.

Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958) (emphasis omitted).
439 U.S. 322 (1979).

46. Id. at 331.
47. Id. at 330.
48. Id. at 330-31 n.14 (citing Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 304 (1957)).
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were favorable to the railroad, it must follow that we should also be
unwilling to treat an adverse judgment as res judicata even though it
was rendered in the first action brought, and is the only one of record.
Our aversion to the twenty-sixth judgment as a conclusive
adjudication stems largely from the feeling that such a judgment in
such a series must be an aberration, but we have no warrant for
assuming that the aberrational judgment will not come as the first in
the series. Indeed, [because the plaintiffs attorneys will tend to bring
the most sympathetic case first, and do so in the forum most hostile to
the defendant,] the judgment first rendered will be the one least
likely to represent an unprejudiced finding after a full and fair
hearing.49

Again, from the point of view of the defendant, there is no
difference between allowing subsequent plaintiffs to preclude
the defendant from re-litigating the issue of liability for
punitive damages and allowing the first successful plaintiff to
collect punitive damages for the harm caused to all of the
victims. Either way, the defendant is punished for the harm
allegedly done to all of the victims in circumstances in which
most of the other alleged victims, had they been given the
opportunity to pursue their own punitive damages claims,
would have been unsuccessful.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore is illustrative of these
points as well. When BMW sold its repainted vehicle to Dr.
Gore, approximately half of the states had enacted statutes
defining the obligations of automobile manufacturers to
disclose pre-sale repairs. 50
Those statutes required a
manufacturer to disclose such repairs only if their cost
exceeded a certain percentage-which varied from state to
state-of the manufacturer's suggested retail price. 5 1 Relying
on these laws, BMW adopted a national policy pursuant to
which it disclosed all pre-sale repairs with a cost exceeding
three percent of the vehicle's suggested retail price-the most
stringent of the state standards. 52 Since the cost of repainting
Dr. Gore's vehicle was significantly less than three percent of
its retail price, BMW did not disclose the repair.5 3 No statute
anywhere in America required it to do so, and the practice of
not doing so had, to that point, never been held to constitute
54
fraud or otherwise been adjudged unlawful in a court of law.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Currie, supra note 48, at 289.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 565 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 563-65.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565.
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Thus, BMW had an argument that, for better or for worse,
might well have resonated with many jurors that its decision
makers made every effort to. comply with the law and had no
idea that they were doing anything wrong.
In these circumstances, it would not be at all surprising for
BMW to win some, perhaps even most, lawsuits brought by
persons in Dr. Gore's position. Moreover, even in those cases in
which BMW is found liable, the jury might well find that
BMW's conduct was not so wanton or malicious as to warrant
punitive damages. Indeed, a few months before Dr. Gore's
trial, his attorney tried a case on behalf of another purchaser of
a repainted BMW, one Dr. Yates, seeking essentially the same
punitive damages. 55 The jury declined to award them. 56 Still,
because a single plaintiff was able to prevail and to convince
the jury of punitive liability in a single action, BMW was forced
to pay punitive damages in an amount that, in the Supreme
Court's words, "would provide an appropriate penalty for
selling approximately 1,000 cars for more than they were
worth."57 Included in those 1000 punished sales was the sale to
Dr. Yates, who had been unable to convince a jury to award
punitive damages in his own case.
Finally, there is yet another aspect of unfairness to the
defendant that arguably inheres in even a single "total harm"
punitive damages award. Such an award fails to consider the
possibility that many of the alleged victims might have been
unable to prevail (or to recover punitive damages) due not to
the tenuous nature of the general case against the defendant,
but rather to the specific circumstances of their individual
claims.
For instance, it is often the case that the
blameworthiness of the defendant's actions varies among
particular victims. In product liability cases, for example, a
defendant's conduct toward customers who purchased its
product at a time when the defendant knew and concealed
evidence that the product was defective is far more culpable
than its conduct toward customers who purchased the product
either before the company was aware of the defect or after the
dangers associated with the product became common
knowledge.
Similarly, where a defendant is accused of
engaging in a course of fraudulent conduct, its actions toward
55. See id. at 565 & n.8.
56. See Yates v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 642 So. 2d 937, 938 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993).
57. Gore, 517 U.S. at 564.
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some victims may be far more reprehensible than its actions
toward others. A bogus telephone psychic, for example,
commits a much more culpable act by telling a desperate and
exploitable victim of domestic violence that, according to the
stars, her abuser will change his ways, than by telling a
lovelorn college student that someday he will meet a tall, dark
stranger. Thus, even if the defendant's conduct toward one
plaintiff calls for punitive damages, it may not follow that the
defendant should be punished (or punished to the same degree)
for the wrongs done to all of those who were harmed by its
actions.
What is more, even apart from the differences in the
defendant's behavior and culpability toward individual victims,
"total harm" punitive damages fail to account for the possibility
that many of the victims may not have been able to establish
specific elements-or that the defendant may have been able to
establish unique affirmative defenses-related to their
individual claims. That is to say, even if the defendant was
guilty of wrongdoing, many of the potential plaintiffs may not
have been legal "victims" at all. Perhaps they suffered no
actual injury, 58 or their injuries were preexisting and were not
caused by the defendant, or they voluntarily and consciously
assumed the risk of harm, or their injuries were predominantly
their own fault, or they waited too long to pursue legal action,
et cetera. By allowing the first plaintiff to receive "total harm"
punitive damages, the court would be punishing the defendant
for allegedly wronging all of these individuals without affording
the defendant any opportunity to raise or prove victim-specific
59
issues and defenses.
Here again, Gore is instructive. Even beyond the tenuous
nature of the general case for fraud and punitive liability, it is
quite possible that, for various reasons relating to the specifics
of their individual cases, many of the 1000 alleged victims
would have been unable to prevail in their underlying fraud
actions. Maybe some of them were automobile aficionados who
had been able to tell that their car had been repainted, and

58. To return to the telephone psychic example, many customers may
have called up purely for kicks, or on a dare, without believing in the
defendant's alleged psychic powers at all.
59. This is quintessentially unfair in the procedural sense of the term,
and, by punishing the defendant for wrongs for which it was not legally
responsible, it will likely produce substantive unfairness as well. See supra
note 20.
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therefore were not misled. Others might have suffered no
damages-perhaps because they had already put their BMWs
through so much wear and tear that the repainting no longer
affected their resale value, or maybe they had already totaled
them, or donated them to charity. Still others might have
discovered the undisclosed painting several years earlier and
chosen not to pursue legal action, so that they would be barred
from filing suit by the statute of limitations. Still, because Dr.
Gore happened to prevail in his action (in which the specifics of
the other alleged victims' cases were not at issue), BMW was
punished for all of these sales without being given the
opportunity to show that many of them were not legally
wrongful.
II. MODERN THEORETICAL (MIS)CONCEPTIONS OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Whether or not the foregoing fairness arguments would
support a successful due process claim, 60 it is at least clear that
there are substantial arguments against even a single award of
"total harm" punitive damages, arguments with which one
would expect the courts to be grappling. Yet the judiciary and
the academy have not even acknowledged these arguments, let
alone rejected them. 61 The only potential unfairness in the
practice of awarding "total harm" punitive damages that has
provoked debate is the multiple punishment problem, which
arises only upon a second or successive such award.
What explains the fact that these seemingly weighty
concerns have flown under the judicial and academic radar
screen? The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that they are
obscured by the modern theoretical conception of punitive

60. Cf England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 429 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("But res judicata is not a constitutional principle; it
has no higher dignity than the principle we announce today." (emphasis
omitted)).
61. The only exception is the insightful work of Andrew L. Frey and Evan
M. Tager, veteran litigators of punitive damages issues in the Supreme Court.
In a single page of discussion, which does not contain any historical or
constitutional analysis, Frey and Tager briefly note one of the forms of
unfairness discussed above--"the situation in which the defendant is
exonerated in several cases, but punished for the full impact of its conduct in
one or a few cases"-and for that reason propose the abolition of "total harm"

punitive damages. Andrew L. Frey & Evan M. Tager, Punitive Damages, in 3
BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS 307, 322 (Robert
L. Haig, ed., 1998).
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damages as punishment for public wrongs.
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS PUNISHMENT FOR PUBLIC WRONGS

The very existence of the multiple punishment problem as
a topic for academic debate necessarily relies upon a
fundamental, unspoken assumption. Take, for instance, this
oft-quoted passage penned by Judge Weinstein in the course of
certifying a nationwide punitive damages class action in the
Agent Orange litigation:
It is axiomatic that the purpose of punitive damages is not to
compensate plaintiffs for their injury, but to punish defendants for
their wrongdoing. In theory, therefore, when a plaintiff recovers
punitive damages against a defendant, that represents a finding by
the jury that the defendant was sufficiently punished for the wrongful
conduct. There must, therefore, be some limit, either as a matter of
policy or as a matter of due process, to the amount
of times
62
defendants may be punished for a single transaction.

Judge Weinstein is assuming that the point of a punitive
damages award is to fully punish the defendant for its wrongful
conduct. He is assuming, in other words, that punitive
damages are, by their very nature, intended to punish the
defendant for the "total harm" that its actions caused.
That Judge Weinstein and others would make this
uncritical assumption about the nature and purpose of punitive
damages is not particularly surprising. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly referred to-pfinitive
damages as punishment for
"reprehensible conduct,"63 which would seem to include all
consequences thereof, and to stand in contrast to punishment
for the harm to a particular individual. Indeed, in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore-which was brought by the
purchaser of a single automobile-the jury punished BMW for
selling 983 refinished cars as new. 64 Although the Supreme
Court held that federalism concerns precluded the Alabama
courts from punishing BMW for the 969 such sales that took
place out of state, 65 the Court proceeded to evaluate whether
62. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
63. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (stating
that punitive damages "are private fines levied by civil juries to punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence"); see also, e.g.,
SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2.
64. See 517 U.S. 559, 564-65 (1996).
65. See id. at 570-74. Relying on the well-established constitutional
prohibition against one state "impos[ing] its own policy choice on neighboring
States," id. at 571, the Court held that, in identifying the extent of the state's
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the punitive award constituted excessive punishment for all
fourteen of the in-state sales, thus implicitly endorsing the
notion that a punitive damages award is intended to punish the
defendant for the full scope of its wrongful conduct,
rather than
66
for the individual, private wrong to the plaintiff.
Other modern courts and commentators have been even
more explicit in declaring that punitive damages are
"punishments for public wrongs" 67-that is, that they "are
legitimate interests, federalism concerns dictate that "consideration [may be]
given only to the interests of [the state's own] consumers, rather than those of
the entire Nation," id. at 574. Thus, the Court held that "Alabama does not
have the power... to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it
occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents. Nor may
Alabama impose sanctions on BMW in order to deter conduct that is lawful in
other jurisdictions." Id. at 572-73 (footnote omitted). The Court ostensibly left
open the question whether a state may properly punish or deter out-of-state
conduct that was unlawful where it occurred. See id. at 573 n.20. Its rhetoric
and reasoning, however, which focused on the fact that a state can never give
extraterritorial effect to laws and can never infringe on the policy choices of
another state (including, presumably, the other state's choices among the
numerous standards and procedures that govern punitive damages awards),
along with its case law emphasizing that no state may usurp another state's
right to enforce its punitive laws, strongly suggest that a state may not punish
or deter out-of-state condifct even if that conduct was unlawful where it
occurred. Id. at 568-74; see also, e.g., Cont'l Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc.,
101 F.3d 634, 636-37 (10th Cir. 1996); Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705
N.E.2d 539, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Cordray, supra note 33, at 305-09;
Richard W. Murphy, Superbifurcation:Making Room for State Prosecutionin
the Punitive Damages Process, 76 N.C. L. REV. 463, 490 n.133 (1998); cf W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961) (recognizing that it
would deny due process to a defendant to force it to pay damages in a state
court proceeding where the state court had no power to ensure that the
defendant would not be held liable for the exact same damages in the courts of
another state).
66. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 584 ("None of these statutes would provide an
out-of-state distributor with fair notice that the first violation-or, indeed the
first 14 violations-of its provisions might subject an offender to a
multimillion dollar penalty."); id. at 584 n.35 ("Even assuming each repainted
BMW suffers a diminution in value of approximately $4,000, the award is 35
times greater than the total damages of all 14 Alabama consumers who
purchased repainted BMW's."). To be sure, the Gore Court took a large bite
out of "total harm" punitive damages by precluding their complete imposition
in cases in which the defendant's wrongful conduct affected victims in more
than one state. Nonetheless, it did not address whether such damages are
recoverable in circumstances in which all of the victims reside in the same
state, or whether, in cases of multi-state harm, a single plaintiff may recover
for the full amount of the harm that the defendant caused to all in-state
victims. (Although, by addressing whether the punitive damages were an
acceptable penalty for all fourteen in-state sales, the Court obviously assumed
that the constitutional concerns stopped at the state border.)
67. E.g., Tuel v. Hertz Corp., 296 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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awarded to punish the wrongdoer for the wrong committed
upon society." 68 Thus, the prevailing modern conception of
69
punitive damages is that they are an anomaly in the civil law.
They serve the very same goals as the criminal law; they just
do so through the mechanism of civil tort suits. 70 In Prosser's
1974).

68. Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Okla. 1992); see
also, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due
Process Limits of Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary
Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979, 981 (2001) ("Punitive
damages are not an entitlement of the victims, but of society: a punitive
damages award is a civil punishment visited upon defendants to vindicate the
public interest in deterrence, and to penalize conduct that violates the social
contract and injures society."); Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.,
Constitutional Restraints on the Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L.
REV. 907, 918 (1990) ("[P]unitive damages are imposed for purposes of
retribution and deterrence by a system which simultaneously compensates the
victim for his injury, and punishes the defendant for the wrong done to society
by his conduct."); Daniel M. Weddle, A Practitioner's Guide to Litigating
Punitive Damages After BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 47 DRAKE L.
REV. 661, 662 (1999) ("[P]unitive damages are meant to provide a public
remedy for a public wrong rather than an individual remedy.").
69. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive
Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241, 242 (1985) ("The punitive damages
doctrine is an anomaly in tort law.").
70. The Second Restatement of Torts observes,
The purposes of awarding punitive damages, or "exemplary"
damages as they are frequently called, are to punish the person doing
the wrongful act and to discourage him and others from similar
conduct in the future. Although the purposes are the same, the effect
of a civil judgment for punitive damages is not the same at [sic] that
of a fine imposed after a conviction of a crime, since the successful
plaintiff and not the state is entitled to the money required to be paid
by the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1977); see also Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 281 (1994) ("The very labels given 'punitive' or
'exemplary' damages, as well as the rationales that support them, demonstrate
that they share key characteristics of criminal sanctions."); Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989) (noting that
"punitive damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence, which
are also among the interests advanced by the criminal law"); id. at 287
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that "this
Court's cases leave no doubt that punitive damages serve the same purposespunishment and deterrence-as the criminal law"); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
punitive damages "serve the same function as criminal penalties and are in
effect private fines"); Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner,
J.) ("Many legal systems do not permit awards of punitive damages at all,
believing that such awards anomalously intrude the principles of criminal
justice into civil cases. Even our cousins the English allow punitive damages
only in an excruciatingly narrow category of cases."). In a recent dissent,
Justice Graves of the Kentucky Supreme Court summarizes the modern
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words, "The idea of punishment, or of discouraging other
offenses usually does not enter into tort law"; it is only in the
"rather anomalous" area of punitive damages that "the ideas
underlying the criminal law have invaded the field of torts."71
It is this understanding of the nature of punitive damages
that prevents courts from recognizing and addressing the
potential forms of unfairness identified above. If punitive
damages are punishment for public, societal wrongs, then it
makes sense to calibrate them by reference to the total harm
done to all of society. As unfair as this may seem, however, the
Supreme Court has routinely upheld the constitutionality of
punitive damages against pleas of injustice, 72 and therefore
there is simply no room left for argument that there is a
constitutional dimension to any form of unfairness that inheres
in a single award of them, no matter how compelling such an
argument may be. The modern consensus is that, although
punitive damages serve criminal-law ends, they have-rightly
or wrongly-been afforded a complete exemption from the
to ensure fairness in the
special procedural rules designed
73
punishment of public wrongs.
theoretical conception of punitive damages:
Awards of punitive damages are an anomaly of our legal system.
Although they are assessed in connection with the common-law tort
system-which has as its overriding goal the compensation of private
parties for actual injuries-punitive damages are imposed to serve
the identical purposes of the criminal law: retribution and deterrence.
Farmland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 36 S.W.3d 368, 386 (Ky. 2000)
(Graves, J., dissenting).
71. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 34, § 2, at 9.
72. See infra Part IV; see also, e.g., Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 159 (1967) (noting that "the Constitution presents no general bar to the
assessment of punitive damages in a civil case" (citation omitted)).
73. See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Cone, 492 N.E.2d 61, 69 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986) (noting that punitive damages "are generally disfavored not only
because they are a 'windfall' to the plaintiff, but also because they allow
punishment without the safeguards of criminal procedure"). Justice Graves,
dissenting in FarmlandMutual Insurance,lamented that
[plunitive damages may be excessive and akin to a criminal
punishment, especially when compared with criminal fines. If a civil
defendant is to be exposed to such "criminal liability," the defendant
should be entitled to criminal procedural protections: (1) a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" burden of proof; (2) a unanimous jury; (3) an upper
limit on the punishment; and (4) bifurcation of the liability and
punitive damages portions of the trial.
36 S.W.3d at 388 (Graves, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., G.J.D. by G.J.D. v.
Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1134 (Pa. 1998) (Flaherty, C.J., dissenting) ("Punitive
damages are quasi-criminal fines imposed upon civil defendants in a system
which lacks the constitutional and procedural safeguards afforded criminal
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This conception may be ubiquitous, but it is woefully
inadequate to the task of explaining the fundamental principles
of punitive damages law. For instance, if punitive damages
truly were punishment for public wrongs (as opposed to
punishment for individual, private wrongs) it should not be
necessary for the plaintiff to prevail on an underlying civil
cause of action in order to receive them. The wrong to society
does not depend on the peculiarities of a civil tort suit, such as
the contributory negligence of a single victim. 74 Under current
law, however, a defendant cannot be made to pay punitive
damages unless the plaintiff establishes an underlying civil
cause of action; if the civil action fails for any reason, the
75
defendant will escape liability for punitive damages.
Similarly, if punitive damages were punishment for the
full scope of the wrong to society, rather than simply the wrong
to the plaintiff, it would make no sense to require a reasonable
relationship between the amount of punitive damages and the
amount of the individual plaintiffs compensatory damages.
Although a number of commentators have criticized this
requirement on precisely these grounds, 76 and a few courts
have rejected it, 77 it has long been a part of punitive damages
defendants."); Richard Adelstein, Victims as Cost Bearers, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 131, 160 (1999) ("But punitive damages are controversial (and relatively
rare) precisely because they blur the distinction between tort and crime and
require juries to assess their magnitude without formal guidance or the
procedural safeguards afforded defendants in criminal cases."); David G.
Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems, and Reform, 39
VILL. L. REV. 363, 382 (1994) ("Punitive damages are in the nature of criminal
fines, yet defendants are not afforded the usual safeguards of criminal
procedure, particularly the benefit of a higher burden of proof." (emphasis
omitted)).
74. Compare 21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 474 (1998) which notes,
Because a crime is by definition a public wrong, one against all the
people of the state, it is ordinarily no defense that a person injured by
the crime condoned the offense. Although condonation or settlement
with the criminal may bar the victim from recovering damages in a
civil action, it generally does not prevent the state from prosecuting
the offender for the crime.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
75. See infra note 203 and text accompanying notes 260-61.
76. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and
Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91,
140 n.242 (1993) ("Because punitive damages are designed to serve the public
law function of punishment, deterrence, and retribution, there is no
compelling reason why there should be any correlation between compensatory
and punitive damages.").
77. See, e.g., Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Okla.
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law-indeed, the Supreme Court has incorporated it into the
constitutional test for determining whether a punitive award is
78
excessive.
Nor does it make sense under the prevailing modern
conception of punitive damages as punishment for the wrong to
society to allow the plaintiff to keep the punitive damages
award. Here again, a number of commentators have criticized
the "plaintiffs windfall" aspect of punitive damages on these
very grounds, 79 and a few states have seized upon this point in
enacting "split-recovery" statutes allocating a portion of each
punitive award to the state, but the common law principle
80
prevails in most jurisdictions.
Finally, if punitive damages serve the criminal law
function of punishing societal wrongs, it is difficult to
understand why it is that the defendant is not permitted to
avail itself of the various criminal procedural safeguards that
the Constitution affords to those accused of public wrongs. 81
Yet punitive damages have weathered vehement attacks on
this very ground for over a century, 82 and they continue to be
1992) ("Because such damages are awarded to punish the wrongdoer for the
wrong committed upon society, Oklahoma does not require the amount of
punitive damages to be in a particular ratio to the amount of actual damages."
(footnote and citation omitted)).
78. See infra note 207 and text accompanying notes 206-09.
79. See, e.g., Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021, 1026
(Ala. 1992) (Shores, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
against allowing the plaintiff to keep the punitive award because "'the plaintiff
seeks compensatory damages for his own injuries and punitive damages to
redress society at large" (quoting Justice Janie L. Shore, A Suggestion for
Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate
Windfalls (1992) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Virginia School of
Law))); Gen. Res. Org. v. Deadman, 932 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Tex. 1996)
(Gonzalez, J., concurring) (suggesting, in light of the fact that punitive
damages punish the harm to society as a whole, "that the Legislature enact a
law apportioning one-half of punitive damages to the State").
80. See Michael Finch, Giving Full Faith and Credit to Punitive Damages
Awards: Will Florida Rule the Nation?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 497, 502 (2002)
("[A]n increasing number of states have reaffirmed the penal role of punitive
damages by appropriating a share of the plaintiffs punitive award. Such
shared recovery laws emphasize that punitive awards now vindicate 'public
wrongs,' and so fulfill the historical purpose of penal laws.").
81. See infra Part IV.
82. For a discussion of nineteenth-century critiques on this ground, see
infra Part IV. For modern criticisms, see, for example, Thomas A. Ford, The
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, in THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE
DAMAGES 15, 15-22 (Donald J. Hirsch & James G. Pouros eds., 1969); Malcolm
E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 322-51 (1983); Note, The Imposition of
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imposed in the complete absence of criminal procedural
protections.
Clearly then, the modern theoretical account of punitive
damages as punishment for public wrongs is deeply at odds
with the actual doctrine of punitive damages. That dissonance
should cause us to question the accuracy and validity of the
prevailing conception.
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS AN ENGINE OF OPTIMAL DETERRENCE

Indeed, some modern scholars have offered a different
conception of punitive damages, 83 one that is based not on
punishment, but on the economic principle of optimal
deterrence: forcing the actor to internalize the costs of
potentially harmful activity, thus ensuring that the actor will
engage in that activity only to an economically efficient degree,
but will not invest additional resources to avoid causing harm
where the cost of avoiding the harm exceeds the cost of the
harm itself.84 This suggestion is purely normative, however;
optimal deterrence is manifestly not the goal of current
85
punitive damages doctrine.
To be sure, in judicial parlance, "deterrence," along with
"punishment," is one of the oft-repeated twin goals of punitive
damages.8 6 By using the term "deterrence," however, the
Punishment by Civil Courts:A Reappraisalof Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1158, 1177-84 (1966).
83. See, e.g., Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (arguing that in many cases, "compensatory
damages are... an inaccurate measure of the true harm caused by an
activity," and that "additional damages... may be an appropriate way of
making the injurer bear all the costs associated with its activities in those
cases"); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution
of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 12 (1990) (discussing "augmented
awards," designed not "to punish the defendant for otherwise evil behavior,"
but "to encourage actors to consider the costs of their action").
84. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of
Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 421 (1998). Judge Calabresi has referred to this
concept as "general deterrence." See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-31, 73-75 (1970).
85. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439
(2001) (noting that juries do not impose punitive damages with the goal of
optimal deterrence in mind).
86. Most courts refer to the twin purposes of punitive damages as
"punishment" and "deterrence," rather than "retribution" and "deterrence."
See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Punitive
damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."); Gertz v. Robert
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courts are referring not to the modern economic concept of
"optimal deterrence," but rather to the classical, punitive
concept of "complete deterrence": 87 ensuring that the defendant
and others refrain entirely from committing similar harms in
the future, regardless of the costs and benefits of the activity
and the socially optimal level of investment in loss
prevention."8 Jurors are instructed to "punish the wrongdoer
and to deter [the] wrongdoer from repeating such wrongful
acts" altogether.8 9 Thus, as the advocates of an optimal
deterrence conception of punitive damages readily concede, the
law does not, as of yet, reflect their prescription. 90
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[Punitive damages] are not
compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."). But see
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) ("[P]unitive damages
are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence."). As Judge Posner
has explained, "This formulation is cryptic, since deterrence is a purpose of
punishment, rather than, as the formulation implies, a parallel purpose, along
with punishment itself, for imposing the specific form of punishment that is
punitive damages." Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996). Indeed,
in other contexts, the Supreme Court has defined the term "punishment" to
include the concept of deterrence. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 329 (1998) ("Deterrence... has traditionally been viewed as a goal
of punishment ...."); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) ("'[A]
civil sanction that ... serv[es] ... deterrent purposes[] is punishment .. "
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989))).
When courts speak of the distinct goals of punishment and deterrence, they
are using the term "punishment" in the more narrow sense of "retribution."
87. See Hylton, supra note 84, at 421. Judge Calabresi refers to this
concept as "specific deterrence." See CALABRESI, supra note 84, at 68-69.
88. See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 246 n.8 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (stating
that punitive damages are "analogous to criminal penalties that seek... to
discourage or even eliminate a particular activity altogether"); Galligan, supra
note 83, at 33 (noting that the current punitive damages doctrine is geared
toward complete deterrence).
89. RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS 100 (4th ed. 1998); see also, e.g., Haslip, 499 U.S. at 6 n.1 (upholding
an instruction that informed the jury that punitive damages are imposed "by
way of punishment to the defendant and for the added purpose of protecting
the public by detering [sic] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in
the future' (emphasis omitted) (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. A2, 105-06)).
90. See Galligan, supra note 83, at 7-14. Indeed, the very name "punitive"
damages is inconsistent with the optimal deterrence conception; unlike
complete deterrence, optimal deterrence is not a punitive concept at all, but
rather is more akin to notions of enterprise liability. Ciraolo,216 F.3d at 24546 (Calabresi, J., concurring). Judge Calabresi has observed that
[a] more appropriate name for extracompensatory damages assessed
in order to avoid underdeterrence might be "socially compensatory
damages." For, while traditional compensatory damages are assessed
to make the individual victim whole, socially compensatory damages
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Indeed, a number of elements of current punitive damages
doctrine are squarely inconsistent with the notion of punitive
damages as a means of achieving optimal deterrence by
ensuring that those who engage in risky activities are made to
internalize the full cost of the harm caused by their conduct. 91
For instance, on such a theory, there would be no need for the
requirement that the plaintiff must prevail on an underlying
cause of action as a predicate to an award of punitive
damages. 92 Indeed, it is the very fact that some plaintiffs or
potential plaintiffs will not prevail-and therefore will not force
the defendant to internalize the cost of the harm done to
them-that drives the theory behind this conception. 93 Nor
would it be appropriate to permit the plaintiff to keep the
punitive damages award, 94 or to allow the jury to tailor the
award to the defendant's wealth. 95 Finally, and most notably, a
conception of punitive damages as a method of cost
internalization, as opposed to a form of punishment, would be
inconsistent with the universal rules that punitive damages
may only be awarded where the defendant's conduct was
wanton or malicious 96 and that the amount of the award
depends on the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's

are, in a sense, designed to make society whole by seeking to ensure
that all of the costs of harmful acts are placed on the liable actor.
Id. at 245 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARv. L. REv. 869, 890-91 (1998) ("[T]he adjective 'punitive' may sometimes
be misleading....
[E]xtracompensatory damages may be needed for

deterrence purposes in circumstances in which the behavior of the defendant
would not call for punishment.").

91.

See Galligan, supra note 83, at 62 (conceding this point).

92. See infra note 203 and text accompanying notes 260-61.
93. See, e.g., Ciraolo,216 F.3d at 243-44 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
94. See id. at 246-47 ("And there is no good reason why socially
compensatory damages should be paid to the individual plaintiff, at least
beyond a relatively small part sufficient to induce the victim to undertake the
expense of pleading and proving them.").
95. See Galligan, supra note 83, at 65 (noting that wealth is irrelevant to

optimal deterrence); Hylton, supra note 84, at 458 (concluding that "the
financial position or wealth of the defendant generally should not matter");
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 90, at 911 (noting that wealth should not be

considered with respect to corporate defendants and should only be considered
with respect to individual defendants under certain circumstances). Under
current law, however, the defendant's wealth is a relevant consideration in
fixing the amount of punitive damages. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1990).
96.

See supra note 34.
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conduct. 97
Unlike the prevailing modern conception of punitive
damages as punishment for public wrongs, the economic
conception of punitive damages as a vehicle for internalizing
costs raises some concerns about "total harm" punitive
damages. These damages, even if awarded in only one case,
will usually be excessive from an optimal deterrence
standpoint. 98 Because the proponents of this conception freely
97. See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 246 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting that
damages imposed to achieve optimal deterrence should be permissible
regardless "of whether or not the defendant's conduct was particularly
blameworthy"); Galligan, supra note 83, at 62-63 (noting that optimal
deterrence does not depend on reprehensibility and that extra-compensatory
damages awarded for these purposes should be available even for simple
negligence); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 90, at 905-06 (suggesting that
"making punitive damages depend on reprehensibility...
distorts]
deterrence"). In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, however, the Supreme
Court held that "[plerhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness
of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct." 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
98. "Total harm" punitive damages have an inherent tendency to force the
defendant to pay damages in an amount greater than the harm that it actually
caused. This results in over-deterrence because "wasteful precautions may be
taken, product prices may be inappropriately high, and risky but socially
beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed." Polinsky & Shavell, supra
note 90, at 873. "Total harm" punitive damages will tend to have this effect
for a number of reasons. First, plaintiffs' lawyers ask the jury not only to
deter future wrongs, but also to punish the defendant for harming so many
people. Thus, in most cases, the jury's award of "total harm" punitive
damages is grounded in both retribution and deterrence. Indeed, in many
cases, the jury will focus much more on notions of retribution than deterrence.
See supra note 3 (highlighting juror outrage and the desire to punish
wrongdoing). Moreover, even when the jury emphasizes deterrence concerns,
it will still often go beyond the amount that it considers to be appropriate to
achieve complete deterrence (which itself is often greater than the amount
necessary to achieve optimal deterrence, see Hylton, supra note 84, at 433-34),
so as to include an element of retribution for the entire course of conduct. For
instance, in the Ford Pinto case, in which the plaintiffs attorney had sought
punitive damages of $100 million based on the defendant's profits, the jury
awarded $125 million. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. One juror
"recalls bringing up the $125 million figure himself. He reasoned that if Ford
had saved $100 million by not installing safe tanks, an award matching that
wouldn't really be punitive. So he added $25 million." Harris, supra note 4.
Second, an award of "total harm" punitive damages in an amount
sufficient, in itself, to achieve complete deterrence over-deters by failing to
consider the additional deterrent effect of compensatory damages that have
been or will likely be awarded in other cases arising out of the same course of
conduct. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 90, at 890-906 (explaining
that the failure to consider the awards of compensatory damages in the
instant case and other cases will result in over-deterrence); cf. Memphis Cmty.
Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) ("[D]amages that compensate

2003]

MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT PROBLEM

613

admit that it is inconsistent with the prevailing law, however,
there is no basis to suggest, based on this literature, that there
is a constitutional problem with total harm punitive damages.
III. THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTION OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES-PUNISHMENT FOR PRIVATE WRONGS
In addressing the problems associated with awarding
punitive damages for acts affecting more than one victim,
courts and commentators have taken as a given the modern
conception of punitive damages as punishment for public
wrongs (or have employed the economic conception of punitive
damages as a means of achieving optimal deterrence, while
recognizing that the law presently conceives of punitive
damages differently). In light of the significant logical discord
between the modern understanding of the nature of punitive
damages and the actual black letter rules of punitive damages
law, however, that uncritical acceptance is troubling. It would
be wise to inquire whether there is more to the nature of
punitive damages than meets the modern eye.
In fact, there is. An exploration of the historical origins
and early conceptions of the doctrine of punitive damages, 99
for actual harm ordinarily suffice to deter. .. ").
Finally, by generalizing from the facts of a single case, "total harm"
punitive damages awards can over-deter by overestimating the actual harm
caused by the defendant's conduct. As explained in Part I, supra, in some
cases, the jury's conclusion that the defendant was guilty of wrongdoing and
should be subjected to punitive damages will be incorrect altogether. Of
course, litigation always carries a risk of erroneous results, but punishing an
entire course of conduct on the basis of a single potentially wrongful decision
inflates that risk-and therefore increases the prospect that the defendant
will be deterred from engaging in socially beneficial activities-especially
when the defendant has already been exonerated in other proceedings. Cf In
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.)
(overturning a class certification order on these grounds). In addition, even if
the jury's assessment of the defendant's culpability is accurate (and even if the
defendant's conduct was equally culpable as to all victims, which, as explained
above, may not be the case), the jury's assessment of the global harm caused
by the defendant's conduct may still be inflated for two reasons. See supra
Part I. First, 'total harm" punitive damages deprive the defendant of the
opportunity to establish that many of the alleged victims were not victims at
all. Supra Part I. Second, because rational attorneys will try to bring the
most sympathetic and compelling cases first, the jury that seeks to punish the
whole course of conduct on the basis of its knowledge of the wrong suffered by
the plaintiff may inflate the total harm by wrongly assuming that all other
victims are identically situated and have as compelling a case for punitive
damages as does the victim before the court. Supra Part I.
99. On the topic of the historical origins of punitive damages, see, for
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and, in particular, of the ways in which the early courts
confronted the problem of punishing acts that harmed more
than one victim, reveals a very different understanding of the
nature and role of punitive damages-one with important
ramifications for the constitutionality of "total harm" punitive
damages today.
A. HISTORY

Punitive damages existed in some form in many ancient
legal systems, 10 0 and were authorized by medieval English
statutes,'0 ' but did not appear in the English common law until
the eighteenth century. 102 In the early part of that century, the
English courts began to assume the power to review damage
awards for excessiveness. 10 3 Soon thereafter, in the face of
what one commentator has dubbed "inexorable pressure to find
some rational basis for awards of hundreds or thousands 10of4
pounds in cases in which no tangible loss had occurred,"
courts recognized punitive damages as a means of justifying
damage awards in excess of the plaintiffs tangible harm. 10 5
Because the doctrine of punitive damages was not created
by the courts to serve an expressed purpose, but rather arose as
an after-the-fact effort to justify unreasoned and seemingly
dubious practices, the English courts struggled to articulate the
actual basis for its existence. Frequently, the courts spoke of
punitive damages as serving the now familiar extra-

example, 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 732 (1988); 1 JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN
J.

KIRCHER,

PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE §§

1:01-:02 (1994);

SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 1; Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairnessand
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-19 (1982);
Owen, supra note 2, at 1262-64; Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 518-20 (1957).
100. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 1.1 (citing examples from

ancient Greek and Egyptian law); Owen, supra note 2, at 1262 n.17 (citing
additional examples from ancient Babylonian, Hittite, Hebrew, Hindu, and
Roman law);.
101.
102.

See Owen, supra note 2, at 1263 n.18.
See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 99, § 1.01; Ellis, supra note 99, at

12; Owen, supra note 2, at 1263 n.19; Note, supra note 99, at 518-19. The
earliest cases to make explicit mention of punitive damages are Wilkes v.
Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763), and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768

(K.B. 1763).
103. See Ellis, supra note 99, at 13; Note, supra note 99, at 518-19.
104. Ellis, supra note 99, at 14.
105. See Note, supra note 99, at 519-20.
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compensatory goals of punishment and deterrence. 10 6 Just as
frequently, however, the courts justified punitive damages as
additional compensation for mental suffering, wounded dignity,
and injured feelings 07-harms that were otherwise not legally
compensable at common law. 10 8 Thus, punitive damages were
initially awarded exclusively in cases that involved insult to the
honor and dignity of the victim, 10 9 and their amount depended
not only on the wealth of the defendant and the degree of
wantonness exhibited by him, but also on the social status of
the plaintiff and the degree of insult that he suffered. Indeed,
the English courts were quite explicit in explaining that "the
state, degree, quality, trade or profession of the party
injured.., must be, and generally are, considered by a jury in
giving [punitive] damages." 110 For instance, the Court of
Common Pleas upheld a large punitive damages award in 1779
because "the plaintiff is a man of family, a baronet, an officer in
the army, and a member of Parliament; all of them respectable
situations, and which may render the value of an injury done to
him" greater."'I Along similar lines, the courts explained that
"the circumstances of time and place, when and where the
insult is given, require different [punitive] damages; as it is a
greater insult to be beaten upon the Royal Exchange, than in a
12
private room."'
As punitive damages made their way across the Atlantic
Ocean, courts continued to speak of them as serving not only as
punishment, but also as compensation for otherwise noncompensable harms. 1 3 The Texas Supreme Court, for instance,
declared in 1851,
When the ordinary rules of compensation are dispensed with the
damages may be denominated exemplary, for the reason that if high
they deter from the commission of similar offenses; but they also
106. See, e.g., Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99.
107. See Note, supra note 99, at 519; see also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §
732 (1988) (noting that punitive damages "originated as a means of giving
damages for wounded feelings, as distinguished from damages for an injury to
person or property"); Ellis, supra note 99, at 14-16 (commenting that some

early courts treated punitive damages as compensation for insult).
108.
109.

See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, at 7-8.
See Ellis, supra note 99, at 15.

110. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768 (K.B. 1763).
111. Leith v. Pope, 96 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (C.P. 1779).
112. Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 910 (C.P. 1769); see also id. at 909
(stating that high punitive damages were justified, "the plaintiff having
received this insult in his own house").
113.

See Note, supra note 99, at 519-20.
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effect the purpose of compensation, and may therefore be regarded
114 as
the damages sustained from the wanton and aggravated outrage.

Nineteenth-century American judges and commentators
made frequent references to the compensatory elements and
origins of punitive damages. For instance, the Texas Supreme
Court noted, this time in 1885, that "[iut may be, and is, most
likely, true that the whole doctrine of punitory or exemplary
damages has its foundation in a failure to recognize as
elements upon which compensation may be given many things
as injuries entitling the injured
which ought to be classed
15
compensation."
to
person
Thus, the American courts continued the English tradition
of fixing the amount of punitive damages by reference not only
to the degree of wantonness exhibited by the defendant, but
also to the gravity and extent of the injury.1 16 Like the English
courts, they tied the amount of punitive damages to the social
status of the insulted plaintiff. 117 As the Illinois Supreme
Court memorably remarked in 1869,
If a rich man, presuming upon his wealth, shall causelessly injure a

114. Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266, 271 (1851); see also, e.g., Beckwith v. Bean,
98 U.S. 266, 305 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting) ("[The jury] may well have
supposed that the amount awarded was at best but poor compensation. Few,
indeed, would consider the verdict given as sufficient for the disgrace,
humiliation, and suffering wantonly inflicted upon the plaintiff. As punitive
damages, the verdict was not at all excessive."); Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117,
120 (1882) ("[Tlhe personal indignity [and] the wounded feelings.., enter into
punitive damages."); Morse v. Auburn & Syracuse R.R., 10 Barb. 621, 625
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1851) (noting that the imposition of punitive damages, which
"are given by way of punishment" and "operate as an example to others,"
includes consideration of "the mental suffering, the injured feelings, the sense
of injustice, of wrong, or insult on the part of the sufferer"); Welborn v. Dixon,
49 S.E. 232, 237-38 (S.C. 1904) (Woods, J., dissenting) ("In this state punitive
damages are regarded as made up of two elements-punishment of wrong, and
vindication of private right, by requiring payment for outrage, oppression, or
indignity, which it is felt should be atoned for by compensation, but which
cannot be expressed by computation.").
115. Stuart v. W. Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885); see also
Edward C. Eliot, Exemplary Damages, 29 AM. L. REG. 570, 572 (1881)
(presently entitled U. PA. L. REV.) ("The difficulty of estimating compensation
for intangible injuries, was the cause of the rise of this doctrine .... [W]hen
the early judges allowed the jury discretion to assess beyond the pecuniary
damage, there being no apparent computation, it was natural to suppose that
the excess was imposed as punishment."); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 463
(1876) (noting that punitive damages arose in an "endeavor to bring . . .
considerations within the grasp of the law" of "compensation for the wounded
feelings, the offended pride, [and] the outraged sense of decency").
116. See, e.g., Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 219, 225-26 (1852).
117. See, e.g., Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56, 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
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poor man, by personal violence toward him, or by any malicious
proceeding, he ought to be visited by vindictive damages, but, at the
same time, they must bear some sort of proportion to the injury done,
and the victim should have a good standing in society. It is not
expected of a jury that, for a mere personal wrong, such as this case
presents, if done to a vagrant, or to a person of but little character in
community, they should award to him the same damages they would
18
give a man whose station and respectability were unquestioned.'

So strong, in fact, were the compensatory roots of punitive
damages that, in the mid-nineteenth century, many courts and
scholars rejected the notion that punitive damages served any
punitive purpose at all. To these authors, punitive damages,
despite their misleading name, were in fact nothing more than
additional compensation for wounded feelings and insult.
Leading the charge was Harvard Law School's Simon
Greenleaf. Greenleaf argued that, notwithstanding widespread
dicta in the decisions of numerous American and English courts
recounting the principle that punitive damages may be
assessed to punish and deter the defendant, such damages had,
in practice, been imposed only as a means of ensuring that the
plaintiff was fully compensated for his tangible and intangible
losses. ' 19 Many courts followed Greenleafs lead and held that
"in all cases it is to be distinctly borne in mind that
compensation to the plaintiff is the purpose in view, and any

118.

Walker v. Martin, 52 Ill. 347, 351 (1869).

119.

See 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §

253, at 240 n.2 (16th ed. 1899); Simon Greenleaf, The Rule of Damages in
Actions Ex Delicto, 5 W.L.J. 289, 290-96 (1848). Other commentators, writing
both before and after Greenleaf, agreed. One noted,
If [courts endorsing punitive damages] mean that it is allowable for a
jury to give damages beyond the amount of what the law regards as
actionable injury to the plaintiff, by way of gratifying his resentment,
or punishing the defendant for the purpose of public example, it is
submitted that they are not true; that there is nothing punitive in
civil actions .... [Rather, this doctrine] means nothing more, when
truly understood, than this, viz. that damages may be given for insult,
contumely, and abuse, not in themselves actionable, when they
accompany an actionable injury.
A Reading on Damages in Actions Ex Delicto, 3 AM. JURIST 287, 305-06 (1830)
[hereinafter Reading]. Another commentator argued that
[t]he true foundation of the doctrine of exemplary and punitive
damages is that in the case of wilful and malicious wrongs which have
actually injured the plaintiff beyond the domain of pecuniarily
computable damage, the jury may allow, not by way of vindictive
punishment in addition to damages, but as a just and proper part of
actual damages, such a reasonable sum as the plaintiff is fairly
entitled to receive make full amends, and as the defendant justly
deserves to be required to pay.
Exemplary Damages, 13 WASH. L. REP. 652, 652 (1885).
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instruction which is calculated to lead [the jurors] to suppose
that besides compensating
the plaintiff they may punish the
120
defendant is erroneous."
In opposition to Greenleafs crusade, Theodore Sedgwick, a
prominent and highly respected treatise author, 12' argued that
the holdings, and not just the dicta, of the cases commanded
the conclusion that the law of punitive damages "blends
together the interest of society and the aggrieved individual,
and gives damages not only to recompense the sufferer, but to
punish the offender." 122 Many courts joined ranks with
Sedgwick, expressing the view that "[t]he true theory of
exemplary damages is that of punishment, involving the ideas
of retribution for willful misconduct, and an example to deter
123
from its repetition."'
During the nineteenth century, a fierce battle raged
between the followers of Greenleaf and the followers of
Sedgwick. It is, in the broadest of terms, no mystery how this
struggle ultimately turned out. It is well recognized that
throughout the nineteenth century, both in the United States and in
England, the concept of actual damages was being broadened to
include intangible harm. As a result, the original compensatory
function of exemplary damages came to be filled by actual damages,
and courts today are led to speak of
exemplary damages exclusively in
1 24
terms punishment and deterrence.

120. Stillson v. Gibbs, 18 N.W. 815, 817 (Mich. 1884). The most thorough
explication of this position can be found in Fay v. Parker,53 N.H. 342, 379-84
(1872).
121. Sedgwick has been called "the seminal American scholar on damages."
Galligan, supra note 83, at 30 n.110. According to Morton Horwitz, Sedgwick's
treatise on damages is "the most brilliant and boldly innovative American
antebellum legal treatise."

MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF

AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 83 (1977).
122. Theodore Sedgwick, The Rule of Damages in Actions Ex Delicto, 5
W.L.J. 193, 194 (1848) (emphasis omitted); see also THEODORE SEDGWICK, A
TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 515-40 (5th ed. 1869).

123. Ala. G.S.R. Co. v. Sellers, 9 So. 375, 377 (Ala. 1891).
124. Note, supra note 99, at 520 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court
noted this point in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
remarking that ,
[u]ntil well into the 19th century, punitive damages frequently
operated to compensate for intangible injuries, compensation which
was not otherwise available under the narrow conception of
compensatory damages prevalent at the time. As the types of
compensatory damages available to plaintiffs have broadened, the
theory behind punitive damages has shifted toward a more purely
punitive.., understanding.
532 U.S. 424, 438 n.11 (2001) (citations omitted).
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In determining what, exactly, was being punished,
however, the courts did not let go completely of the
compensatory roots of the doctrine.
As noted above, the early focus of punitive damages awards
was on the degree of insult to the victim, and thus the courts
tailored the amount of the punitive award to the victim's social
status and to the circumstances of the insult. As courts
gradually moved away from viewing punitive damages as
compensation for non-compensable harms and toward viewing
punitive damages as punishment, they steadfastly maintained
their focus on the insult to the individual victim. Thus, the
judicial rhetoric drifted from notions of compensating the insult
to notions of punishing the insult, 125 or more generally
punishing the injury, but remained centered throughout on the
insult or injury to the plaintiff.1 26 As such, although the courts
eventually settled upon an understanding of punitive damages
as punishment rather than compensation, they did not conceive
of them as punishment for some amorphous wrong to society, or
as punishment for the malicious act in the abstract; rather,
they conceived of them as punishment for the private legal
wrong-the insult-done to the individual plaintiff.

125. See, e.g., Chi., St. Louis & New Orleans R.R. v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 456,
465 (1882) (speaking of "exemplary punishment for.., insult"); Duncan v.
Stalcup, 18 N.C. 440, 442 (1836) ("[Tjhe jury are [sic] permitted to punish
insult by exemplary damages."); Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761
(C.P. 1814) ("[J]uries are permitted to punish insult by exemplary damages.").
126. See, e.g., Harrison v. Ely, 11 N.E. 334, 335 (Ill. 1887) ("Where an
injury is wantonly and willfully inflicted, the jury may, in addition to the
actual damages sustained, visit upon the wrong-doer vindictive or punitive
damages by the way of punishment for such willful injury."); Foote v. Nichols,
28 Ill. 486, 488 (1862) (holding that the jury "may give exemplary damages not
only to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant for such wanton
injury"); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Berry, 111 S.W. 370, 371 (Ky. 1908)
(noting that punitive damages may be awarded "by way of punishment for the
wrongs and injuries done the plaintiff"); Callahan v. Caffarata, 39 Mo. 136,
137 (1866) ("[The jury may add such further sum, by way of smart money, as
in their opinion will sufficiently punish the defendant Caffarata for the wrong
and injury done to plaintiff."); McGarry v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 36 Mo. App. 340, 352
(1889) (finding that a jury may award "such further sum by way of exemplary
damages" as it thinks "to be right and just to punish the defendant for the
injury complained of"); Robison v. Fetterman, 9 Sadler 604, 610 (Pa. 1888)
(noting jury instructions defining punitive damages as "punishment for the
injury done"); Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 7 (S.C. 1784) ("[A] very
serious injury to the plaintiff... entitled him to very exemplary
damages .... "); Hamilton v. Marsh, 2 Tyl. 403, 405 (Vt. 1803) ("[Tlhe plaintiff
ought to be recompensed for the injury he may have sustained with exemplary
damages ....).
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That conception is most clearly manifested in the cases
confronting the argument that, to avoid unconstitutional
double punishment, punitive damages should not be allowed
127
where the defendant's conduct is also punishable as a crime.
Initially, the broad divide in the courts over the true purpose
and nature of punitive damages led to a split of authority on
this issue. 128 To some courts that viewed punitive damages as
purely compensatory, any argument that allowing punitive
damages would amount to double punishment was "based on a
misconception of the meaning of the expression punitive
damages," the true object of which "is not to inflict a penalty,
but to remunerate for the loss sustained." 129 To those courts
that viewed punitive damages as true punishment, however,
the principle that "a man shall not be twice punished for the
same offence" dictated that "punishment-damages," as distinct
from "compensation-damages," cannot be awarded where the
130
wrongful act is also a crime.
127. See generally Annotation, Assault: Criminal Liability as Barring or
MitigatingRecovery of Punitive Damages, 98 A.L.R.3d 870, 879 (1980).
128. See Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68, 71 (1878). Whatever its actual views,
the Boyer court noted,
[I]t will be a hopeless task to endeavor to reconcile them either with
the adjudicated cases, or the conclusions of eminent text writers of
either this country or England, for as far as we have been able to
examine them they are pretty evenly divided both in numbers and
weight of authority.
Id.; see also Ala. Power Co. v. Goodwin, 99 So. 158, 159 (Ala. 1923) (noting
that the split in authority is due "to divergent theories of the nature and
purpose of punitive damages in civil cases"), overruled in part by Morrison v.
State, 100 So. 2d 744 (Ala. 1957).
129. Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146, 151-52 (1859) (emphasis
omitted).
130. Cherry v. McCall, 23 Ga. 193, 199 (1857); see also Taber v. Hutson, 5
Ind. 322, 325-26 (1854) (precluding punitive damages because, although the
double jeopardy doctrine technically applies only to criminal prosecutions,
"still it serves to illustrate a fundamental principle inculcated by every wellregulated system of government, viz., that each violation of the law should be
certainly followed by one appropriate punishment and no more" (emphasis
added)); Austin v. Wilson, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 273, 275 (1849) (precluding
punitive damages because "the defendant might be punished twice for the
same act"). One reason advanced by Professor Greenleaf in support of the
theory that punitive damages must be considered as purely compensatory was
that
[i] f more than this was intended, how is the party to be protected from
a double punishment? For, after the jury shall have considered the
injury to the public, in assessing damages for an aggravated assault,
or for obtaining goods by false pretences, or the like, the wrong-doers
are still liable to indictment and fine as well as imprisonment, for the
same offence.

2003]

MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT PROBLEM

621

Neither of these positions ultimately prevailed. Instead,
the majority rule arose from the decisions of courts that took a
more nuanced stance: Punitive damages do not implicate
double jeopardy concerns, not because they are not intended as
punishment at all, but rather because they are intended as
punishment for the wrong to the individual victim. 13 1 To these
courts, "the damages allowed in a civil case by way of
punishment[] have no necessary relation to the penalty
incurred for the wrong done to the public," but rather are
imposed "as a punishment for the wrong done to the
1 32 "In this view, the awarding
individual."
of punitive damages
can in no just sense be said to be in conflict with the
constitutional or common law inhibition against inflicting two
punishments for the same offense." 133 As the Wisconsin
Supreme Court explained,
[J]udgment for the criminal offense is for the offense against the
public; judgment for the tort is for the offense against the private
sufferer; ...

though punitory damages go in the right of the public for

example, they do not go by way of public punishment, but by way of
private damages; for the act as a tort and not as a crime, to the
private sufferer and not to the state. Though they are allowed beyond
compensation of the private sufferer, they still go to him for himself,
as damages allowed to him by law in addition to his actual damages;
like the double and treble damages sometimes allowed by statute.
Considered as strictly punitory, the damages are for the punishment
134
of the private tort, not of the public crime.

Greenleaf, supra note 119, at 296.
131. See infra notes 132-34.
132. Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 391 (1866).
133. Id. Hendrickson "makes the distinction between the punishment for
the wrong done the public, for which the punishment is inflicted in the
criminal action, and that done to the individual, for which punishment may be
imposed by the jury in the civil action." Hauser v. Griffith, 71 N.W. 223, 223
(Iowa 1897).
134. Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 287-88 (1878); see also, e.g., Smith v.
Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 127 (1882) (rejecting the argument that a jury cannot
award punitive damages in a civil tort action when the defendant's conduct is
also punishable criminally); Baldwin v. Fries, 46 Mo. App. 288, 296 (1891)
(asserting that "such damages are [punishment] for the wrong done to the
individual, and have no relation to the wrongs done to the public"); Zick v.
Smith, 112 A. 846, 846 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1921) (arguing that the double jeopardy
argument "is illogical" because the "criminal action is a punishment for the
wrong done to the public" whereas the "punitive damages [award] is a
punishment for the wrong done to the individual"), affd, 116 A. 927 (N.J.
1922); Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385, 393-94 (1878) ("When the act is both a public
and private wrong, the public and the person aggrieved, each has a distinct
and concurrent remedy ....

[The private right to] vindictive damages ...

cannot be defeated by the fact that the [defendants] may be punished for an
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Thus, the courts avoided the double jeopardy problem by
holding that punitive damages are punishment, not for the
improper act in the abstract, or the wrong that the defendant
caused to society, but for the legal wrong to the individual

plaintiff.135
Just as the law recognized that the wrong to the public
stemming from an illicit act is legally distinct from the private
wrong to the victim arising from the same act, it also
recognized that a single illicit act that harms more than one
person constitutes a number of legally distinct private wrongs.
Indeed, it is axiomatic that
a wrong cannot, in a legal sense, be a violation of more than one right.
The same act may violate any number of rights, but each such violation
would constitute a different wrong. If such violations or wrongs are
distinct and separate, even though resulting from the same act, they
would give rise to different causes
of action; but from a single wrong but
13 6
one cause of action can arise.
injury to the public." (citations omitted)).
135. The court in Mayer v. Frobe, 22 S.E. 58 (W. Va. 1895), declared that
the just rule of exemplary damages to be as follows: If, after the jury
has assessed damages to fully compensate the plaintiff for the injury,
such damages are still not sufficient in amount to punish the
defendant for the maliciousness of the private wrong of which he is
found guilty, and to hold him up as a public example and warning, to
prevent the repetition of the same or the commission of similar
wrongs, they may add such further sum, in their judgment, as may be
necessary for this purpose.
Id. at 63 (emphasis added); see also Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521
(1885) (noting that punitive damages are imposed to punish private wrongs);
Edmunds v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 162 P. 1038, 1039-40 (Cal.
1917) (suggesting that punitive damages are "punishment for the wrong which
the jurors believe[] [has] been inflicted upon plaintiff"); Winans v. Cong. Hotel
Co., 227 Ill. App. 276, 285 (1922) (arguing that "exemplary damages are such
damages as will punish the defendant for the wrong done, if any, to the
plaintiff'); Miller v. Hammers, 61 N.W. 1087, 1088 (Iowa 1895) ("'[E]xemplary
damages are given as a punishment for the wrong done to plaintiff....'")
(quoting the trial court's jury instructions); Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry., 114 N.W.
353, 355 (Minn. 1907) (arguing that punitive damages are "imposed in the
nature of punishment for the wrong complained of'); N. Ohio Trac. & L. Co. v.
Peterson, 33 Ohio Cir. Dec. 14, 15 (Cir. Ct. 1908) (authorizing a jury to "award
to plaintiff punitive or exemplary damages; that is, damages in addition to
compensatory damages, for the purpose of punishing the defendant for the
wrong done to plaintiff'); see also sources cited supra note 126.
136. City of Columbus v. Anglin, 48 S.E. 318, 320 (Ga. 1904); see also, e.g.,
People v. Israel, 109 N.E. 969, 970 (Ill. 1915) ("Where articles of property are
stolen at one and the same time and at the same place, from several separate
owners, there are as many wrongs committed against private citizens as there
are separate owners ...."); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Slater, 39 Ill. App. 69, 81 (1890)
(insisting that it is "well settled that many causes of action may grow out of a
single act ...to as many individuals as suffer damages by the wrongful act");
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Thus, in the earliest cases to confront the multiple
punishment problem, the courts allowed awards of punitive
damages to more than one victim of the defendant's act on the
theory that, properly understood, each punitive damages award
was designed to punish the defendant only for the wrong done
to the individual victim. For instance, in Alabama Power Co. v.
Goodwin 137-in which the plaintiff sued for injuries resulting
from a street car collision-the court rejected the argument
that the jury should have been informed "that punitive
damages were assessed against this defendant in another suit
by another passenger, based upon this same collision and this
same alleged act of wanton negligence." 138 The court explained
its reasoning,
The vice of appellant's contention, as it seems to us, lies in the
assumption that a single act of wanton negligence, which
simultaneously injures a number of individuals, is a single wrong....
But in its civil aspects the single act or omission forms as many

distinct and unrelated wrongs as there are individuals injured by
39
it.1

Multiple punitive awards are permissible because each
award serves as punishment only for the legal wrong that is
actually before the court-the wrong done to the individual

plaintiff.
Of course, if that is so, it follows that each punitive
damages award must be fixed in an amount designed to punish

only the individual wrong.

It must not punish other legal

wrongs-wrongs to other victims-that stemmed from the same

act or course of conduct but were not directly at issue.
The courts recognized that very principle in the earliest
decisions to raise the specter of multiple punishment: those
addressing the question whether, in cases involving seduction
and breach of a promise to marry, it was permissible for both
the seduced woman and her father to obtain punitive damages
from the seducer for the same wrongful conduct. 40 In the first
Bennett v. Strow, 220 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ("It is elemental that
each person induced by fraudulent misrepresentations to make a purchase has
suffered a separate wrong and has a separate cause of action." (citing Brenner
v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 11 N.E.2d 890, 891 (N.Y. 1937))).
137. 99 So. 158 (Ala. 1923).
138. Id. at 159.
139. Id. at 160 (citations omitted).
140. At common law, seduction was a cause of action available only to the
father, usually when his daughter had become pregnant.
See Lea
VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817, 821-22, 826
n.33 (1996). The only cause of action available to the daughter was for breach
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such decision-the 1769 case of Tullidge v. Wade141-the Court
of Common Pleas sustained a judgment of punitive damages in
favor of the father of a seduced daughter. Dismissing concerns
about unfair multiple punishment, Lord Chief Justice Wilmot
remarked that, if the daughter "brings another action against
defendant for the breach of promise of marriage, so much the
better; he ought to be punished twice."'142 Crucially, however,
the court explained that it surely would have been improper in
the instant case (brought by the father) for the jury to have also
punished the defendant for the harm that his acts caused to the
daughter. 143 It was only because the jury was properly
instructed not to do so, 44 and because the comparatively low
amount of the judgment suggested that the jury followed its
instructions, that there was no ground for reversal. 45 In other
words, the defendant "ought to be punished twice," but only
once for each distinct legal wrong.
The American courts agreed. As the justification for
punitive damages was in flux in the early part of the
nineteenth century, American courts employed differing
rationales for allowing multiple punitive damages awards in
seduction and breach of promise to marry cases. Some courts
appeared to treat punitive damages primarily as compensation
for the non-pecuniary injury and insult suffered by the
victims. 46 Because the father and the daughter each suffered
serious, yet distinct, injuries, these courts had no problem
of a promise to marry.

Id. at 840 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES *142 n.30). Although breach of a promise to marry sounded in

contract, the courts treated it like a tort, and allowed awards of punitive
damages. See Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract:
The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 222-23
(1977). Throughout the nineteenth century, however, courts and legislatures
began to grant standing to women to sue on their own behalf for seduction. See
VanderVelde, supra, at 891-94.
141. 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1769).
142. Id. at 909 (Wilmot, C.J.).
143. See id. at 910 (Bathurst, J.).
144. The court noted,
Upon summing up the evidence to the jury, the Judge (Gould) was
pleased to say, that he told them over and over again, that, in giving
damages in this action, they must not consider the injury done to A.B.
as to the promise of marriage, but must leave that matter quite out of
the question, because A.B. might have her action for breach of that
promise ....
Id. at 909.
145. See id. at 909-10.
146. See infra note 149.
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allowing both victims to recover exemplary damage awards for
the same wrongful conduct. 4 7 As the Illinois Supreme Court
explained, the exemplary damages awarded to the father "are
only such as he may have sustained in the disgrace brought
upon his family, in his wounded feelings, or otherwise, and
nothing is allowed on account of the suffering and disgrace of
the daughter." 148 As such,
[ilt does not follow.., that the seducer will be made to pay double
damages for the same injury. He pays to the father for the injury
done him; if the daughter is permitted to recover, it is for the injury
done her, and it often happens that by one act, a wrong
may be done
149
several persons, for which, each has a right of action.

Other early American courts, however-like the English
court in Tullidge v. Wade-treated punitive damages in these
cases not only as compensation, but also as a punishment and
deterrent. Still, because each punitive damages award served
to punish a different injury, those courts saw no unfairness in
allowing awards to both the father and the daughter in
separate actions. For instance, in Stevenson v. Belknap, 150
decided by the Iowa Supreme Court in 1858, the court noted
that, to resolve the question of whether both the father and the
daughter may recover punitive damages for seduction, 15 1 it was
147. See infra notes 148-49.
148. Tubbs v. Van Kleek, 12 Ill. 446, 448 (1851).
149. Id. In 1834, the Missouri Supreme Court argued,
[N]or is it a reason why the daughter should not be permitted to
recover on the breach of a marriage contract for a seduction procured
under cover of the contract, that the father may give it in evidence
and recover in his action for the same seduction. Money at most can
afford but a paltry and inadequate recompense for the loss of virtue
and character to the child; or for the loss of the child's society, and the
peace and happiness of the family, to the parent. They each sustain
injuries peculiar to themselves, and for which each should have
redress.
Green v. Spencer, 3 Mo. 225, 227 (1834). The Virginia Supreme Court
reiterated in 1856,
That such promise is an independent cause of action by the daughter,
is no good reason why it should not be proved in aggravation of
[exemplary] damages in the father's action for seduction ....
Each
has a perfect right to recover damages to the full extent of the wrong
done to each; and in order to do so, may prove whatever may
reasonably serve to show the measure of damages sustained by each.
White v. Campbell, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 573, 574 (1856); cf. Paul v. Frazier, 3
Mass. 71, 73 (1807) ("[D]amages are recoverable for a breach of promise of
marriage; and if seduction has been practised under color of that promise, the
jury will undoubtedly consider it as an aggravation of damages.").
150. 6 Iowa 96 (1858).
151. In derogation of the common law, Iowa afforded a statutory cause of
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necessary to determine "for what exemplary damages may be
given."152 The court recognized the principle that punitive
damages serve to punish the wrongdoer, 53 but rejected the
argument that the father should not be permitted to recover
punitive damages because the "defendant is still liable to an
action for seduction by the daughter; and if the father may
recover exemplary damages, it may result in their being twice
claimed against him in a civil suit, and the defendant is in
danger of being twice punished for the same injury." 154 That
argument missed the mark because it failed to recognize that
the "injury to the father is distinct from the injury, to the
daughter. They are different in character, and there is nothing
incompatible or inconsistent in the idea of both resulting from
the one wrongful act of defendant." 155 "If actions are brought
by both the father and the daughter,. . . the jury may consider
every fact which goes to the injury of the plaintiff.., and may
give damages commensurate with the injury sustained," that
is, "damages resulting to the plaintiff alone, and not to
56
another."
To the same effect is Phelin v. Kenderdine,157 decided by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1853, in which the court
allowed the father in a seduction case to introduce evidence of a
breach of promise of marriage as proof of the aggravated nature
of his own injury, notwithstanding the fact that the daughter
could bring her own action based on that breach. 158
Recognizing that punitive damages exist in part as
"punishment of the wrongdoer," 159 the court explained,
So far as the promise of marriage tends to show the nature of the
injury to the parent, or the means by which it was accomplished, the
evidence is as pertinent as any other circumstance which gives
character to the transaction; and the only instruction which the
defendant has a right to require in regard to such evidence is, that
the jury must not award to the father any part of the damages which
belong to the daughter, by reason of the breach of the contract of
marriage. It is written that "the way of the transgressor is hard;" but
there is no unjust hardship in two punishments where there are two
action to a seduced woman to sue on her own behalf. See id. at 101.
152. Id. at 100.
153. See id. at 104.
154.

Id. at 101.

155. Id. at 102.
156. Id. at 101.
157.
158.
159.

20 Pa. 354 (1853).
Id. at 362.
Id. at 361.
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offences. It is proper that the daughter should have her action on the
contract of marriage for the damages which she has sustained; and it
is equally just that the contract should be given in evidence in the
action by the father, where the defendant himself160has made use of it
as the means of deceiving and injuring the parent.

"The seducer who commits two offences, has no better right to
escape with a single punishment, than the burglar who
murders the servant in order that he may rob the house of the
61
master without opposition."'
Thus, the courts rejected the double jeopardy argument by
holding that, in any given case, the defendant may be punished
with an award of punitive damages only for the wrong done,
62
and the harm caused, to the individual plaintiff. 1
That was also the conclusion reached by the Michigan
Supreme Court in a different context in Ganssly v. Perkins,163 a
160. Id. at 362.
161. Id. at 363.
162. See Coil v. Wallace, 24 N.J.L. 291, 314-15 (1854) (rejecting the
argument that allowing punitive damages to both the father and the daughter
would mean that the defendant would "be twice mulcted in damages for the
same violation of duty" because each victim is entitled to punitive damages
'not flagrantly excessive or disproportionate to [his or her] injury"); Coryell v.
Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90, 91 (1791) (upholding award of punitive damages in a
breach of promise to marry case despite the fact that the father had previously
received an award of punitive damages in a seduction case in which the fact of
the breach of promise had entered into the punitive calculation); Brownell v.
McEwen, 5 Denio 367, 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (indicating that, where the
jury in a seduction case brought by the father also heard evidence of a possible
breach of a promise to marry, reversal would be appropriate only if it could be
established that the jury actually attempted to punish both the wrong to the
father and the wrong to the daughter); Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (Wis.
1914) (upholding a punitive damages award to the father in a seduction suit
despite the fact that the daughter had already recovered punitive damages in
a breach of promise to marry suit and rejecting the argument that "because
...the same act... constituted a wrong against two different persons the
defendant may... not be subject to exemplary damages at the suit of each").
In an effort to prevent multiple punishment for the same injury, a distinct
minority of courts refused to allow evidence of the seduction to be introduced
in the breach of promise to marry case at all, and vice versa. See, e.g., Foster
v. Scoffield, 1 Johns. 297, 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806); Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Pa.
80, 82 (1845). But those courts still allowed both victims to pursue their own
causes of action for punitive damages arising out of the same wrongful
conduct. Foster, 1 Johns. at 299; Weaver, 2 Pa. at 82.
163. 30 Mich. 492, 494-95 (1874). Michigan is one of a few states that
today treats exemplary damages as purely compensatory in nature. See
Kerwin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980) ("In
Michigan, exemplary damages are recoverable as compensation to the
plaintiff, not as punishment for the defendant."). In Ganssly, however, the
court clearly treated them at least in part as punishment. See 30 Mich. at
494-95. In fact, the court cited its recent decision in Kreiter v. Nichols, 28
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case involving the interpretation of a statute that provided that
"every wife, child, parent, guardian, husband, or other person,
who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or
otherwise, by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the
intoxication of any person" shall have an action against the
alcohol vendor, and may recover "actual and exemplary
damages." 164 The Ganssly court sought to determine to whom
punitive damages may be given under the statute, and in what
amount. Noting that "[t]here is nothing in these cases to
exempt them from the rules applied in any other cases of
actionable wrongs," 165 the court held that
exemplary damages should be given in those cases, and only in those
cases, where the plaintiff has some personal right to complain of a
wanton and willful wrong, which the wrong-doer, when he committed
it, must be regarded as having committed against the plaintiff
herself, in spite
of the injury he must have known she was likely to
66
suffer by it.

The court explained,
The foundation of exemplary damages.. . rests on the wrong done
willfully to the complaining party, and not to wrong done without
reference to that party. Otherwise, every one entitled under the
statute to bring an action might bring his or her separate action for
the same wrong, and while each would recover as his own actual
damages no more than his own injury, the same exemplary damages
would be multiplied and recoverable in addition to actual damages in
every one67of those actions. No such consequence can have been
intended.1

Historically, then, punitive damages, even when regarded
as punishment, were consciously limited to the amount
necessary to punish the defendant for the wrong done, and the
harm caused, to the individual plaintiff only. 168 Although they
Mich. 495 (1874), for an explanation of the "foundation of exemplary
damages." Ganssly, 30 Mich. at 495. In Kreiter, the court articulated "the
grounds on which such damages are allowed": They may be imposed "by way
of punishment" and should go "beyond what could be measured by way of
compensation." 28 Mich. at 499-500.
164. 30 Mich. at 494 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 2137 (1871)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 494-95.
167. Id. at 495.
168. This principle can also be distilled from the decision of New York's
highest court in Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808). The
question in Tillotson, a libel case, was whether the trial court erred in refusing
to allow the defendant to inform the jury that he had already paid to the
plaintiff a large punitive damages award for publishing essentially the same
libelous allegations in the very same newspaper just two weeks before the
publication of the libel at issue. Id. at 61-62. The court upheld the decision of
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ultimately served the public good, they were punishment not
for the public wrong, but for the private wrong to the plaintiff.
B. EXPLORING THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTION
Historically, the law did not recognize a concrete
distinction between the civil and the criminal law. 169 In the
time of Glanvill, in the twelfth century, all wrongs were
considered "criminal," and their prosecution in a single
proceeding, whether initiated by the government or the victim,
usually led to remedies of both punishment and
the trial court to exclude the evidence, holding that the two libels were
separate legal wrongs, calling for entirely separate awards of compensatory
and punitive damages. Id. at 62. In rejecting the notion that prior punitive
damages awards for separate but related legal wrongs should serve to mitigate
future awards, the court noted that it would obviously be inappropriate to
consider, in determining the proper amount of punitive damages, "a former
recovery, in favour of a different plaintiff" for the libel. Id. at 63.
It is also interesting to note (and it appears that, to date, no one has done
so), that the very first reported punitive damages cases-Wilkes v. Wood, 98
Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763), and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.
1763)-involved multiple punishment for the same course of conduct: the
invasion and rummaging by the King's messengers under the authority of an
invalid general warrant of the homes of persons suspected of publishing a
particular libelous pamphlet. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490; Huckle, 95 Eng.
Rep. at 768. In Wilkes, the jury rendered a punitive award of 1,000i. Wilkes,
98 Eng. Rep. at 499. In Huckle, the jury awarded 300E. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep.
at 768. Declaring that "[t]o enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless
warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a
law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a most
daring public attack made upon the liberty of the subject," Huckle, 95 Eng.
Rep. at 769, the courts allowed the awards in the name of punishment and
deterrence. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99; Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768-69.
In addition, one of the judges in Huckle noted that the appeal in that case was
"a motion to set aside 15 verdicts in effect; for all the other persons who have
brought actions against these messengers have had [punitive] verdicts for
200£ in each cause by consent, after two of the actions were fully heard and
tried." Id. at 769 (Bathurst, J.). The evidence in each case was limited to the
invasion of the individual plaintiffs home, and none of the judges thought
even to mention the possibility of excessive or impermissible multiple
punishment. See id. at 768-69; see also Beardmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep.
790, 793-94 (K.B. 1764) (noting that, in deciding whether the punitive
damages were excessive in these cases, "the Court must consider [all of the]
damages as given against Lord Halifax," the official who authorized every one
of the invalid searches).
169. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: Beyond the
Public/Private Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1091 (1989); Morton J.
Horwitz, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423, 1424 (1982) (noting that "only in the nineteenth century was the
public/private distinction brought to the center of the stage in American legal
and political theory").
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compensation. 170 For centuries after that, much of the business
of prosecuting crimes was undertaken by victims, rather than
the crown. 17 1 Thus, at the time of the earliest punitive
damages decisions in England, it did not seem particularly
incongruous to speak of punishment in a privately initiated
action.
During the eighteenth century, just as the doctrine of
punitive damages was emerging, legal thinkers were beginning
72
to articulate a distinction between public and private wrongs. 1
Blackstone explained in 1769,
The

distinction

of public

wrongs

from

private ..

seems

principally to consist in this: that private wrongs, or civil injuries, are
an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to
individuals, considered merely as individuals; public wrongs, or
crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public

rights and duties due to the whole community,
considered as a
173
community, in its social aggregate capacity.

Blackstone recognized that a single odious act can constitute
both a public and a private wrong: "In all cases, the crime
includes an injury: every public offense is also a private wrong,
and somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it likewise
affects the community." 174 He saw no reason why each victimthe individual and the state-could not have a separate remedy
75
at law.
The permissible content of the private remedy soon became
the subject of some dispute, however.
Once the courts
embraced a clear divide between wrongs to the state and
wrongs to the individual, they began to see each type of wrong
as calling for an entirely different type of remedy. Thus, during
the following century, the distinction between public and
170.

See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW

285, 403-04 (2d ed. 1981).
171. See, e.g., Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial
Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 357, 359-72 (1986); see also Note, supra

note 99, at 523 ("The common-law appeal of felony, a criminal proceeding
prosecuted by the victim or his relatives, survived into the nineteenth century.
A civil action of trespass as late as 1694 could result in criminal sanctions
against the defendant." (footnotes omitted)); William F. McDonald, The Role of
the Victim in America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION,
RETRIBUTION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 295 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel
III eds., 1977) (noting that criminal prosecutions in colonial America were
perceived as redressing an individual injury and were privately prosecuted).
172. See generally Harris, supra note 169, at 1079-99.
173. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 140, at *5.

174.

Id. at *6.

175.

Id.
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private wrongs blossomed, in America, into a full-blown
distinction between public and private law. 176 Public lawwhich was concerned exclusively with public wrongs-was the
sole business of the criminal courts. 177 The proper remedy for a
public wrong was punishment which sought to regulate
conduct. 178 Private law, on the other hand, was concerned only
with private wrongs and was the exclusive province of the civil
courts. 179
The proper remedy for private wrongs was
compensation, which sought to make victims whole, but did not
concern itself with the public law business of regulation. There
was no room for compensation in the public law and no room
180
for punishment in the private law.
176. See generally Harris, supra note 169, at 1079-99; Horwitz, supra note
169, passim.
177. See Harris, supra note 169, at 1090.
178. See id.; Horwitz, supra note 169, at 1425-26.
179. See Harris, supra note 169, at 1090; Horwitz, supra note 169, at 142526.
180. See Horwitz, supra note 169, at 1424-26. The triumph of the rigid
distinction between public and private law was short-lived. See Harris, supra
note 169, at 1093-96. The distinction originally emerged in an "effort of
orthodox judges and jurists to create a legal science that would sharply
separate law from politics." Horwitz, supra note 169, at 1425. Public law
alone was concerned with regulating conduct; private law was simply "a
neutral system for facilitating voluntary market transactions and vindicating
injuries to private rights." Id. at 1426. But by the late nineteenth century,
just as the distinction was beginning to enjoy widespread acceptance in the
courts, critics were already setting out to debunk it. Thus, Professor Austin
declared in 1869 that "publiclaw and private law are names which should be
banished [from] the science; for since each will apply indifferently to every
department of the law, neither can be used conveniently to the purpose of
signifying any." 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 68 (5th ed.,
photo. reprint 1911); see also 2 id. at 750. Austin rejected the notion that
there was a distinction between public and private law that could sensibly be
expressed in terms of the difference between the ends sought by civil
proceedings (compensation) and those sought by criminal proceedings
(punishment and deterrence), because civil sanctions also serve the goal of
preventing future misconduct. See 1 id. at 503-05. A dozen years later,
Holmes famously announced that "the general principles of criminal and civil
liability are the same." OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 44 (35th prtg.
1943). In the decades that followed, nearly every significant American legal
thinker followed suit,
devot[ing] themselves to attacking the premises behind the
public/private distinction. Paralleling arguments then current in
political economy, they ridiculed the invisible-hand premise behind
any assumption that private law could be neutral and apolitical. All
law was coercive and had distributive consequences, they argued. It
must therefore be understood as a delegation of coercive public power
to individuals, and could only be justified by public policies.
Horwitz, supra note 169, at 1426. Thus, "[b]y 1940, it was a sign of legal
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On this reading, the doctrine of punitive damages no
longer made sense. For that reason, it endured progressively
more and more criticism throughout the nineteenth century, as
the public/private distinction took root in American legal
thought. As one mid-century commentator explained, "The
principal force of the argument against vindictive damages, lies
in the notion that the sole object of a civil suit is to give exact
compensation to a plaintiff."181 Although Greenleaf and his
followers had focused their early critique on the simple ground
that, as punishment, punitive damages lacked precedential
support-that the entire doctrine "seems to have arisen under a
mistaken idea, and as a result of unadvised dicta and
incompetent reasoning"' 8 2-their criticisms soon ran deeper, to
an argument that the existence of the doctrine, whether or not
it had been sanctioned by the courts, was an indefensible blight
on the symmetry of the law. By allowing punishment (a public
law remedy) in a civil lawsuit (a private law action), punitive
damages impermissibly blurred the fundamental line between
public and private law.18 3 As one writer put it, "the mingling of
the criminal principles with the civil, which the doctrine
184
necessitates, is altogether wrong."
sophistication to understand the arbitrariness of the division of law into public
and private realms." Id. Today, of course, the law continues to hang on to a
distinction between public and private wrongs, and between civil and criminal
law, but it understands that all legal rules serve to regulate conduct. Indeed,
the central thrust of the last thirty years of tort scholarship has focused on the
potential for compensatory tort liability to regulate behavior and to maximize
social welfare. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 84, at 3-16. See generally A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed.
1989).

181. Vindictive Damages, 11 AM. L.J. 61, 62 (1852).
182. Eliot, supra note 115, at 571.
183. This objection continues to form the basis of many modern critiques of
the punitive damages doctrine. See Harris, supra note 169, at 1089-90.
184. Eliot, supra note 115, at 573; see also, e.g., id. at 574 ("'[A] civil court
in matters of civil injury is a bad corrector of morals; it has only to do with the
rights of the parties ..... " (quoting Lord Commissioner Adam of Scotland in

Beattie v. Bryson, 1 Murr. R. 317)); Reading, supra note 119, at 306. Professor
Horwitz has noted that
[a] final example of the persistent effort of late nineteenth-century
legal thinkers to create a sharp distinction between public and
private law was the movement to eliminate punitive damages in tort.
Because the purpose of punitive damages was to use the tort law to
regulate conduct, not merely to compensate individuals for injuries,
their imposition was regarded as a usurpation of the public law
functions of the criminal law.
Horowitz, supra note 169, at 1425; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 113-15 (1992) (discussing
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Those nineteenth-century courts that struck down the
punitive damages doctrine did so in large part on these
grounds. In the memorable words of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court,
[Tihe idea of punishment is wholly confined to the criminal law, and
expressed in its forms of indictments, complaints, and penal actions.
What is a civil remedy but reparationfor a wrong inflicted, to the
injury of the party seeking redress,-compensation for damage
sustained by the plaintiff? How could the idea of punishment be
deliberately and designedly installed as a doctrine of civil remedies?
Is not punishment out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional,
unjust, unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous, when classed
among civil remedies? What kind of a civil remedy for the plaintiff is
the punishment of the defendant? The idea is wrong. It is a
monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence,
deforming the symmetry of the body of the law. 85

Despite this criticism, however, punitive damages
persevered in the vast majority of jurisdictions. By allowing
considerations of punishment and deterrence in a civil case,
they may have sullied the imaginary, pristine line between
public and private law, but they did not, in the eyes of the
courts, obliterate that distinction altogether by treating a
public wrong in a private setting. They did not, in other words,
fall on the wrong side of the emerging distinction between
public and private law; rather, they fell in between the cracks
of that distinction.
The contemporary critics charged that punitive damages
usurped the role of the criminal courts by serving a purely
public law end in a private law setting--"using a purely private
action to redress a public wrong"186-but that characterization
was unfair. The courts conceived of punitive damages as
punishment for the private wrong. 8 7 Thus, as the courts
understood them, punitive damages existed as a unique hybrid.
the nineteenth-century debate over punitive damages).
185. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872); see also, e.g., Murphy v.
Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 125-26 (Colo. 1884) (criticizing the anomalous nature of
punitive damages on these grounds); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25
P. 1072, 1073-75 (Wash. 1891) (same).
186. Murphy, 5 P. at 125; see also, e.g., Greenleaf, supra note 119, at 296
(charging that punitive damages redress "the injury to the public").
187. See, e.g., City of Charleston v. Beller, 30 S.E. 152, 152 (W. Va. 1898)
("The true definition of the word 'criminal,' . . . as distinguished from the word
'civil,'... is a violation of any law or ordinance of man subjecting the offender
to public punishment, including fine or imprisonment, and excluding redress
for private injury, punitive or compensatory." (emphasis added)); supra Part
III.A.
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The goal that they served-punishing the private wrong to the
individual-was distinct from pure private law in that it
punished the private wrong, rather than merely providing
compensation for it, but it was also distinct from pure public
law in that it punished the private wrong, rather than the
public one.
This was a goal that, under contemporary legal taxonomy,
could not be served by the criminal law. The criminal law was
concerned only with public wrongs; the private harm to
individuals was irrelevant. In Blackstone's words, "[T]he king,
in whom centres the majesty of the whole community, is
supposed by the law to be the person injured by every
infraction
of the public rights belonging to that
community ....
-188 In America, of course, that role was played
by the state. A crime was, by definition, a wrong done to the
state alone, as the representative of the community. Thus, as
one commentator has explained,
The late nineteenth century position was that crimes were no
business of any "private" party, including the victim: "We must
remember that a criminal offense is: an offense against the sovereign
state, and not against an individual, and that no individual, not even
the complaining witness, has the power or authority to control the
action of his sovereign, whose dignity, alone, is sought to be
vindicated."' 89

As such, punitive damages were intended to achieve an
interest that would otherwise have fallen by the wayside in a
legal system that was rigidly bifurcated along public and
private lines. Purely private law could compensate the wrong
to individuals, and purely public law could punish the wrong to
society, but neither could punish the defendant for the private
wrong to the individual-to vindicate the dignity not of the
sovereign, but of the individual victim. That was where
punitive damages fit in. The vindication of the dignity of the
victim was the whole point of punitive damages, which, it will
be recalled, were initially imposed only in cases involving insult
188. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 140, at *2.
189. Harris, supra note 169, at 1095 (quoting Ex parte Galbreath, 139 N.W.
1050, 1051 (N.D. 1913)); see also, e.g., Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 257, 262
(1876) (noting counsel's argument that "the definition of a criminal cause" is
"an offense against the public"); People ex rel. Schmittdiel v. Bd. of Auditors,
13 Mich. 233, 234 (1865) (contending that "the enforcement of criminal law" is
concerned with "offenders charged with violating the peace and dignity of the
state"); Legette v. Smith, 85 S.E.2d 576, 580 (S.C. 1955) ("In the criminal law,
where the issue is between the accused and the State,...

against the peace and dignity of the State.").

the offense is
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or affront to the honor and dignity of the victim. 190
To the extent that it can be attributed to anything more
than stare decisis,19 1 the survival of the punitive damages
doctrine in the face of vicious nineteenth-century criticism may
have reflected the judges' inability to stomach the full
consequences of the emerging public/private distinction. In
most instances, nineteenth-century judges were willing to limit
the individual victim's stake in a wrong to her right to full
compensation, and to treat retribution and deterrence as
interests of the state alone. When the wrong was deeply
personal, and constituted an affront to the honor and dignity of
the victim, however, the courts hung on to the notion that the
victim had a right to seek punishment as well: to demand that
the perpetrator be made to suffer for the wrong that he had
visited upon her. 192 In this regard, the punitive damages
doctrine can be thought of as an intellectual precursor to the
modern victims' rights movement in the criminal law, which
also seeks to recognize "the crime victim's privity of interest in
exacting justice for the harm committed," 193 and refuses to
190. See supra text accompanying notes 116-119; see also, e.g., Barry v.
Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 562 (1886) (noting that "exemplary damages [are]
calculated to vindicate [the plaintiffs] right[s]"); The Golden Gate, 16 F. Cas.
141, 143 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 8815) ("In an action against the perpetrator
of the wrong, the aggrieved party would be entitled to recover not only actual
damages but exemplary,-such as would vindicate his wrongs, and teach the
tort feasor the necessity of reform.").
191. See infra Part IV.
192. In fact, one of the early justifications for punitive damages was that
their availability would prevent insulted victims from seeking private revenge.
See, e.g., Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (C.P. 1814) (Heath, J.) ("It
goes to prevent the practice of duelling, if juries are permitted to punish insult
by exemplary damages."); SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, at 10;
Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173,
1198 (1931). For instance, in Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872), the Illinois
Supreme Court stated,
The act in question [spitting in the plaintiffs face in open court]
was one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by
force, and the law, as far as it may, should afford substantial
protection against such outrages, in the way of liberal damages, that
the public tranquillity may be preserved by saving the necessity of
resort to personal violence as the only means of redress.
Id. at 554.
193. Cardenas, supra note 171, at 390; see also, e.g., Josephine Gittler,
Expanding the Role of the Victim in a CriminalAction: An Overview of Issues
and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 140-42 (1984) (symposium issue) (arguing
that the victim has a retributive interest in seeing that the defendant is
punished); McDonald, supra note 171, at 295-96 (criticizing the criminal law
notion that, because crime is an offense against the state alone, the victim has
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accept the notion that the individual victim has no right to
vindication, as distinct from compensation.
Although, under the historical conception, punitive
damages ostensibly addressed a purely private interest, the
courts understood that the ends that they served-punishment
and deterrence-were beneficial not only to the individual
victim, but also to society. To capture this concept, the
American courts adopted the descriptive device employed by
Theodore Sedgwick: the doctrine of punitive damages "blends
94
together the interest of society and the aggrieved individual."'
Thus, numerous courts endorsed the principle that
"[e]xemplary, vindictive, or punitory damages are such as blend
together the interests of society and of the aggrieved individual,
and are not only a recompense to the suffering, but also a
punishment to the offender and an example to the
community." 195
The historical understanding of punitive
damages was that they punish the purely private wrong to the
victim and, in so doing, also benefit the public, but the public
benefit is, in a sense, a welcome incidental effect of the private

punishment. 196
no right to vindication); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: The Role of the
Victim, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 209, 210 (issue entitled CRIME,
CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY) (explaining that the victims' rights movement is
premised on the notion that the desire for revenge is a legitimate value in the
criminal law); Doug Janicik, Note, Allowing Victims' Families to View
Executions: The Eighth Amendment and Society's Justifications for
Punishment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 935, 937-38 (2000) (explaining that the recent
wave of statutes affording victims' families the right to attend executions are a
product of the victims' rights movement, and are motivated by the family's
perceived need to know that justice has been done and that the perpetrator
has been made to pay); Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment
and War, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1232 (2002) ("The crime victim, in current
American understanding, has a tangible interest in seeing the criminal
punished and in ensuring that he can do no further harm. The development of
these normative theories is particularly visible in three areas: preventive
detention, the death penalty, and the victims' rights amendment.").
194. Sedgwick, supra note 122, at 194.
195. Fla. Cent. & Peninsular R.R. v. Mooney, 24 So. 148, 150 (Fla. 1898);
see also, e.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885); Yerian v.
Linkletter, 22 P. 70, 70 (Cal. 1889); Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 294, 297-98
(1872); Stacy v. Portland Publ'g Co., 68 Me. 279, 287 (1878) ("It is said, in
vindication of the theory of punitive damages, that the interests of the
individual injured and of the society are blended."); Osmun v. Winters, 46 P.
780, 782 (Or. 1896) ("[P]unitive or vindictive damages... may operate as a
punishment in the interest of society as well as for the doing of a willful
personal injury to a fellow mortal.").
196. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, 41 Iowa 686, 688 (1875) (noting that
"vindictive damages are never allowed alone for the purpose of public good

2003]

MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT PROBLEM

637

C. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE CURRENT DOCTRINE
Many commentators have lamented that the hornbook
rules of punitive damages law do not accord with the standard
modern conception of punitive damages as punishment for
socially wrongful conduct (or with the recent economicsinspired conception of punitive damages as an engine of cost
internalization).' 97 Rules that appear random and unprincipled
under the modern conception, however, suddenly make sense
when viewed through the lens of the historical understanding
of punitive damages as punishment for a private wrong. Since
punitive damages are-under this conception-punishment, it
is appropriate to require a culpable mental state on the part of
the defendant, 198 and to tailor the amount of the penalty both to
the defendant's wealth 199 and to the degree of reprehensibility
of its conduct. 200
Similarly, since punitive damages are
punishment for a purely private wrong, it makes sense to give

through the example given in their assessment," rather "[tihe effect upon the
public is but an incident"). In 1901, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted
that
punitive damages go to the plaintiff, not as a fine or penalty for a
public wrong, but in vindication of a private right which has been
willfully invaded; and, indeed, it may be said that such damages in a
measure compensate or satisfy for the willfulness with which the
private right was invaded, but, in addition thereto, operating as a
deterring punishment to the wrongdoer, and as a warning to others.
Watts v. S. Bound R.R., 38 S.E. 240, 242 (S.C. 1901); see also infra note
319.
197. See supra Part II.
198. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616-17 (1994) (noting
that our legal system generally does not permit harsh punishment in the
absence of a culpable mens rea); HOLMES, supra note 180, at 3 ("Vengeance
imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that
a wrong has been done. It can hardly go very far beyond the case of a harm
intentionally inflicted: even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over
and being kicked.").
199. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, Justice Breyer, concurring,
explained that
[since a fixed dollar award will punish a poor person more than a
wealthy one, one can understand the relevance of this factor to the
State's interest in retribution (though not necessarily to its interest in
deterrence, given the more distant relation between a defendant's
wealth and its responses to economic incentives).
517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
200. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A,
at 3 (1995) ("Some argue that appropriate punishment should be defined
primarily on the basis of the principle of 'just deserts.' Under this principle,
punishment should be scaled to the offender's culpability and the resulting
harms.").
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them to the plaintiff, rather than to the government or to
society at large, neither of which were the victim of the wrong
being punished, 2 1 and it is at least understandable, if still a bit
disquieting, that the defendant is deprived of criminal
procedural safeguards, as the Supreme Court has historically
required those protections only when the courts seek to punish
20 2
public wrongs.
In fact, some of the principles of punitive damages law that
cannot be squared with the prevailing modern conception of
punitive damages were demonstrably born of the historical
conception. For instance, the universal rule that a plaintiff
must prevail on an underlying cause of action and establish an
entitlement to actual damages in order to receive punitive
damages 20 3 is an outgrowth of the principle that punitive
damages operate to punish the defendant only for the legal
wrong committed against the plaintiff. If the plaintiff cannot
establish the underlying tort, then there is no private legal
wrong to be punished. As the South Carolina Supreme Court
201. Cf Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998)
(noting that penalties that are paid to the state must be intended to redress
the public interest, rather than the interest of the individual); Paul H.
Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinctionand the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 201, 207 (1996) (noting that criminal fines are paid to the state because
they redress wrongs to society).
202. See infra Part IV.
203. See infra note 260 and accompanying text; see also Richard C. Tinney,
Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing of Actual Damages to Support Award of
Punitive Damages-Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 11, § 2(a), at 18 (1985) ("The
general rule that punitive damages may not be awarded unless the party
seeking them has sustained actual damage is accepted universally ...."). The
courts are, however, divided on the subsidiary questions: first, whether proof
that the plaintiff sustained actual damages is sufficient to support punitive
damages in circumstances in which, for whatever reason, the jury chose not to
award any compensatory damages; and second, whether punitive damages
may be awarded in a case in which the plaintiff recovered only nominal
damages by way of compensation. See id. at 19. Historically, the courts that
refused to allow punitive damages when the compensatory damages were only
nominal were motivated by the fact that punitive damages punish the
defendant only for the harm to the individual plaintiff. For example, in 1878
the Maine Supreme Court asserted that
[sluch damages are to be awarded against a defendant for
punishment. But, if all the individual injury is merely technical and
theoretical, what is the punishment to be inflicted for? If a plaintiff,
upon all such elements of injury as were open to him, is entitled to
recover but nominal damages, shall he be the recipient of penalties
awarded on account of an injury or a supposed injury to others beside
himself?
Stacy v. Portland Publ'g Co., 68 Me. 279, 287-88 (1878).
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explained in 1901, the reason that punitive damages "can only
be awarded to vindicate the right of the plaintiff, and only in
case actual injury has been inflicted" is that, "in the absence of
actual injury to plaintiff, such damages cannot be given merely
in punishment for a wrong to the public." 20 4 This is so because
punitive damages go to the plaintiff, not as a fine or penalty for a
public wrong, but in vindication of a private right which has been
willfully invaded; and, indeed, it may be said that such damages in a
measure compensate or satisfy for the willfulness with which the
private right was invaded, but, in addition thereto, operating as a
deterring punishment to the wrongdoer, and as a warning to
others .205

The rule that the amount of punitive damages must bear a
reasonable relationship to the amount of compensatory
damages is also a direct remnant of the historical conception of
punitive damages. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the "principle that
exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to
compensatory damages has a long pedigree." 20 6 It is reflected
in dozens of cases going back to the earliest days of punitive
damages. 20 7 This principle explicitly arose from the notion that
the proper amount of punitive damages depends on the severity
of the injury to the plaintiff. As one court explained,
"[E]xemplary damages should bear some reasonable proportion
to the actual damages sustained, and what we mean by that
expression is that the character of the injury inflicted should in
some degree be considered by the jury in measuring the

204. Watts v. S. Bound R.R., 38 S.E. 240, 242 (S.C. 1901).
205. Id.
206. 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996).
207. See, e.g., Mobile & Montogmery R.R. v. Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 15, 33 (1872)
("The punitive damage ought also to bear proportion to the actual damages
sustained."); Flannery v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 111, 125 (1885)
(stating that when the punitive damages award "is out of all proportion to the
injuries received, we feel it our duty to interfere"); Hennies v. Vogel, 87 Ill.
242, 245 (1877) (reversing where punitive damages were "out of all proportion
to the injury inflicted"); Saunders v. Mullen, 24 N.W. 529, 529 (Iowa 1885)
("When the actual damages are so small, the amount allowed as exemplary
damages should not be so large."); Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447, 448
(1852) ("[E]xemplary damages allowed should bear some proportion to the real
damage sustained . . . ."); McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90, 91-92 (1875)

(declaring that punitive damages "enormously in excess of what may justly be
regarded as compensation" for the injury must be set aside "to prevent
injustice"). Indeed, so well established is this pedigree that the Gore Court
made the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages an integral part
of the federal due process excessiveness inquiry. See 517 U.S. at 580-83.
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punishment to be meted out."20 8 In focusing on "the actual
harm inflicted on the plaintiff,"20 9 rather than on the harm to
society and all of the victims, 2 10 this principle-like the rule
that a plaintiff must sustain actual damages in order to recover
punitive damages-is a modern day reflection of the historical
conception of punitive damages as punishment for individual
wrongs.
Indeed, in the 1970s, a few courts seized upon these black
letter rules as grounds for rejecting the emerging modern
conception of punitive damages, and thus rejecting the nascent
practice of awarding "total harm" punitive damages. For
instance, in Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,211 the plaintiff, an

208. Pendleton v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 95 S.E. 941, 944 (W. Va. 1918); see
also, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 52 I1. 347, 351 (1869) (holding that "vindictive
damages ... must bear some sort of proportion to the injury done" and noting
that a wrong "if done to a vagrant, or to a person of but little character in
community" does not warrant "the same damages [the jury] would give a man
whose station and respectability were unquestioned").
209. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580.
210. It is true that modern courts applying the ratio requirement
sometimes compare the punitive damages to the potential harm that the
defendant's actions may have caused. See id. at 581 (discussing TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (plurality opinion)). In
so doing, however, the courts are examining the potential "harm to the victim
that would have ensued if the tortious plan had succeeded." Id. (emphasis
added); see also TXO, 509 U.S. at 462 (speaking of "potential harm' to
respondents"). In other words, punitive damages must bear a reasonable
relationship to the actual and potential harm to the plaintiff, not the actual
and potential harm to others. This has always been the law, and it is merely a
reflection of the fact that sometimes the measure of the legal wrong done to
the individual victim is greater than the actual harm that the victim suffered.
See, e.g., Hildreth v. Hancock, 55 Ill. App. 572, 574-75 (1894) ("[Elxemplary
damages may well be proportioned to the extent of the injury intended rather
than to that actually done ....
"), affd, 156 Ill. 618 (1895); Gilreath v. Allen,
32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 67, 70 (1849) (asserting that damages "should not be
restricted to a mere compensation for the injury actually done, however short
it may be of the injury intended, and which would have been suffered, had not
the plaintiffs character been too high to be reached by the tongue of slander");
Benson v. Frederick, 97 Eng. Rep. 1130, 1130 (K.B. 1766) (noting, in a case in
which the defendant ordered the public flogging of the innocent plaintiff, that
the punitive "damages were very great, and beyond the proportion of what the
man had suffered," but explaining "that it was rather owing to the lenity of the
drummers than of the colonel, that the man did not suffer more"). When the
Supreme Court does refer to potential harm to other victims, it speaks of "the
possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future
behavior were not deterred." TXO, 509 U.S. at 460 (plurality opinion)
(emphasis added). This is a reflection of the deterrent purpose of punitive
damages, discussed infra.
211. 374 F. Supp. 850, 852 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
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individual, brought suit alleging that he suffered a serious
impairment to his vision as a result of using Aralen, a drug
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff sought "total
harm" punitive damages on the theory that "punitive damages
are imposed to punish an outrage to society" and therefore can
2 12
be based on "the impact of Aralen on the whole of society."
The plaintiff intended to "argue to the jury that punitive
damages should be assessed against Sterling in an amount
reflecting the wrong perpetrated against [him] and all like
2 13
consumers of Aralen."
The court rejected the plaintiffs theory, noting that
"Pennsylvania has consistently required that the plaintiff
secure a verdict for compensatory damages as a prerequisite to
punitive damages" and that "Pennsylvania requires a
reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive
damages." 214 In light of these limitations, and of the prospect of
multiple punishment, 2 15 the court refused to "allow the plaintiff
to argue that he should receive punitive damages in a sum
computed by the size of Sterling's affront to society," labeling
that argument "folly" and "ludicrous."2 16 Instead, the court
held that "the computation of the punitive damage verdict, if
any, must be a reasonable sum in relation to the defendant's
conduct vis-a-vis the plaintiff."217 That is to say, "[E]ach Aralen
consumer showing a bona fide injury may, if the evidence
warrants, collect his reasonable proportion of the punitive
2 18
damages the defendant owes to 'society.'
Aside from an endorsement from another judge in a
neighboring federal district court 2 19 and a favorable mention in
212. Id. at 856.
213. Id.
214.

Id.

215.

The court declared that

[i]n the context of the instant case, the plaintiffs argument creates a
genuine opportunity for multiple recovery at the defendants' expense.

We note that this is not the only personal injury suit involving Aralen
directed against Sterling. Applying the plaintiffs rationale, each
injured consumer

of Aralen, using identical evidence regarding

testing, notice, etc., could individually recover on behalf of "society" to
punish the affront.
Id. at 857.
216.

Id. at 856-57.

217. Id. at 856.
218. Id. at 857.
219. See Thomas v. Am. Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 264
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
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a footnote in a single law review article, 220 this decision went
largely unnoticed and quickly passed into obscurity. 221 That is
a shame, because the court was on to something.
So too was the Alaska Supreme Court in Sturm, Ruger &
Co. v. Day.222 In that case, the jury determined the appropriate
amount of punishment by seeking to completely remove the
profits from the defendant's sales of defective handguns. The
jurors multiplied the number of defective revolvers that the
defendant had sold by the amount of additional manufacturing
cost per revolver that the defendant would have incurred had it
cured the defect, thus rendering an award "roughly equal to the
profit directly attributable to Sturm, Ruger's callous disregard
for the safety of its customers." 223 The court struck down the
award because it was
so out of proportion to the amount of actual damages as to suggest
that the jury's award was the result of passion or prejudice. The
jurors apparently responded to an invitation to punish Sturm, Ruger
for all wrongs committed against all purchasers and users of its
products, rather than for the wrong done to this particular plaintiff." 4
220. See David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 51 n.243 (1982).
Professor Owen endorsed the district court's reasoning on the grounds that
"[t]his view probably is correct in that it relates the punitive award to the
plaintiffs injury consistent with traditional doctrine, reduces substantially the
incentive to race to the courthouse, and anticipates a multiplicity of similar
actions that together will result in many smaller 'stings' to the manufacturer."
Id. Thus, Professor Owen concluded that "the defendant should [not] be forced
to redress the totality of its wrong to the public in a single action and a single
punitive damages award." Id.
221. One notable exception is 3 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 17.31, at 17-98 (3d ed. 1992). This treatise
cites the case for the proposition that
[p]unitive damages may not be awarded for the benefit of parties not
before the court directly or indirectly (e.g., class members who have
not opted out of the class) because defendants are not being punished
for the same wrongful conduct in related claims. Rather, in any
particular case, defendants are being punished solely for their
violation of their duty to named (or properly represented) claimants,
and the punitive damages are appropriately limited.
Id.
222. 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), on reh'g, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980).
223. Id. at 50 (Burke, J., dissenting in part).
224. Id. at 48 (majority opinion). On rehearing, however, the court seems
to have backed off of this reasoning. See Sturm, 615 P.2d at 624 & n.3
(concluding that the jury verdict was excessive, but not the result of passion
and prejudice, and noting that, while "a comparison of actual damages with
the punitive damages is a factor which may enter into the determination of
excessiveness[,J ...there may be cases in which it is of only slight value or is
totally inapplicable").
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Although these decisions have been drowned out by
contrary cases, they serve to illustrate that the black letter
rules of modern punitive damages law accord with a conception
of punitive damages as punishment for individual private
wrongs, not with a conception of punitive damages as
punishment for the wrong to society. Indeed, the only aspect of
modern punitive damages practice that does not conform to the
historical conception is the practice of awarding "total harm"
punitive damages-a practice that emerged only recently, and
without substantial analysis or explanation.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HISTORICAL
CONCEPTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE DOCTRINE
Although an examination of the historical origins of
common law doctrines is usually interesting, and often
compelling, it is rarely dispositive; the law can and does evolve
over time. In this regard, it might, at first glance, seem more
sensible to bridge the logical discord between the modern
conception of punitive damages and traditional punitive
damages doctrine by updating the outdated doctrine to fit the
current conception, rather than reverting to the historical
understanding. Given the unique circumstances of punitive
damages, however, I do not believe that such a path is
available. Punitive damages owe their constitutionality solely
to their history. To abandon the historical conception of
punitive damages in favor of the modern notion of punitive
damages as punishment for public wrongs is, I believe, to all
225
but concede their unconstitutionality.
From their earliest days, punitive damages have skated on
the thinnest of constitutional ice. Their nineteenth-century
critics, like Greenleaf, attacked them not only on the grounds of
precedent and legal symmetry, but also on constitutional and
fairness grounds. The critics argued that
even if it be allowable to fine the defendants in a civil court, there
seems no reason why the plaintiff should be the recipient ....

If the

plaintiff is entitled to damages as a matter of right, let him receive
them in their proper character of indemnity; if he is not so entitled,
there is no power in any government which can justly deprive another
of his property for plaintiffs benefit. Judicial procedure ought not to

225. This is so because of the punitive aspect of punitive damages. I
express no opinion here on the reconceptualization of punitive damages as an
engine of optimal deterrence. See supra Part II.B.
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What is more, contended the critics, the fusion of civil and
criminal principles unconstitutionally tramples upon the rights
of the defendant. "[T]he unfortunate defendant is not only not
permitted to ask to have this anomalous crime, for such it
is denied
amounts to, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but
227
many other rights accorded to the lowest criminal."
Perhaps the most blistering nineteenth-century assault
upon the constitutionality of punitive damages came from the
pen of Judge Foster of the New Hampshire Supreme Court:
Why longer tolerate a false doctrine, which, in its practical
exemplification, deprives a defendant of his constitutional right of
indictment or complaint on oath before being called into court?
deprives him of the right of meeting the witnesses against him face to
face? deprives him of the right of not being compelled to testify
against himself? deprives him of the right of being acquitted, unless
the proof of his offence is established beyond all reasonable doubt?
deprives him of the right of not being punished twice for the same
offence?
Punitive damages destroy every constitutional safeguard within
their reach. And what is to be gained by this annihilation and
obliteration of fundamental law? The sole object, in its practical
results, seems to be, to give a plaintiff something which he does not
claim in his declaration. If justice to the plaintiff required the
destruction of the constitution, there would be some pretext for
wishing the constitution were destroyed. But why demolish the
plainest guaranties of that instrument, and explode the very
foundation upon which constitutional guaranties are based, for no
other purpose than228 to perpetuate false theories and develop
unwholesome fruits?

226. Eliot, supra note 115, at 573-74.
227. Lewis L. Smith, Punitive Damages, 32 AM. L. REG. & REV. 517, 518
(1893) (presently entitled U. PA. L. REV.). As another nineteenth-century
critic put it,
One of the greatest objections ... to the doctrine of punitive damages,
in my opinion, consists in this. When a man is fined for the
commission of an offense, at least where the fine is a heavy one, the
accusation against him is, as a general rule in the United States, first
submitted to a grand jury, which is supposed to carefully examine the
Upon
evidence against him before they find an indictment.
indictment found his case is submitted to a jury, He enjoys, as a rule,
a large privilege of peremptory challenge, and is surrounded by a
great many safeguards denied to him in a civil action. A mere
preponderance of testimony does not convict; his guilt has to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gustave Koerner, Punitive Damages, 4 WiSC. LEGAL NEWS 380, 380 (1882).
228. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1872). One nineteenth-century
commentator referred to this opinion as "a perfect legal fusilade regarding the
subject" of punitive damages. Exemplary Damages, 8 WASH. L. REP. 49, 50
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This criticism was as widespread as it was bilious. It
would be difficult to overestimate the extent to which these
critiques pervaded the judicial and academic discourse on
punitive damages in the nineteenth century.
In the face of these vehement attacks, about the only thing
that most courts could say in defense of punitive damages was
that they had been around for a long time-and it was that fact
alone that preserved their existence against constitutional
attack.
For instance, the chief justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, whose opinion was shared by all members of
the court, 229 declared in 1877 that "[iun the controversy between
Prof. Greenleaf and Mr. Sedgwick, I cannot but think that the
former was right in principle, though the weight of authority
may be with the latter."230 Still, because "the rule was
adopted.., long ago.., and has been repeatedly affirmed
since," it was "too late to overturn it by judicial decision." 23 1 A
"rule so long and so generally established is a sin against sound
232
judicial principle, not against the constitution."
The same conclusion was reached by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in 1891. The court was "disposed to think that
the weight of the argument is in favor of the view contended for
by Greenleaf,-that in no case should damages be awarded
against a defendant, in a civil action, by way of punishment."233
Thus, "if the question were an entirely open one," the court
"would be disposed to adopt that view."234 Since "the doctrine
[was] settled[] by a long line of unbroken authority" in South
Carolina, however, the court refused to reconsider the issue. 235
(1881).
229. See Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 286 (1878) ("[The Chief Justice]
believes that his views of punitory damages, as an original question, are

sanctioned by every present member of the court.").
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Bass v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877) (Ryan, C.J.).
Id. at 673.
Brown, 44 Wis. at 288.
Duckett v. Pool, 13 S.E. 542, 547 (S.C. 1891).
Id.
Id.; see also, e.g., The Harriet Newhall, 11 F. Cas. 598, 598 (D. Mass.

1856) (No. 6102) (noting that it is "quite clear in theory that Mr. Greenleaf
maintains the true principle," but that it is doubtful whether the case law
supports his position); Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 245, 257 (1864) ("Mr.
Greenleaf thinks the damages should be limited to compensation only.
Logically, we [think] he is right, and were the question an open one, we should
be inclined to adopt his view of the subject."); Cincinnati & Springfield Ry. v.
Sleeper, 3 Am. L. Rec. 464, 471 (Ohio. Super. Ct. 1874), available at 1874 WL

5363, at *6 (noting the writings of Greenleaf, but proclaiming that "[i]t is now
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Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the
doctrine in 1892, over a vigorous dissent proclaiming its
unconstitutionality, 2 36 on the sole ground "that it is the settled
rule of this state."237 Maine's Supreme Judicial Court also
endorsed the doctrine in 1861 because it was the settled "law in
238
nearly all the States of the Union" and England,
notwithstanding a heated dissent bemoaning "its inconsistency
with the universally recognized principles of natural justice"
239
and declaring it to "smack of barbarism."
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
upheld punitive damages solely on the basis of their historical
pedigree. As early as 1851, the Court wrote, "We are aware
that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some
writers; but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a
century are to be received as the best exposition of what the
law is, the question will not admit of argument."240 Some years
later, the Court expressed sympathy with the Greenleaf theory,
remarking that
[als the question of intention is always material in an action of tort,
and as the circumstances which characterize the transaction are,
therefore, proper to be weighed by the jury in fixing the compensation
of the injured party, it may well be considered whether the doctrine of
exemplary damages cannot be reconciled with the idea, that

too late to question the right, in a proper case, to recover such damages");
Dougherty v. Shown, 48 Tenn. 302, 306 (1870) (stating that punitive damages
have been "too often construed by this Court[] to be now disturbed"). As one
attorney argued in 1866,
If this were a new question, it would seem that the doctrine of
Greenleaf would be most consistent with true principle and legal
analogies. But a different rule has been so frequently laid down and
acted upon, both by the English and American courts, that an attempt
now to shake it would be an act of vain labor.
New Orleans,Jackson & Great Northern Railroad v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395, 406
(1866).
236. See Cornelius v. Hambay, 24 A. 515, 517 (Pa. 1892) (Williams, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
237. Id. at 515 (majority opinion).
238. Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539, 543 (1861).
239. Id. at 544-45 (Rice, J., dissenting). In 1884, the Colorado Supreme
Court, confronting the doctrine for the first time, found it unconstitutional
because it punishes the defendant without affording him the procedural
protections offered by the criminal law. See Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 120-21
(Colo. 1884). The court surmised that "[were this subject now presented to
the various courts of the country for the first time, we have little doubt as to
what the verdict would be." Id. at 120.
240. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
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241
compensation alone is the true measure of redress.

Nonetheless, explained the Court,
[J]urists have chosen to place this doctrine on the ground, not that
the sufferer is to be recompensed, but that the offender is to be
punished; and, although some text-writers and courts have
the general rule in
questioned its soundness, it has been accepted as242
England and in most of the States of this country.

After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court based its holding that "[tihe imposition of punitive or
exemplary damages in [tort] cases cannot be opposed as in
conflict with the prohibition against the deprivation of property
without due process of law" and "cannot therefore be justly
assailed as infringing upon the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States" solely on the ground that the
"propriety and legality [of punitive damages] have been
recognized... by repeated judicial decisions for more than a
century."243 When the Court revisited the question in 1991, it
explained that "the common-law method for assessing punitive
damages was well established before the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted" and "[n]othing in that Amendment's
text or history indicates an intention on the part of its drafters
to overturn the prevailing method." 244 It was because of "this
consistent history"-because "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has
not displaced the procedure of the ages"-that the Court found
no due process violation: "If a thing has been practised for two
hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case
245
for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it."
Awarding punitive damages as punishment for public
wrongs is not a practice that the courts have engaged in for 200
years, however. The fact that the historical institution of
punitive damages has been around for centuries immunizes it
from constitutional review, but it does not, of course, mean that
any remedy that a modern court chooses to call "punitive
damages" is automatically constitutional.
If the courts
completely change the fundamental nature of the institution of
punitive damages, slapping the old label on them will not avoid
all questions of constitutional infirmity.

241. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492 (1875).
242. Id. at 492-93.
243. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 36 (1889).
244. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1991).
245. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 111 (1934); Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988)).
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Quite the opposite is true. Because the courts-were
uncomfortable with the fairness of punitive damages even
under the historical conception, and indicated that, were it not
for the sanction of history, they would reject the practice
altogether, any reconceptualization would be constitutionally
suspect.
That is especially true of an effort to reconceptualize
punitive damages as punishment for public wrongs. To convert
punitive damages from punishment for a private wrong-a goal
that could not be accomplished by the criminal law-to
punishment for a public wrong-the very raison d'etre of the
criminal law-would be to create a fundamentally different,
and markedly less defensible, institution. Indeed, as explained
above, it was the fact that punitive damages punish only the
private wrong to the victim, rather than the public wrong, that
led courts to uphold them against early double jeopardy and
246
due process challenges.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that criminal
procedural safeguards must apply to all sanctions that are
properly categorized

as penal. 247

As early as

1892,

in

246. See supra Part III.A. Some of the cases that relied on the distinction
between punishment for the public wrong and punishment for the private
wrong in upholding the constitutionality of punitive damages were the very
same cases in which the judges indicated that, were the issue an open one,
they would reject the doctrine altogether. See, e.g., Brown v. Swineford, 44
Wis. 282, 286-89 (1878).
247. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1963).
The Court observed in 1946,
Those who wrote our Constitution ... intended to safeguard the
people of this country from punishment without trial by duly
constituted courts. And even the courts to which this important
function was entrusted were commanded to stay their hands until
and unless certain tested safeguards were observed. An accused in
court must be tried by an impartial jury, has a right to be represented
by counsel, he must be clearly informed of the charge against him, the
law which he is charged with violating must have been passed before
he committed the act charged, he must be confronted by the witnesses
against him, he must not be compelled to incriminate himself, he
cannot twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense, and even after
conviction no cruel and unusual punishment can be inflicted upon
him.
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1946) (citation omitted); see
also, e.g., Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.)
(holding that criminal procedural protections apply to any "infractions of the
law, visited with punishment as such"); cf Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 63132 (1988) (concluding that any sanction for contempt that operates in practice
as punishment may not be imposed without full criminal procedural
protections).
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Huntington v. Attrill, the Court held that "[t]he test whether a
law is penal, in the strict and primary sense, is whether the
wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a
wrong to the individual, according to the familiar classification
of Blackstone." 248 Subsequently, relying on that case, the Court
held that punitive damages are not penal because, rather than
addressing the public wrong, they are calibrated by reference to
the private injury. 249 That distinction between redressing
public and private wrongs remains an important element in the
Supreme Court's current test for determining whether a
sanction is sufficiently penal to require criminal procedural
safeguards. 250 Indeed, the law continues, in the tradition of
Blackstone, 25 1 to treat the terms "crime" and "public wrong" as
essentially synonymous. 252 Thus, a number of commentators
(along with two Justices) have noted that punitive damages,
under their modern conception, clearly appear to meet the test
for requiring criminal procedural protections. 253 The only way
248. 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892); see also, e.g., HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW 359 (3d American ed. 1878) (noting that the salient characteristic of a
tort is "that the person who suffers it, and not the State, is conceived to be
wronged"); id. at 372 (noting that "the conception of Crime, as distinguished
from that of Wrong or Tort and from that of Sin, involves the idea of injury to
the state or collective community").
249. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1914); see also, e.g., United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1943) (noting that
punitive damages redress a civil, rather than a criminal, injury); Gruetter v.
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 181 F. 248, 251-52 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1909) (stating
that "[a]n action is 'civil' when it lies to enforce a private right, or redress a
private wrong" even if it allows for punitive damages).
250. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 9 (2001); Grass, supra note 69, at 29293; cf Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) (holding that a contempt
sanction that operates as punishment for "a public wrong" is a criminal
sanction).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 173-175.
252. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 377 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
"crime" as "[a] social harm that the law makes punishable"); id. at 381
(defining "criminal law" as "[tihe body of law dealing with offenses against the
community at large"); see also Whitley v. State, 336 S.E.2d 301, 303 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1985) (noting that "[a] crime is by definition a public wrong against the
sovereign, i.e., the state"); State v. Fahlk, 524 N.W.2d 39, 49 (Neb. 1994)
(stating that "a crime is by definition a public wrong against the State"
(quoting Pratt v. State, 307 S.E.2d 714, 715-16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983))); 21 AM.
JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 474 (1998) (noting that "a crime is by definition a
public wrong, one against all the people of the state").
253. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 298 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168-69 (1963)); Ford, supra note 82, at 17-18. See generally Grass, supra note
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to avoid this conclusion, and to take advantage of the historical
shield against constitutional challenge, is to constrain punitive
damages to their historical role as punishment for private
wrongs.
In sum, if punitive damages were to be cut loose entirely
from their historical moorings in the harm to the plaintiff, and
set adrift in a sea of constitutional doubt, they could no longer
lay claim to the only defense against constitutional challenge
that has sustained them-their historical pedigree. That
pedigree is fundamentally intertwined with the historical
conception of punitive damages as punishment for private
wrongs. Historically, the constitutionality of punitive damages
was expressly dependent upon the fact that they punish
private, not public, wrongs. Once stripped of their pedigree,
and of the pretense that they punish only the private wrong
done to the civil plaintiff, it would be a formidable challenge to
anchor punitive damages in the need to punish the wrong to
society. To do so would be to create an institution that is all
but indistinguishable from criminal punishment, but does not
afford any criminal procedural safeguards. It would be a tall
task-indeed, likely an insurmountable one-to justify them.
V. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF "TOTAL HARM"
PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE
HISTORICAL CONCEPTION
As such, the constitutionality of punitive damages hinges
on their conceptualization as punishment for individual,
private wrongs. Under this conception, there is simply no room
for "total harm" punitive damages. Indeed, these damages are
a by-product of the mistaken notion that a punitive damages
award punishes the wrong to society. A plaintiff seeking to
recover "total harm" punitive damages does so on the ground
that "punitive damages are imposed to punish an outrage to
society" and therefore can be based on "the impact of [the
254
defendant's conduct] on the whole of society."
Still, it might be suggested that the modern practice of
imposing "total harm" punitive damages can be reconciled with
69 (examining the question in exhaustive detail).
254. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 (M.D. Pa. 1974);
see also, e.g., Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th
Cir. 2001) (declaring that "total harm" punitive damages are recoverable
because punitive damages punish "a public wrong" and "not the wrong done to
a single individual").
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the historical conception of punitive damages as punishment
for individual wrongs on the theory that, rather than punishing
the public wrong to society, modern law effectively punishes the
defendant for all of the individual, private wrongs in a single
case brought by a single victim. Even so conceived, however, I
do not believe that the practice can withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
As noted above, the early courts were careful to ensure
that the defendant was not punished for the wrong done to
other victims. If punitive damages are confined to punishment
for purely private wrongs, imposed through private law tort
suits, then they should conform to a private law, bilateral
model of litigation. They should not be imposed for wrongs that
were done to parties that are not before the court. Indeed,
properly understood in reference to their historical roots, these
damages are based in the victim's right to seek punishment for
the private, individualized insult to her personal honor and
dignity.255 That right-the interest sought to be protected by
punitive damages-is intensely private. 256 It would make no
sense to allow a third party with no relationship to the victim
to vindicate it.
In fact, if one agrees that the multiple punishment problem
is of constitutional dimension-that, even if there is no
constitutional problem with a single award of "total harm"
punitive damages, there is a due process limit on the ability of
multiple plaintiffs to each obtain such an award 257-then
255. See supra Part III.
256. But see, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1319-20 (9th Cir.
1980) (employing the modern conception of punitive damages and noting that
"[slo far is this opportunity [to seek punitive damages] from being a
fundamental personal right that it is an interest not truly personal in nature
at all. It is rather a public interest").
257. Although most courts have been slow to recognize this point, see supra
note 10, the claim that the total amount of all punitive awards cannot exceed
the amount necessary to achieve punishment and deterrence appears to follow
inexorably from the Supreme Court's holding in BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore that "[plunitive damages may properly be imposed [only] to further a
State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition" and may not be excessive in relation to those interests. 517 U.S.
559, 568 (1996). It would seem to be a necessary corollary of this proposition
that the state has no constitutional right to impose these damages when its
legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence have already been fully
vindicated by prior punitive damages awards. See, e.g., Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 51 (Tex. 1998) ("[I]f a single
punitive damages award becomes unconstitutional when it can fairly be
categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to a state's legitimate interests in
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allowing a third party to vindicate the victim's personal
interest in seeking punishment might well preclude the victim
from doing so herself, which would be a wholly nonsensical
result under the historical conception of punitive damages.
What is more, allowing a single victim to receive punitive
damages for the private wrongs done to other victims would
present serious procedural due process concerns. Although the
forms of potential unfairness identified in Part I of this article
do not support a constitutional argument under the modern
conception of punitive damages, they are, I believe, of
constitutional dimension if punitive damages are treated as
punishment for private wrongs.
Under the historical conception, punitive damages are
punishment for the wrong done, and the harm caused, to a
particular individual.
Punitive damages for harming an
individual are not, however, recoverable in every instance in
which that individual suffered harm as a result of the
defendant's wanton conduct. 258 Rather, because they are
punishment for the legal wrong-for the individual tort, and
not for the wrongful conduct in the abstract-they remain to
this day recoverable only when the plaintiff can successfully
establish the underlying tort. 259 That is to say, they are
recoverable only when the plaintiff can prevail on an
underlying cause of action for compensatory damages:
A claim for punitive damages must be based on some underlying
cause of action, since, as a general rule, there is no separate and
distinct cause of action for exemplary damages. A claim for punitive
damages cannot stand as a separate cause of action, since it merely
constitutes an element of recovery on the underlying cause of action.
A party who has no cause of action independent of a supposed right to
recover exemplary damages has no cause of action at all. This means
that the sufficiency of the allegation and proof of complainant's cause
of action is to be determined independently of the complainant's claim
for exemplary damages. A complainant who has failed to properly
plead or prove his cause of action is not to be allowed an award of
exemplary damages, because he 16must
establish his cause of action as
0
a prerequisite to such an award.
punishment and deterrence, it follows that the aggregate amount of multiple
awards may also surpass a constitutional threshold.").
258. See infra notes 260-61.
259. See infra notes 260-61.
260. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 741 (1988) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g.,
Mejia v. Motel 6 O.L.P., No. CV-98-07134, 2001 WL 681782, at *16 (D. Nev.
Jan. 24, 2001) ("Indeed, it is a basic legal principle that 'there is no cause of
action for punitive damages.
Punitive or exemplary damages are
remedies .... Punitive damages are merely incident to a cause of action, and
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The recovery of punitive damages is contingent on the
underlying cause of action, and it will be defeated in the
absence of proof of an element of the underlying claim, such as
individual causation, or in the presence of an affirmative
defense, such as contributory negligence or expiration of the
statute of limitations. 261 After all, in those circumstances,
there is no legal wrong to punish.
Thus, if a court allows a single plaintiff to collect "total
harm" punitive damages on the theory that the defendant
should be punished for committing private legal wrongs against
can never be the basis thereof.') (quoting Grieves v. Superior Court of Orange
County, 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 163-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)); Hassoun v.
Cimmino, 126 F. Supp. 2d 353, 372 (D.N.J. 2000) ("Punitive damages are a
remedy incidental to cause of action, not a substantive cause of action in and
of themselves."); Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 342 (Ohio
1994) ("[N]o civil action may be maintained simply for punitive damages.
Rather, punitive damages are awarded as a mere incident of the cause of
action in which they are sought." (citations omitted)). Indeed, as far back as
1888, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that
[nlo right of action for exemplary damages, however, is ever given to
any private individual who has suffered no real or actual damages.
He has no right to maintain an action merely to inflict punishment
upon some supposed wrong-doer. If he has no cause of action
independent of a supposed right to recover exemplary damages, he
has no cause of action at all.
Schippel v. Norton, 16 P. 804, 807 (Kan. 1888). Even those states that have
permitted a plaintiff to recover punitive damages in the absence of an actual
award of compensatory damages, see supra note 203, have made clear that this
rule "does not dispense with the requirement of proving a substantive cause of
action," Gautam v. De Luca, 521 A.2d 1343, 1347 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987).
261. See, e.g., Morris v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., No. EV 95-142-C H/H, 1997 WL
534156, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 1997) ("The claim for punitive damages does
not state an independent cause of action .... Accordingly, because relief is
barred by the statute of limitations for all substantive causes of action, the
additional prayer for punitive damages is also barred."); Terry v. Tyler Pipe
Indus., 645 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (E.D. Tex. 1986) ("Since the plaintiffs
underlying tort claim is time barred, plaintiffs claim for exemplary damages
is likewise barred."); Koenning v. Manco Corp., 521 S.W.2d 691, 703 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975) ("The trial court was correct in granting the motions for instructed
verdict on the issue of exemplary damages, because the tort actions which
form the basis of appellant's request for exemplary damages are barred by the
two year statute of limitations."); Tucker v. Marcus, 418 N.W.2d 818, 823-29
(Wis. 1988) (holding that, where the plaintiff is more than fifty percent
responsible for the accident, and therefore is barred from prevailing on the
underlying action by the state's modified comparative negligence statute, the
plaintiff may not recover punitive damages); Cox v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co.,
630 F. Supp. 95, 101 (D. Kan. 1986) (same); Williams v. Carr, 565 S.W.2d 400,
402 (Ark. 1978) (same); McDonald v. Int'l & G.N. Ry., 22 S.W. 939, 944 (Tex.
1893) (holding that, if the defendant can establish the affirmative defense of
contributory negligence, the plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages).
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numerous individuals, it must require the plaintiff to prove,
and afford the defendant the opportunity to disprove, that the
defendant committed an actionable legal wrong against all of
the alleged victims. Because punitive damages are properly
recoverable for each individual injury only if all of the elements
of the underlying cause of action are present and there are no
affirmative defenses, the defendant must be permitted to
contest causation and other elements of the alleged tort on an
individual basis with respect to each victim and to raise all
affirmative defenses that it might have against particular
victims.
In most circumstances, however, that will be impossible.
In a case brought by a single victim, the evidence at trial will,
of course, focus on the wrong done, and the harm caused, to the
plaintiff. The other wrongs allegedly resulting from the same
course of conduct will be treated only peripherally and painted
with a very broad brush. The plaintiff will probably be
permitted to introduce some very general, most likely
statistical, evidence about these other wrongs, but, because the
trial must necessarily center on the plaintiffs case, no evidence
will be introduced regarding the specifics of any of them. In all
likelihood, no effort will be made to determine, for instance,
how many of the other acts were genuinely wrongful, or how
many of the other supposed injuries were legitimate, and were
in fact caused by the defendant. If the jury were given the
opportunity to inquire into these allegations of peripheral
harms, it might well find that many of them were not what
they seemed. But, as a practical matter, no attempt can be
made to do that in most cases without unacceptably
fragmenting the proceeding into an endless series of "minitrials," distracting the jury from the primary focus of the
dispute. 262 Yet, even though the other harms will not (and
cannot) be proven, the jury will be permitted to punish the
defendant for the whole lot of them.
This the Constitution will not bear, for it contravenes the
most basic principles of procedural due process.
As the
262. See generally FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."); Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. AETNA Cas. &
Sur. Co., 89 F.3d 976, 994 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding the district court's
decision to exclude evidence that, while probative, would require a series of
mini-trials that would cause undue delay and mislead the jury).
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Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear, '"Due process
requires that there be an opportunity to present every available
defense.' 263 "If parties were barred from presenting defenses
and affirmative defenses to claims which have been filed
against them, they would ...be unconstitutionally deprived of

their opportunity to be heard .
,,264 That is precisely the
effect of "total harm" punitive damages-if we conceive of them
as an effort to punish the defendant for a series of individual,
private wrongs.
Indeed, courts have held that, even if a class action were
certified on behalf of all victims of a mass tort, "the jury would
still be required to determine for each class member whether
he or she [was injured], and, if so, whether defendants . . .
caused that [injury] .,265 According to these courts, allowing the
entire plaintiff class to recover without permitting the
defendant to question the elements of each individual claim
would violate the defendant's due process rights. 266 So too
would allowing recovery without permitting the defendant to
raise all defenses that it may have against individual
victims. 267
In vindicating these principles, courts have
expressed concerns that "'[t]he systemic urge to aggregate
litigation must not be allowed to trump our dedication to
individual justice,"'268 and that the advantages of collective
263. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (quoting Am. Sur. Co. v.
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932)).
264. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d
376, 394 (3d Cir. 1994); see also 16B AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 956
(1998).
265. Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also,
e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 342-43 (4th
Cir. 1998); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir.
1988) ("This is an understandably easy trap to fall into in mass tort litigation.
Although many common issues of fact and law will be capable of resolution on
a group basis, individual particularized damages still must be proved on an
individual basis."); In re Dow Corning Corp., 250 B.R. 298, 360 n.34 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 2000).
266. See, e.g., Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 489 n.21; id. at 493 (noting that it "would
abrogate the constitutional rights of defendants" for plaintiffs seeking to
recover for harm to a group of persons to attempt to prove damages and
causation only on a "class-wide basis" (citing In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d
706, 710 (5th Cir.1990))).
267. See, e.g., W. Elec. Co. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976); In
re Masonite Corp. Hardboard Siding Prod. Liab. Litig., 170 F.R.D. 417, 425
(E.D. La. 1997) (explaining that defendants "cannot receive a fair trial without
a process which permits a thorough and discrete presentation of [their]
defenses"); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 372 (D.N.J. 1987).
268. In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1993)
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litigation "must'269yield to a paramount concern for a fair and
impartial trial.
In other words, under current law, if all of the victims were
to join together in a class action, the defendant would be spared
the expense of paying either compensatory or punitive damages
for any class members who could not individually establish
their underlying cause of action. It is difficult to see why the
result should be any different where only a single victim seeks
to punish the defendant for the individual wrongs to the entire
class.
Indeed, it is a fundamental tenet of the common law that,
in those rare circumstances in which the general rule that a
single plaintiff may not recover for the harm caused by the
defendant to numerous third parties 270 is not applicable, the
plaintiff must sue in subrogation. In such cases, the plaintiff
stands in the shoes of the individual victims, and can recover
for the harm to each victim only by proving that victim's claim,
and only if the defendant cannot establish that it would have
had affirmative defenses to a lawsuit brought by that victim. 27 1
Courts have consistently rejected efforts by plaintiffs to make
"an illegitimate end-run around principles of subrogation" 272 by
seeking to recover for the harm done to all victims of the
defendant's wrongful course of conduct without showing that
273
every one of the victims could prevail in their own tort suits.
As Judge Easterbrook has explained, "no rule of law requires
persons whose acts cause harm to cover all of the costs, unless
these acts were legal wrongs," and that proposition cannot

(quoting In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 853 (2d Cir.
1992)).
269. Malcolm v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing

Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (2d Cir. 1990)).
270. See, e.g., Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)
(noting that at common law, "a plaintiff who complained of harm flowing
merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant's
acts" could not recover).

271. See, e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[Pjlaintiffs' right to sue for damages

would be subrogated to the rights of those individual smokers for whom they
provided health care benefits .... [PIlaintiffs would stand in the shoes of the
injured participants and recoup damages from defendants ... only to the
extent defendants were liable to the participants themselves.").

272. Texas Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d
788, 790 (5th Cir. 2000).
273. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818,
821 (7th Cir. 1999).
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the
legitimately be established through "litigation in which
274
plaintiffs seek to strip their adversaries of all defenses."
In the context of "total harm" punitive damages, the
plaintiff is not, of course, seeking to be compensated for the
harm to third parties, and does not have the option of suing in
subrogation. Still, the same fundamental principle would seem
to apply. If due process will not permit a defendant to be
tagged with compensatory damages for the wrongs that it
visited upon a large number of people without being afforded
the opportunity to contest individual elements of each alleged
victim's claim and to raise victim-specific affirmative defenses,
it cannot tolerate the imposition of punitive damages in these
circumstances, especially given that punitive damages for each
wrong are expressly contingent upon an entitlement to
compensatory damages. The defendant can be punished
through the mechanism of punitive damages for the harm
caused to third parties only if it committed legal wrongs
against all of those parties. The only way to establish that it
did so is through individual tort suits (or a collective proceeding
in which the defendant is afforded the opportunity to defend
against each allegation), not litigation in which the plaintiff
effectively strips the defendant of all of its defenses.
For this reason, if punitive damages must be conceived of
as punishment for private, individual wrongs, it would, I
believe, be unconstitutional in most instances to allow a single
plaintiff to recover those damages for the wrongs done to an
entire class of people.
VI. RE-IMPLEMENTING THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTION
Thus, the Constitution requires that punitive damages
awards be limited to the amount necessary to punish the
defendant for the wrong to the individual plaintiff. What does
it mean, as a practical matter, to say that punitive damages
cannot be imposed as punishment for the harm to persons not
before the court? How must the current practice be changed to
vindicate this principle? The answer does not, in my opinion,
lie in any of the proposals for change that have dominated the
discussion of "total harm" punitive damages to this point, as
these proposals have been preoccupied only with the multiple
punishment problem.
274. Id. at 823; see also, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 250 B.R. 298, 359-61
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
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A. THE INADEQUACY OF PRIOR EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE
MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT PROBLEM

In their zeal to protect against excessive multiple
punishment, a herd of commentators and lawmakers have
proposed a variety of reforms to the tort system, many of which
2 75
would be quite revolutionary indeed.
Some courts and commentators have proposed what is
essentially a "double jeopardy" regime: having the jury in the
first

case

that

goes

to

trial

determine

an

appropriate

punishment (if any) for the entire course of conduct, and then
precluding all subsequent juries from imposing punitive
damages.

276

275. In addition to the popular proposals discussed below, a number of
commentators have offered other, unique suggestions. See, e.g., Cordray,
supra note 33, at 309-14 (arguing that serious enforcement of BMIV of North
America, Inc. v. Gore's extraterritoriality limitations will obviate the multiple
punishment problem); N. Todd Leishman, Note, Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading
Corp.: Toward Due Process Limitations on Multiple Awards of Punitive
Damages in Mass Tort Litigation, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 439, 468-73 (arguing in
favor of delaying enforcement of all punitive damages awards for a course of
conduct until all litigation arising out of that conduct has been completed);
John A. Maya, Note, Punitive Damages and the Mass Tort: An Insurance
Alternative to the Consequences of Multiple Liability, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1241, 1262-64 (1991) (arguing in favor of allowing defendants to insure
against all but the first award of punitive damages arising out of a single
course of conduct).
276. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 422-23 (arguing that, with regard to
multiple punitive damages awards, the core principle of double jeopardy is
included in the Due Process guarantee). A version of this reform has been
adopted by statute in Georgia. Section 51-12-5.1(e)(1) of the Georgia Code
states,
In a tort case in which the cause of action arises from product
liability, there shall be no limitation regarding the amount which may
be awarded as punitive damages. Only one award of punitive
damages may be recovered in a court in this state from a defendant
for any act or omission if the cause of action arises from product
liability, regardless of the number of causes of action which may arise
from such act or omission.
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (2000). But see McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
737 F. Supp. 1563, 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (striking down this provision on
equal protection and due process grounds). Some judges have also endorsed
this reform. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1064
(D.N.J. 1989) (concluding that "subjecting defendants to the possibility of
multiple awards of punitive damages for the single course of conduct alleged
in this action would deprive defendants of the fundamental fairness required
by the Due Process Clause"), vacated in part on reconsideration,718 F. Supp.
1233, 1234 (D.N.J. 1989) ("The court abides by its ruling that multiple awards
of punitive damages for a single course of conduct violate the fundamental
fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause, but concludes that equitable
and practical concerns prevent it from fashioning a fair and effective
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Others, recognizing an obvious problem with this
approach-that often the first case will produce a verdict before
the full extent of the defendant's malice and the full scope of
the harm that it caused are understood-have admitted an
exception to the strict, one-bite-at-the-apple rule. Senator
Hatch, who has repeatedly proposed bills "to provide a fair and
balanced resolution to the problem of multiple imposition of
punitive damages," 277 explains that "[u]nder the exception, an
additional award of punitive damages may be permitted if the
court determines that the claimant will offer new and
substantial evidence of previously undiscovered, wrongful
behavior on the part of the defendant. 2 78 If so, the court will
allow a second punitive award, but "must reduce the amount of
punitive damages awarded by the amounts of prior punitive
279
damages based on the same acts."

remedy."). One federal judge phrased the argument in this way:
A defendant has a due process right to be protected against
unlimited multiple punishment for the same act. A defendant in a
civil action has a right to be protected against double recoveries not
because they violate "double jeopardy" but simply because
overlapping damage awards violate that sense of "fundamental
fairness" which lies at the heart of constitutional due process....
Our law on punitive damages was created in an era of single
plaintiff versus single defendant disputes and has not yet been
adapted to the complexity of multi-party litigation. Common sense
dictates that a defendant should not be subjected to multiple civil
punishment for a single act or unified course of conduct which causes
injury to multiple plaintiffs.
In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887, 899-900 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982).
277. 143 CONG. REC. S454 (1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also The
Multiple Punitive Damages Fairness Act of 1997, reprinted in 143 CONG. REC.
S454-55 (1997); The Multiple Punitive Damages Fairness Act, reprintedin 141
CONG. REC. S5148-49 (1995).
278. 143 CONG. REC. S454 (1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
279. Id. In a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, one advocate
of this reform explained that
legislation should allow a plaintiff in a case tried after punitive
damages have already been awarded in a previous case to obtain
punitive damages if the court determines in a pre-trial hearing that
the plaintiff will offer new and substantial evidence of previously
undiscovered, additional wrongful behavior on the part of the
defendant, aside from injury to the claimant.
This exception
preserves a way to augment punishment if it is later discovered that
the original punishment was based on inadequate information. This
situation may occur, for example, where the investigatory process
reveals previously undiscovered documents showing a very
substantial coverup of a product hazard, or where it is found that the
defendant has hidden or destroyed material documents.
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Still other reformers have recognized that, even as
modified, the double jeopardy solution might be too lenient on
defendants. 280 Just as it would be unfair to impose "total harm"
punitive damages on a defendant who would likely win 99 of
the 100 cases arising out its course of conduct, but happens to
lose the first one that comes to trial, 28 1 it would be unduly lax
to let a defendant who would likely be stung with massive
punitive damages in 99 of these cases walk away with little or
no punishment if that 100th case happens to be the first one to
reach a verdict. To combat this problem, these reformers have
proposed that each punitive damages award be calculated by
reference to the entire scope of the defendant's conduct and
then reviewed for excessiveness when considered in
combination with all prior punitive awards for the same course
of conduct. 282 Thus, if the prior award (or awards) amount to
less than what the jury and judge consider to be the optimal
level in the instant case, additional punitive damages will be
allowed up to the point at which the total amount of
punishment is sufficient to punish in full. If the jury's award of
punitive damages (as reviewed for excessiveness by the judge)
is less than or equal to the cumulative amount already
283
awarded, however, no punitive damages will be allowed.
Versions of this popular model have garnered significant
academic support, 284 and have been adopted by statute in
Florida, 285 Ohio, 286 and Missouri, 28 7 proposed by tort reformers
Punitive Damages: Tort Reform and FDA Defenses, Hearings on S. 671 and S.
672 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 101 (1995)
(statement of Victor E. Schwartz); see also, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A.
Behrens, The American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury: A Timely Call for Punitive Damages
Reform, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 263, 281 (1993).
280. See infra notes 284-89.

281. See supra text accompanying notes 34-49.
282. See infra notes 284-89.
283. See infra notes 284-89.
284. See, e.g., Jones et al., supra note 12, at 28-32; Pace, supra note 33, at
1634; Schulkin, supra note 11, at 1800-01; Schwartz & Behrens, supra note
279, at 281.
285. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2002).
286. See Brett M. Wall, Comment, Sympathy for the Devil: How the Ohio
Tort Reform Act Creates a Flawed System of Punitive Damages, 58 OHIO ST.

L.J. 1023, 1032-40 (1997). This provision was recently repealed in response to
a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court striking down the entirety of Ohio's tort
reform bill. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (Anderson 2001); State ex rel.
Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1091 (Ohio 1999).
287.

See Mo. ANN.

STAT.

§ 510.263(4)

(West Supp. 2002) (allowing
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in Congress, 288 and incorporated into the U.L.A.'s Model
289
Punitive Damages Act.
Finally, yet another set of courts and commentators,
perhaps concerned with the inflexibility and potential
inadministrability of the above approaches, has advanced a
more watered-down solution: placing the duty to protect
against multiple punishment in the hands of the jurors by
instructing the jury to consider prior and potential future
punitive awards in fixing the amount of punitive damages to
assess,2 90 or, alternatively, requiring the courts in reviewing
the jury's award for excessiveness at least to consider "the
existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the
291
same conduct, these ... to be taken in mitigation."
All of these proposals have their pros and cons (many are
heavy on the cons), 292 and the debate among academics and
jurists as to which among them is the best has been robust. I
do not join in that discussion in these pages for the simple
reason that none of these proposals is consistent with the
historical (and, I believe, constitutionally mandated)
understanding of punitive damages as punishment for the

defendants to receive a credit for prior punitive damages awards for the same
course of conduct).
288. See The Multiple Punitive Damages Act, reprinted in 140 CONG. REC.
S14836-37 (1994).
289. See MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 10, 14 U.L.A. 70-71 (2001
Supp.).
290. This is the position advanced by the Second Restatement:
Another factor that may affect the amount of punitive damages is
the existence of multiple claims by numerous persons affected by the
wrongdoer's conduct. It seems appropriate [for the jury] to take into
consideration both the punitive damages that have been awarded in
prior suits and those that may be granted in the future, with greater
weight being given to the prior awards.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1977). This reform has also
been endorsed in some form by a number of courts, see Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1998) (collecting cases);
Seltzer, supra note 2, at 58 n.121 (same), commentators, see, e.g., Owen, supra
note 2, at 1319; Jacqueline Perczek, Note, On Efficiency, Punishment,
Deterrence and Fairness:A Survey of Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed
Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 825, 872 (1993), and state
legislatures, see MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 549.20(3) (2000); OR. REV. STAT.

§ 30.925(g) (2001).
291. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991) (discussing and
endorsing the factors employed by the Alabama courts).
292. Judge Friendly's landmark discussion of the multiple punishment
issue anticipated and eloquently critiqued many of these proposals. See
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1967).
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individual wrong. Because all of these proposals fight only half
of the battle, 293 still allowing for an award of "total harm"
punitive damages to a single plaintiff, I believe that they are all
unconstitutional.
The only existing proposal that arguably effectuates (albeit
unintentionally) the historical limitation on punitive damages
is the class action. Finding various faults with the other
proposals just mentioned, a number of commentators have
come to the conclusion that the best way to solve the multiple
punishment problem is to use the class action device to
consolidate lawsuits brought by all of the victims of the
defendant's misconduct in a single proceeding. 294 If all of the
293. Some extant proposals do not even logically tend to solve the multiple
punishment problem. For example, a number of commentators have argued
that the multiple punishment problem can be effectively, if indirectly, solved
simply by employing a handful of procedural safeguards, such as a clear and
convincing evidence standard, designed to protect against unwarranted
punitive damages awards. See, e.g., Seltzer, supra note 2, at 89-91 (endorsing
early dismissal of unsupported punitive damages claims, bifurcation of trials,
and close appellate scrutiny); Wall, supra note 286, at 1050-54 (advocating a
clear and convincing evidence standard, de novo appellate review, and other
reforms); see also, e.g., Scheufler v. Gen. Host Corp., 126 F.3d 1261,-1272 (10th
Cir. 1997) (rejecting a multiple punishment argument in part on the grounds
that the defendant was given "considerable procedural safeguards with respect
to the punitive damage issue"). As the Supreme Court has noted, however,
procedural protections like "the clear and convincing standard of proof[] [are]
important check[s] against unwarranted imposition of punitive damages,
but, ... [they] provide[] no assurance that those whose conduct is sanctionable
by punitive damages are not subjected to punitive damages of arbitrary [or
excessive] amounts." Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 433 (1994).
Imposing additional procedural safeguards might help ensure that punitive
damages are awarded only in appropriate cases, but it will do nothing to
protect against excessive multiple punishments when punitive damages are
appropriate in more than one case arising out the same course of conduct.
Similarly, a number of commentators have argued that the problem
should be solved by imposing draconian substantive reforms not directly
related to multiple punishment. See, e.g., Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839 (noting
the option of abolishing punitive damages altogether in cases in which there is
a danger of multiple punishment "overkill"); Owen, supra note 220, at 48 &
n.227 (arguing in favor of imposing dollar caps to protect against unfair
multiple punishment). These proposals go too far in the other direction,
throwing away the baby with the bath water. As I hope to establish below,
there is a way to ameliorate the multiple punishment problem, and to
vindicate the historical conception of punitive damages, without going to these
extremes.
294. See, e.g., Kevin M. Forde, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Cases:
Recovery on Behalf of a Class, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 397, 450-52 (1984); Janice
Kemp, The Continuing Appeal of Punitive Damages: An Analysis of
Constitutional and Other Challenges to Punitive Damages, Post-Haslip and
Moviel, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 68-70 (1995); Mabry, supra note 33, at 236-
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victims are represented in the same case, and share in a single
award of "total harm" punitive damages, then there is no
danger of multiple punishment. This solution would also
vindicate the historical conception of punitive damages as
punishment for individual wrongs; if all victims are
represented, the award of punitive damages does not punish
the defendant for the harm to victims not before the court.295
As commentators have explained in some detail, however,
the class action device, due to its myriad procedural and
substantive limitations, is usually not appropriate for assessing
punitive damages arising out of mass torts. 296 To begin with,
37; Seltzer, supra note 2, at 61-88; Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1789-97 (1983); Timothy J. Phillips, Note, The Punitive
Damage Class Action: A Solution to the Problem of Multiple Punishment, 1984
U. ILL. L. REV. 153, 163-74; Briggs L. Tobin, Comment, The "Limited
Generosity" Class Action and a Uniform Choice of Law Rule: An Approach to
Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive Damage Adjudication in the Federal
Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457, 465-79 (1989); see also Ryan K. Roth, Note, Mass
Tort Malignancy: In the Search for a Cure, Courts Should Continue to Certify
Mandatory, Settlement Only Class Actions, 79 B.U. L. REV. 577, 623-29 (1999)
(arguing in favor of mandatory, settlement-only class actions).
295. Actually, this will be true only if the punitive award does not attempt
to punish the defendant for the harm to class members who are unable to
prevail on their individual claims. Courts employing the conventional
understanding of punitive damages do not endorse this limitation. See, e.g.,
Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 1996) ("The
punitive damages sought in this case are a single collective right in which the
putative class has a common and undivided interest; the failure of one
plaintiffs claim will increase the share of successful plaintiffs."), overruled on
other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072-77 (11th Cir.
2000) (en banc); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1333-34 (5th Cir.
1995) ("In class actions or multi-plaintiff suits, the defendant's potential
exposure to a large punitive damage award is not affected by the failure of
individual claims as long as one plaintiff is successful."), overruled on other
grounds by H&D Tire & Automotive-Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 227
F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2000).
296. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 20, at 942; Phillips, supra note 12, at 44448; Deborah Deitsch-Perez, Note, Mechanical and Constitutional Problems in
the Certificationof Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort Class Actions Under Rule
23, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 567-71 (1983). The Fifth Circuit has noted that
[a] single class action for recovery of one award of punitive damages
might be an attractive alternative from a theoretical point of view,
but does not appear feasible. Because the losses are so widespread
and disparate, the vital legal issues would not be common to all
plaintiffs, nor would the applicable legal standards be identical in all
jurisdictions in which the cases would arise.
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 527 (5th Cir. 1984). In
Judge Friendly's words,
If there were any way in which all cases could be assembled
before a single court, as in a limitation proceeding in admiralty, it
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only those class actions that are mandatory-that do not allow
potential plaintiffs to opt out of the class and bring their own
"total harm" punitive damages claims-can effectively solve the
multiple punishment problem, as well as effectuate the
historical understanding of punitive damages. 297 The only form
of mandatory class action currently authorized by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that could possibly be applicable to
most punitive damages cases is the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class
action, which is permissible only when "adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class ... would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
298
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests."
Those who advocate using this mechanism to resolve mass tort
claims argue that, due to potential bankruptcy, the defendant's
assets constitute a "limited fund" such that individual punitive
damages verdicts in favor of some plaintiffs will effectively
extinguish the rights of other plaintiffs to receive compensation
for their injuries. 299 That has proven, however, to be a very
difficult proposition to establish in most cases, and appellate
courts have generally refused to accept the certification of
300
mandatory class actions on these grounds.
In addition, even if the requirements for a Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
class action could be met, there are a number of significant
impediments to the use of the class action device to resolve
might be possible for a jury to make one award to be held for
appropriate distribution among all successful plaintiffs, although
even as to this the difficulties are apparent. But we perceive no way
of accomplishing that except by legislation requiring all claims in
respect of drugs supervised by the FDA to be asserted in the federal
courts-hardly a desirable course.
Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839 n.11.
297. See Hines, supra note 20, at 900-01. Classes certified under Rules
23(b)(1)(A), 23(b)(1)(B), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are mandatory. Rule 23(b)(3) governs opt-out classes.
298. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
299. See Hines, supra note 20, at 903-04 (collecting cases in which courts
have relied on "limited fund" theories). Courts have also considered whether a
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class would be appropriate on the theory that, due to the
potential due process constraints on multiple punitive damages awards, the
victims are all seeking essentially the same punitive damages, and an award
to one plaintiff would preclude recovery by others regardless of the financial
situation of the defendant. See id. at 904 (collecting cases). If one accepts the
thesis of this article (that punitive damages awards are proper only in the
amount necessary to punish the defendant for the wrong done to the
individual plaintiff), however, this theory is invalid.
300. See id. at 904-05 (collecting cases).
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punitive damages claims arising out of a single course of
conduct. 301
Included among these impediments are the
following: (1) often, choice of law rules will dictate that
different substantive rules or different procedural standards for
the imposition of punitive damages apply to different plaintiffs'
claims, making it unmanageable to adjudicate all claims in a
single proceeding; 30 2 (2) the Anti-Injunction Act 30 3 makes it
nearly impossible for federal courts to prohibit some potential
class members from bringing suit in state court; 304 (3) even
where the defendant's conduct was identical with respect to all
victims (which is often not the case), individual issues
(including causation and the amount of both compensatory and
punitive damages) will tend to predominate, again making a
class action unworkable; 30 5 and (4) the court might not have
personal jurisdiction over some unwilling absent class members
who do not reside in the forum state, and therefore the decision
30 6
in the class action might not be binding on all victims.
Not surprisingly, then, most appellate courts have refused
to allow class certification in cases of this sort.30 7 Indeed, in its
recent decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,308 the Supreme
Court appears to have all but sounded the death knell for
30 9
mandatory class actions in mass tort cases.
The inadequacy of existing procedures has led numerous
commentators to propose new nationwide class action
3 10
procedures to overcome the multiple punishment problem.
301. See Deitsch-Perez, supra note 296, at 535-54 (noting that due process
may not permit a mandatory class action in these circumstances even if the
requirements of Rule 23 are met).
302. See Hines, supra note 20, at 916-19, 922.

303.

28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).

304. See In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180-83 (8th Cir. 1982)
(striking down a class certification order on these grounds); Hines, supra note
20, at 906-07; Deitsch-Perez, supra note 296, at 563-67.
305. See Hines, supra note 20, at 914-16.
306. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846-47 (1999); Deitsch-

Perez, supra note 296, at 535-47.
307.

See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1002-08, 1010 (3d

Cir. 1986); In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 118083; Hines, supra note 20, at 902-12.
308. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).

309.

See id. at 841-48 (raising serious constitutional, historical, and

practical concerns with mandatory class certification in mass tort cases under

Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
310. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON PUNITIvE DAMAGES,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE ExAMINATION 78-81 (1986); AM. COLL.

666

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:583

We need not answer this question, however, at least not in
order to vindicate the historical conception of punitive
damages. Punitive damages can be effectively limited to the
amount necessary to punish the defendant for the individual
3 11
wrong without revolutionizing the tort system.
B. ELIMINATING "TOTAL-HARM" PUNITIVE DAMAGES
If none of the existing proposals adequately ameliorates
the constitutional infirmity of "total harm" punitive damages
(except in those circumstances in which a class action is
permissible), what does? Again, what does it mean, in practice,
to say that the jury must limit its award of punitive damages to
the amount necessary to punish the defendant for the wrong
done to the plaintiff or plaintiffs before the court?
To begin with, the fact that the jury cannot punish the
defendant for harm to third parties does not mean that the jury
is precluded from considering that harm altogether. Rather, as
the Supreme Court held in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, evidence of additional, related harms that cannot be
punished may be "relevant to the determination of the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct" toward the
plaintiff.3 12 The Gore Court noted that, in this regard, the law
of punitive damages is similar to the criminal law: The jury
can consider evidence of additional wrongdoing as a means of
providing some context for the harm at issue, so as to
determine whether the individual wrong to the victim is more

OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 20-26 (1989); 2 AM.

LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 260-65, 412-39 (1991); Deitsch-Perez, supra note 296, at 567-71; see

also Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed
FederalProcedureAct, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1060-90, app. (1986) (proposing a
federal mass tort procedure act as the "best approach for dealing with the
nationwide litigation crisis engendered by mass-tort lawsuits"); David
Rosenberg, Mandatory-LitigationClass Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 840-66, 896-97 (2002) (concluding that "only
mandatory-litigation class action will minimize the sum of accident costs
through optimal mass tort deterrence and insurance").
311.

I recognize that there are many other reasons why it would be

desirable to create a new form of collective adjudication to resolve mass tort
disputes. I am concerned in these pages, however, only with the issue at
hand-the unconstitutionality of "total harm" punitive damages-which can
be addressed without enacting such a reform.
312. 517 U.S. 559, 574 n.21 (1996) (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993)).
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reprehensible when considered in light of the defendant's entire
course of conduct. 313
It may not, however, punish the
314
additional harm.
For instance, a wrongful refusal to pay
benefits due under an insurance policy would be more
reprehensible-and thus deserving of greater punishment-if it
were a part of a nationwide and company-wide practice of
victimizing elderly or otherwise vulnerable insureds than it
would be if it were simply the result of an isolated act of
wrongdoing by one unsavory employee. 315 The jury should be
allowed to consider the evidence of other wrongful denials in
order to make that determination, but it should not be
permitted to award punitive damages in an amount that it
believes to be necessary to punish the defendant for committing
all of the nationwide wrongs, or indeed, for committing any
wrongs not directly at issue.
313. See id. at 573 n.19, 576-77.
314. See id. In the criminal law, the sentencing court may consider the
defendant's prior wrongful acts, see Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,
747 (1994) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244-52 (1949)), or
uncharged concurrent wrongful conduct, see id. (citing McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84-91 (1986)); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576,
584-86 (1959), but only for the purpose of determining the reprehensibility of
the charged crime. "[T]he enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense
'is not to be viewed as [an] additional penalty for the earlier crimes,' but
instead as 'a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an
aggravated offense because a repetitive one."' Witte v. United States, 515 U.S.
389, 400 (1995) (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)); see also,
e.g., Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895) (holding that "the accused is
not again punished for the first offence" because "the punishment is for the
last offence committed, and it is rendered more severe in consequence of the
situation into which the party had previously brought himself'). The criminal
cases recognize that it would be unconstitutional to actually punish the
defendant for extraneous wrongful conduct without requiring the prosecution
to prove the defendant's guilt of that additional conduct beyond a reasonable
doubt and without offering the defendant a full opportunity, with the
assistance of counsel, to raise all available defenses. See Apprendi v. United
States, 530 U.S. 466, 474-97 (2000) (indicating that the judge may consider
other facts or conduct in imposing a sentence for the wrong at issue, but that it
would violate due process to punish the defendant for the extraneous wrongs
without affording full criminal procedural protections).
315. In the words of the Gore Court,
Certainly, evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in
prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful
would provide relevant support for an argument that strong medicine
is required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law. Our
holdings that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first
offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible
than an individual instance of malfeasance.
517 U.S. at 576-77 (citations omitted).
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Nor should the jury attempt to take away the profits that
accrued to the defendant as the result of wrongs not at issue.
At first glance, it may seem appropriate, in punishing the
wrong to the plaintiff, to remove those profits in order to
achieve the legitimate goal of deterring the defendant from
committing similar wrongs in the future. It is, after all, an
elementary principle of economics that a defendant will
ordinarily engage in wrongful behavior if it has an expectation
that, even after legal sanctions, it will derive a net profit
from its malfeasance. 3 16 That principle, however, when it is
employed for the punitive purpose of achieving complete
deterrence, must concern itself only with the possibility that
the defendant might have escaped liability for the wrong to the
plaintiff; it should not be addressed to the possibility that the
defendant may have profited from additional wrongs to other
persons.
A rational actor will decline to commit a profitable wrong
only if it concludes ex ante that the expected profit from the
wrong is exceeded by the amount of the potential sanction,
multiplied by the probability that the sanction will be imposed
(that is, the probability that the wrong will be detected and
successfully prosecuted). 317 Therefore, where the probability of
sanction is low, the expected punishment for each individual
wrong must be high enough to dissuade the actor from
committing the wrong on the expectation that it will likely get
away with it. Indeed, courts have traditionally recognized that,
in situations in which the wrong may have been hard to detect
(or caused only minor damages to the individual victim, thus
providing little incentive to prosecute), concerns for deterrence
justify setting the penalty at a higher level than would
otherwise be appropriate. 318 That principle, which, to be sure,
316. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 166 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., The Athlone
Press 1970) (1780) ("The value of the punishment must not be less in any case
than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence.").
317. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 207-09 (1968); Hylton, supra note 84, at 42425; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 90, at 887-88.
318. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (noting that higher punitive damages
"may... be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect," or where "a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic
damages"); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (Opinion of Scalia,
J.) ("[Slince deterrent effect depends not only upon the amount of the penalty
but upon its certainty, crimes that are less grave but significantly more
difficult to detect may warrant substantially higher penalties.").
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can sometimes yield very high punitive damages, focuses only
on the nature of the wrong done to the plaintiff. It does not ask
how many other wrongs the defendant committed, and it does
not concern itself with whether or not the defendant will, in
fact, escape liability for other wrongs.
To engage in the latter exercise is to punish the other
wrongs. Imagine, for instance, a criminal case in which the
police catch a car thief in the act of stealing a car and, in the
course of coercing an involuntary and inadmissible confession
out of him, learn that he has stolen seven other cars. In these
circumstances, it would be appropriate to punish the defendant
only for the single theft that could be established without
recourse to the unconstitutional confession. That punishment
already takes into account the possibility that the defendant
might have gotten away with the crime; we do not simply fine
the defendant in an amount equal to the resale value of the
vehicle. In addition, the fact that the defendant has a history
of criminal behavior may lead us to impose a sentence at the
high end of the range authorized for a single auto theft. It
would clearly be impermissible, however, to say that because
we believe that the defendant has gotten away with seven other
auto thefts, and therefore derived a net benefit from his
thievery, we will punish him in the name of deterrence eight
times as hard for the one theft that we can prove than we
would have if we could punish him separately for each of the
other thefts, or if we believed that this was the only theft that
he had committed. In these circumstances, all of the semantic
gymnastics in the world cannot get around the fact that we
manifestly would be punishing the defendant for all eight
thefts; what we would really be saying is that, to ensure that
the defendant is fully deterred, we will punish the wrongs done
to all of the victims. This is precisely what the Constitution does not permit. The deterrence tail cannot wag the
punishment dog.3 19 Any attempt to ensure that the defendant
319. Cf Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128, 133
(1956) ("By definition, punitive damages are based upon the degree of the
defendant's culpability."). Indeed, courts have traditionally recognized that
the goal of deterrence is achieved only through the mechanism of retributive
punishment. See, e.g., Tiblier v. Alford, 12 F. 262, 265 (C.C.E.D. La. 1882)
("Exemplary or punitory damages are... allowed... as a punishment, to
deter others from like conduct."); Stinson v. Buisson, 17 La. 567, 572 (1841)
(declaring that punitive damages "are given as an example to deter others
from similar conduct in future, and really for the purpose of punishing men for
their bad motives and intentions"); Harmon v. Harmon, 61 Me. 233, 234 (1873)
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is made to answer for, and does not profit from, a past wrong is
320
an act of punishment for that wrong.
Indeed, the BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore decision
specifically rejects the notion that concerns for deterrence can
justify taking away the defendant's profits from the harm done
to other victims where the court is not empowered to punish
the defendant for harming those victims. Recall that, in Gore,
the Court held that concerns for federalism and comity dictate
that a state does not have the power to punish out-of-state
conduct. 321 Thus, the Court refused to allow the plaintiff to
collect punitive damages in an amount that was designed to
take away the defendant's nationwide profits from its wrongful
course of conduct, 322 notwithstanding the plaintiffs argument
that, absent a disgorgement of nationwide profits, the company
would not have sufficient incentive to change its company-wide
(noting that the jury was charged that punitive damages are awarded "for the
purpose of punishment, so that it shall be an example that he will not be likely
to do the thing again"); Hagan v. Providence & Worcester R.R., 3 R.I. 88, 91
(1854) (explaining that punitive damages are awarded upon evidence of
wickedness "which for the good of society and warning to the individual, ought
to be punished"); Watts v. S. Bound R.R., 38 S.E. 240, 242 (S.C. 1901) (noting
that punitive damages "operat[e] as a deterring punishment to the wrongdoer,
and as a warning to others"); Willis v. McNeill, 57 Tex. 465, 471 (1882)
(observing that punitive damages go "by way of punishment to the plaintiffs as
an example to the public to prevent a repetition of the act"). As the Iowa
Supreme Court explained in 1875, the deterrent effect of punitive damages "is
but an incident" of the retributive punishment. Ward v. Ward, 41 Iowa 686,
688 (1875); see also id. ("[O]ne of the objects of punishment in all cases is to
prevent the repetition of the crime by the culprit and others. The example of
punishment, it is presumed, will deter others from the commission of the
offense in the future.").
320. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979)
(observing that in taking away the profits from the entire course of conduct,
the "jurors apparently responded to an invitation to punish Sturm, Ruger for
all wrongs committed against all purchasers and users of its products, rather
than for the wrong done to this particular plaintiff"), on reh'g, 615 P.2d 621
(Alaska 1980); Owen, supra note 220, at 51 n.243 ("How the profitability of the
misconduct should figure into the calculation of a punitive damages award is
an aspect of the broader question whether the defendant should be forced to
redress the totality of its wrong to the public in a single action and a single
punitive damages award."); see also McDaniel v. Walker, 24 S.E. 378, 381 (S.C.
1896) (instructing the jury that, "as a matter of justice, the law permits
further compensation, not only to make up to the plaintiff for all injury he has
sustained, but to prevent the defendant from deriving any profit from the
wrongful act complained of, at the expense of the plaintiff' (emphasis added)).
321. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
322. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 n.21 (holding that "it was error for the jury
to use the number of sales in other States as a multiplier in computing the
amount of its punitive sanction").
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policy, and therefore would not alter its conduct. 323
That said, let us return to the question at hand: what, as a
practical matter, do we have to change in order to vindicate the
constitutional principle that the jury may punish the defendant
only for the harm done to the plaintiff? In fact, not all that
much change is required.
Historically, the jury had a great deal of leeway in
awarding punitive damages. The Supreme Court repeatedly
noted in the nineteenth century that "[t]he discretion of the
jury in such cases is not controlled by any very definite
rules." 324 "[No precise rule of law fixes the recoverable
damages[;] it is the peculiar function of the jury to determine
the amount by their verdict."325
The jury was usually
instructed to render an award of punitive damages in an
amount that would be sufficient to punish the defendant for the
wrong done to the plaintiff, and would deter the defendant and
others from committing similar wrongs in the future.32 6 Little
guidance beyond that was typically given.
This nearly
unfettered discretion being so well established, the Court has
long held that no constitutional infirmity lies in the fact that
the states do not provide the jury with a detailed "rule for
measuring damages." 32 7 As recently as 1991, the Court found
nothing unconstitutional about bare-bones instructions of this
sort, so long as the courts employ, as a check on the jury's
discretion, post-trial and appellate review procedures to
"ensure that the award 'does not exceed an amount that will
328
accomplish society's goals of punishment and deterrence."'
In light of these cases, it would be an uphill battle to argue
that the Constitution requires monumental changes to our
system of awarding punitive damages-and I make no such
argument here. The fact that the Constitution mandates that
the jury limit its award of punitive damages to the amount
necessary to punish the defendant for the wrong done to the
plaintiff does not mean that we need new legislation or a
323. See id. at 572 n.18, 573-74.
324. Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885); see also, e.g., Day v.
Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852) ("This has been always left to

the discretion of the jury, as the degree of punishment to be thus inflicted
must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case.").
325.
326.

Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).
See Pac. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15, 19 (1991).

327. Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 285 (1912).
328. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21 (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218, 222 (Ala. 1989)).
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radical reworking of our entire tort system. Instead, all that
we need is a return to basics.
Along these lines, this Article does not address the difficult
and important normative questions of how much is enough to
punish and deter, 329 how the jury should go about reaching that
conclusion, 330 or whether the jury as an institution is capable of
performing its duty in a competent fashion at all. 33 1 Nor does it

join in the longstanding debate about whether punitive
damages should be substantially reformed 332 or even abolished
altogether. 333 Rather, it leaves the law as it has always been,
trusting (for better or for worse) the determination of how
much the defendant should be forced to pay in the name of
retribution and deterrence to the broad discretion of the jury,

329. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 84, at 421 (noting varying approaches to
computing optimal deterrence); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 90, at 890-91
(proposing guidelines for achieving optimal deterrence through punitive
damages).
330. See, e.g., David Crump, Evidence, Economics and Ethics: What
Information Should Jurors be Given to Determine the Amount of a PunitiveDamage Award?, 57 MD. L. REV. 174, 230 (1998) ("What is striking... is that
sometimes jurors are given virtually no information that is closely associated
with the deterrence gap when asked to determine punitive awards."); Polinsky
& Shavell, supra note 90, at 957-62 (proposing complex jury instructions to
assist the jury in determining an economically efficient outcome).
331. See, e.g., Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive
Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179, 217 (1998) (opining that "the wisdom of a
judge is preferable in this instance to the collective wisdom of the jury"); Cass
R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2093 (1998) (exploring the limitations
of the jury as an institution for awarding punitive damages); W. Kip Viscusi,
The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 316
(2001) (concluding on the basis of experimental data that juries are generally
incapable of setting the amount of punitive damages in an efficient manner).
332. Compare Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 279, at 281 (proposing
substantial reforms to our system of awarding punitive damages), and Pace,
supra note 33, at 1607 (same), with Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The
Historical Continuity of Punitive Damage Awards: Reforming the Tort
Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1330 (1993) (defending the status quo).
333. Compare Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in
Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 61 (1990) (criticizing the empirical case
against punitive damages), and David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive
Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 359 (1998) (rebutting the case for abolishing
punitive damages and arguing that punitive damages serve important
retributive and deterrent goals), with John D. Ingram, Punitive Damages
Should be Abolished, 17 CAP. U. L. REV. 205, 213 (1988) (arguing that
punitive damages no longer make sense in our modern civil legal system), and
James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1171 (1984) (arguing that
punitive damages no longer serve any useful goals).
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with the simple change that the jury resume its traditional role
of punishing only the wrong to the plaintiff.
This traditional role is not entirely forgotten today. 334 The
Second Circuit remarked only a decade ago that the
"traditional manner" of awarding punitive damages in cases of
mass torts or product liability involves the jurors "confining
their consideration of the appropriate punishment to the injury
335
inflicted upon the plaintiffs in each particular litigation."
Over the past fifteen years, a number of courts have refused to
consider multiple punishment claims on the ground that, in
fact, the jury in the prior case did not award "total harm"
punitive damages at all. 336 Rather, "the evidence demonstrated
that the punitive damage awards were only for the harm
inflicted upon the specific plaintiffs" in each case. 337 Still, in
334. In addition to the few cases that have outright rejected "total harm"
punitive damages and the corresponding modern conception of punitive
damages as punishment for public wrongs, see supra Part III.C, one can
stumble upon the occasional modern case that seems to vindicate the
historical principle, albeit without much analysis. For instance, Pridemark
Custom Plating,Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 702 S.W.2d 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), was
a product liability action brought by the lessor and lessee of a burned-down
factory against the manufacturer of the highly flammable insulation that
caused the accident. At trial, the plaintiffs introduced evidence that an
employee had died in the fire and urged the jury in closing arguments to
punish the defendant for that death. Id. at 573. The court held that the
admission of this evidence was erroneous because "punitive damages ... are to
punish the defendant in the interest of society for the acts againstthe plaintiff
who was damaged thereby." Id. (emphasis added). In a wrongful death action
brought by the employee's family, such evidence would surely be relevant, but
in the instant case, it "had no probative value in proving the nature of
defendant's acts toward the plaintiffs and the resulting damages." Id. The
court would have done better to speak in terms of the "wrong" to the plaintiffs,
rather than the "acts" directed against them (since many legal wrongs can
flow from the same act, and punitive damages historically went to punish only
the wrong to the plaintiff), and it may have gone too far in excluding the
evidence altogether, but it was correct to recognize that the jury could not
properly punish the defendant for the wrongful death.
335. Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir.
1990).
336. See infra note 337.
337. Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 591 A.2d 544, 557 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991), affd in part & rev'd in part, 604 A.2d 47 (Md. 1992); see also, e.g., King
v. Armstrong World Indus., 906 F.2d 1022, 1030 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Punitive
damages awarded.., have reflected the harm inflicted upon only the plaintiffs
in those suits."); Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1466 (D. Haw.
1989) ("[Tlhere is no evidence...

that the juries ...

awarded [punitive]

damages for the full extent of defendants' allegedly outrageous and repetitive
behavior."). These courts did not, however, suggest that it would have been
impermissible for the prior jury to have done otherwise.
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recent years, it has become more and more common for the
courts to abandon the historical conception of punitive damages
in favor of allowing the plaintiff to seek and recover "total
3 38
harm" punitive damages.
We need to reverse that trend, and to get away from the
notion-so often repeated that it seems almost axiomatic these
days-that punitive damages are designed to punish the
defendant for engaging in wrongful conduct. 339 It is that notion
that leads courts to believe that every victim of a defendant's
wrongdoing has a claim to punitive damages in an amount that
is sufficient to punish the entire scheme. 340 It is that notion
that leads plaintiffs to ask for "total harm" punitive damages,
and juries to award them. Indeed, even where the plaintiffs
attorney is not explicit in asking the jury to punish the
defendant for harming others, a jury that sees itself as
punishing the defendant for committing the wanton act or
series of acts is still naturally inclined to do so. That is why so
many judges and commentators worry about multiple
punishment.
We need to be much more careful with our language and
more explicit in recognizing that, in fact, the purpose of
punitive damages is not to punish the defendant for its
wrongful act, but rather to punish the defendant for the wrong
done, and the injury caused, to the plaintiff. In many
circumstances, this distinction is mere semantics. That is
perhaps the explanation for the emergence of the modern
conception of punitive damages. To be sure, one can unearth
occasional early cases that speak of punitive damages as

338.
339.

See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)

("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[Punitive damages] are not

compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.").
340.

See, e.g., Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th

Cir. 1996) (stating that "where the wrong to the individual is small but the
course of conduct is large, the potential punitive damages would be to punish
and deter the course of conduct as a whole"), overruled on other grounds by

Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000); Allen v. R &
H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1995) ("As punitive damages
are collective awards, each plaintiff has an integrated right to the full amount
of an award."), overruled on other grounds by H&D Tire & Automotive-

Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2000).
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punishment for the wrongful act or conduct. 34 1 Loose language
of that sort was sufficient when there was no call for greater
precision-which was most of the time, as the vast majority of
early cases involved harm to only one victim. 342 When it
mattered, however, the courts generally made the distinction
clear. 343 Subsequently, however, courts and commentators
seized upon the loose language as articulating the true nature
and purpose of punitive damages, and employed it to sanction
the practice of awarding punitive damages based on the total
harm to society-completely losing sight of the fundamental
distinction between punishment for wrongful conduct and
punishment for private wrongs. 344 We need to find that
distinction again.
In other words, we can continue to afford the jury ample
discretion to fix an appropriate punishment, but we must make
sure that the jury is properly informed of what, exactly, it is
supposed to be punishing. In addition, we must also ensure
that the courts, in exercising their constitutionally mandated
role as a check on the jury, enforce the limit on the scope of the
jury's penal authority.
This can be done by taking several simple procedural steps.
First, contrary to the prevailing current practice, the plaintiffs
attorney should not be permitted to ask the jury to punish the
defendant for the full scope of the harm caused by its actions,
or indeed, to punish the defendant for the harm caused to
anyone other than the actual plaintiff or plaintiffs before the
court. Second, and again contrary to the current practice, the
plaintiff's attorney should not be permitted to ask the jury to
take away the defendant's profits from its entire course of
conduct, or indeed, to take away the profits that inured to the
defendant from wrongs done to anyone other than the plaintiff
or plaintiffs before the court.
In addition, the trial court should instruct the jury that
punitive damages punish the defendant for the wrong done to
the plaintiff.345 The jury should be instructed that it may
341. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 22 S.W. 358, 360 (Mo. 1893)
(stating that punitive damages are awarded "for the purpose of punishing the
defendant for the wrongful act").
342. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d. Cir.
1967).
343. See supra Part III.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6, 62-73.
345. See, e.g., N. Ohio Trac. & L. Co. v. Peterson, 43 Ohio Civ. Dec. 14, 15
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consider the harm to other victims only for the purpose of
ascertaining the degree of reprehensibility of the wrong to the
plaintiff, but it may not punish the defendant for the wrong
done, or the harm caused, to persons not before the court; nor
should it endeavor to remove the profits illicitly gained at the
expense of victims not before the court.
Historically, when the courts admitted evidence of harm
that the defendant's wrongful act or course of conduct caused to
others, they instructed the jury along precisely these lines. For
instance, in the eighteenth century English seduction case of
Tullidge v. Wade,346 discussed above, the court upheld the
punitive award to the father only because
[ulpon summing up the evidence to the jury, the Judge... told them
over and over again, that, in giving damages in this action, they must
not consider the injury done to [the daughter] as to the promise of
marriage, but must leave that matter quite out of the question,
because 347
[the daughter] may have another sort of action upon that

promise.

Similarly, in Phelin v. Kenderdine,348 a nineteenth-century
American seduction case brought by an aggrieved father, also
discussed above, 349 the court allowed the jury to consider the
defendant's breach of a promise of marriage to the daughter
insofar as it made the wrong to the father more reprehensible,
but it held that "the defendant has a right to require in regard
to such evidence [an instruction] that the jury must not award
to the father any part of the damages which belong to the
daughter, by reason of the breach of the contract of
marriage." 350 Indeed, it is a familiar principle that, when
evidence is admitted for one purpose, but it would violate the
Constitution for the jury to consider it for a different purpose,
the court should instruct the jury not to consider the evidence
for the impermissible purpose. 35 1
(Ohio Cir. Ct. 1908) ("'fflou may award to plaintiff punitive or exemplary

damages; that is, damages in addition to compensatory damages, for the
purpose of punishing the defendant for the wrong done to plaintiff

....

(quoting the trial court's jury instructions)).
346. 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1769).
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 909.
20 Pa. 354 (1853).
See supra text accompanying notes 157-161.
Id. at 362 (emphasis added and omitted).
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414-15 (1985) (holding

that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the introduction of the
confession of an accomplice for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting the
defendant's testimony that his own confession was coercively derived from the
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Finally, in post-trial and appellate proceedings, the courts
should review the trial record and the punitive award first to
ensure that the award was not based on an effort to punish the
defendant for the wrong done to persons other than the
plaintiff or to take away the profits gained at the expense of
persons other than the plaintiff,352 and second to determine

whether the award is excessive in light of the legitimate state
interest in punishing the defendant for the wrong done to the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff alone. 353 Of course, concerns for
deterrence allow the courts to justify a higher punitive
damages award where the harm was difficult to detect or the
wrongful conduct caused only minimal damages to each
individual victim. 354 Moreover, like the jury, the reviewing

accomplice's statement, but only if the jury is instructed not to consider the
confession for the truth of the matter asserted); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459
U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) ("[Ilntroduction of the defendant's prior conviction did
not pose a sufficient danger of unfairness to the defendant ...in part because
such evidence was accompanied by instructions limiting the jury's use of the
conviction to sentence enhancement."); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224
(1971) (holding that the state may introduce statements elicited from a
defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), for the
purpose of impeachment, so long as the jury is instructed that such evidence
may not be considered for the purpose of determining guilt).
352. See Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90, 91 (1791) (suggesting that
reversal would be appropriate in a seduction action brought by the father if
the punitive damages award also attempted to punish the wrong done to the
daughter); Brownell v. McEwen, 5 Denio 367, 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848)
(indicating that, where the jury in a seduction case brought by the father also
heard evidence of a possible breach of a promise to marry, reversal would be
appropriate if it could be established that the jury actually attempted to
punish both the wrong to the father and the wrong to the daughter); see also,
e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 424 (1994) (holding that a
reviewing court has a duty to strike down a punitive award if it appears that
the jury "'acted from improper motives" (quoting Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760,
762 (C.C. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578) (Story, J.))); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 467 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that a reviewing court should look to
the size of the award, "as well as direct evidence from the trial record," to
determine whether the jury based the amount of its punitive damages award
on improper considerations); Freeman v. A & M Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 359
S.E.2d 532, 536 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) ("Like an award of actual damages, an
award of punitive damages will be set aside if it ...appears to be the result
of... improper considerations."); Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 237 P. 255, 277
(Wyo. 1925) (holding that, when a jury based the amount of its punitive
damages award on improper considerations, reversal is required).
353. See Blunt, 3 F. Cas. at 761-62 (Story, J.) (holding that a reviewing
court has a duty to strike down a punitive award that is "excessive in relation
to the ...

injury").

354. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
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courts may consider the evidence of additional harm in order to
ascertain the reprehensibility of the wrong at issue. They
should not, however, uphold an excessive verdict on the ground
that it was an acceptable punishment for the harm to others, or
that it is reasonable when considered in connection with the
profits that the defendant gained from its entire course of
wrongful conduct.
CONCLUSION
The practice of asking the jury in a case brought by a
single victim of a defendant's wrongful course of conduct to
award punitive damages in an amount that will punish the
entire illicit scheme has fostered volumes of academic and
judicial commentary advancing numerous complex and farranging proposals in the name of protecting the defendant
against excessive multiple punitive damages awards for the
same wrongdoing. At once, these proposals go too far and not
far enough. They fall short in the sense that they fail to
recognize that it is not just the prospect of multiple punishment
that makes these "total harm" punitive damages awards
unconstitutional; even a single such award violates due process
because it impermissibly punishes the defendant for harm
caused to society and to persons not before the court. At the
same time, they reach too far in the sense that they assume
that the only solution lies in radical (and sometimes
convoluted) modifications to the traditional procedures for
awarding punitive damages. In fact, the exact opposite is true.
The constitutional infirmity can be ameliorated through a
simple return to the historical understanding of punitive
damages as punishment only for the wrong done to the
plaintiff.

